Should central banks like the Federal Reserve consider and adapt to fiscal policy – directly, indirectly, preemptively, or belatedly?
- Heterogeneous-Agent New Keynesian (HANK) advanced models
- Large fiscal deficits in unstable economies (Turkey '90s/'00s; Mexico '94; Russia '98; Brazil '99; Argentina '01)
- Large fiscal deficits in stable economies (wealth effect vs inflation expectations vs monetary counterbalance)
- Central bank response impacts (preemptive vs coincident vs lagging)
- Loose fiscal vs tight monetary policy (Reagan/Volcker '80s)
- Central bank independence vs fiscal reaction function
This podcast is Al-generated with NotebookLM, using the following sources, research, and analysis:
- Inflation Scares and Forecast-Based Monetary Policy (Williams, 2003.07)
- Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policies: Why Central Bankers Worry About Government Budgets (Hilbers, 2005.01)
- International Macroeconomics: From the Great Financial Crisis to COVID-19, and Beyond (Gourinchas, 2022.08)
- Interview: The Yellen View (Yellen, 2005)
- Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest (NY Fed)
- Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions for Central Bankers (Leeper, 2023.02)
- Navigating by Falling Stars: Monetary Policy with Fiscally Driven Natural Rates (Campos/Fernandez-Villaverde/Nuño/Paz, (2025.06)
- New Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget Deficits and Debt (Laubach, 2003.12)
- A Taylor Rule for Fiscal Policy (Kendricka/Ammanb, 2011.01)
- Underlying Trends in the U.S. Neutral Interest Rate (Carvalho/Ferrero/Mazin/Nechio, 2025.04)
# economics econometrics r* r-star equilibrium policy rates Taylor Rule Laubach-Williams (LW) Holston-Laubach-Williams (HLW) Zaman Model Vasicek Interest Rate Model
