In this episode, we discuss:
*How the Germans and Soviets organized their forces in and near Ukraine on the eve of Operation Barbarossa and the principal senior commanders on each side
*Why the Southwestern Front put up a stouter resistance against Army Group South than did its counterparts against Army Groups North and Center
*The Uman encirclement and what this defeat meant for the Soviets
*The likelihood of a Soviet soldier captured in 1941 surviving until 1945
*The 3-month siege of the city of Odessa
*The capture of Crimea
*Where the Soviets thought the main German blow would land in the summer of 1942 and why
*The Second Battle of Kharkov
*The role the Dneper River plays in the fighting in Ukraine in 1941 and 1943
*Where the war in Ukraine stood by the end of 1943
*The Cherkassy Pocket
*Hube’s Wandering Pocket
*Stalin's role in military operations and how this changed over time
*Stalin’s working relationships with his generals and how these evolved
*Aspects of the war in Ukraine in WWII that Richard would like to research
*Two things Richard wants U.S. Marines and soldiers to know about Ukraine in World War II
*Some parallels between the fighting in Ukraine in WWII and the war there now
*Richard's assessment of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries’ performance so far
*How likely we are to see the war escalate to involve NATO forces
Links
The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940 by Richard Harrison
Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and Theories of G.S. Isserson by Richard Harrison
The Soviet Army High Commands in War and Peace, 1941–1992 by Richard Harrison
When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler by David Glantz and Jonathan House
Errata
Near the beginning of the interview, I ask Richard about the “German” siege of Odessa in 1941. In fact, the Romanians besieged and captured the city, with some assistance from the Germans.
