In this case, the court considered this issue: Should challenges by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from the requirements of the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard program be heard exclusively in the U-S Court of Appeals for the D-C Circuit because the agency’s denial actions are “nationally applicable” or “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect”?
The case was decided on June 18, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that EPA’s denials of small refinery exemption petitions from renewable fuel requirements must be challenged in the D-C Circuit because they are locally applicable actions based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
The Clean Air Act establishes a tripartite venue system for reviewing EPA actions. “Nationally applicable” EPA actions must be challenged exclusively in the D-C Circuit, while “locally or regionally applicable” actions ordinarily belong in regional courts of appeals. However, locally or regionally applicable actions that are “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” must be reviewed in the D-C Circuit if EPA finds and publishes that such basis exists. To identify the relevant “action” for venue purposes, courts must look to the specific statutory authority EPA is exercising rather than how EPA packages its decisions. Each EPA denial of an individual refinery’s exemption petition constitutes its own “action” because the Clean Air Act allows each small refinery to petition EPA separately and requires EPA to act on each petition. An action is “nationally applicable” if it applies on its face throughout the entire country; alternatively, it is “locally or regionally applicable” if it applies only to particular places. EPA’s denial of a single refinery’s exemption petition applies only to that specific refinery in a particular location, making such denials paradigmatically locally or regionally applicable actions.
The “nationwide scope or effect” exception applies because EPA’s statutory interpretation and economic theory formed the core basis for its denials. A “determination” refers to EPA’s justifications for taking action, and determinations have nationwide “scope” if they apply throughout the country as a legal matter or nationwide “effect” if they apply as a practical matter. An EPA action is “based on” such a determination only if that determination lies at the core of the agency action and forms the primary explanation for EPA’s decision—requiring more than but-for causation. EPA’s interpretation of “disproportionate economic hardship” and its RIN passthrough theory constitute clear determinations of nationwide scope because they apply generically to all refineries regardless of location. These determinations formed the core basis for EPA’s denials because EPA used them to reach a presumptive resolution to deny all petitions, then considered refinery-specific factors only to confirm it had no reason to depart from this presumptive disposition. Where EPA relies on determinations of nationwide scope or effect to reach a presumptive resolution, those determinations qualify as the primary driver of its decision, making EPA’s confirmatory review of refinery-specific facts merely peripheral by comparison.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, arguing that the Clean Air Act’s substantive provisions do not call for EPA to make determinations of nationwide scope or effect when acting on individual small refinery hardship petitions, and that the majority’s new test will make simple venue questions unnecessarily difficult and expensive to resolve.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
