If causation is not fundamental, what keeps reality from turning into chaos with things randomly popping into existence, and does the kalām’s claim that whatever begins to exist has a cause really explain the order we see?
My links: https://linktr.ee/frictionphilosophy.
1. Guest
Dan Linford is lecturer at Old Dominion University, Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies. His work focuses on physics and the philosophy of physics, philosophy of religion.
2. Interview Summary
In this interview, Dan Linford discusses his paper “Without microphysical causation, just anything cannot begin to exist just anywhere,” motivated in part by debates around the causal principle often associated with the kalām cosmological argument. He frames the core question as whether the order we observe in the universe really requires causation—specifically, whether “whatever begins to exist must have a cause”—or whether there are non-causal ways to explain why we don’t see arbitrary “raging tigers” popping into existence out of nowhere.
A major focus is a traditional line of support for the causal principle that Linford labels the Hobbes–Hume–Edwards–Pryor principle (HPP): roughly, if the causal principle were false, we’d lack a good explanation for why things don’t begin to exist at arbitrary times, places, in arbitrary numbers, and of arbitrary kinds. Linford and the host also pause on how strong the causal principle is supposed to be (mere accident vs physical/metaphysical necessity), and note that once you add extra metaphysical commitments (the interview uses the A-theory of time as an example), the principle can become either harder to justify or even vacuously true in a way that won’t do the work causal-principle defenders want.
Linford then develops an alternative picture—drawing on “neo-Russellian” themes—on which causation isn’t fundamental to microphysics (for Russell-style reasons like time-symmetry), but causal talk remains useful in the special sciences for identifying “effective strategies” (a Cartwright-inspired point about intervention vs mere correlation). The upshot is that even if microphysical causation fails, it doesn’t follow that “anything goes”: what can begin to exist is still constrained by nomic (law-based), metaphysical, and logical principles, and those constraints can underwrite explanations of why tigers (etc.) don’t pop into existence. He also addresses a familiar objection to Humean-style views—why expect an “ordered continuation” of the mosaic rather than chaos—by appealing to Lewis-style similarity/“closeness” considerations (and related constraints on probability talk), arguing that the standard HPP-based worry doesn’t straightforwardly land.
3. Interview Chapters
00:00 - Intro
00:30 - Overview
04:40 - How strong is the causal principle?
10:15 - The Hobbes-Edwards-Prior (HEP) principle
16:20 - Expecting chaos vs. no explanation
20:35 - What if explanation just runs out?
23:37 - Neo-Russellianism
32:30 - Fundamental physics
36:13 - Time asymmetries in fundamental physics?
40:49 - The main challenge to Neo-Russellianism
44:23 - Do microphysical things "begin to exist"?
51:33 - Law-based explanations without causation
57:22 - Are laws more mysterious than causes?
1:03:41 - The Neo-Humean response
1:14:35 - Where does metaphysical explanation end?
1:17:37 - Theological connections and brute facts
1:21:45 - Final thoughts
1:22:14 - Value of philosophy
1:24:30 - Conclusion
