Can a perceptual experience be rational or irrational in the same way a belief can, and what happens when fear or prejudice shapes what you literally see?
My links: https://linktr.ee/frictionphilosophy.
1. Guest
Susanna Siegel is Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, and her work focuses on mind, epistemology, perception, and related topics.
2. Interview Summary
Susanna Siegel lays out and defends the central idea of The Rationality of Perception: perceptual experiences themselves can be rational or irrational, and so can be appropriate targets of epistemic “reactive attitudes,” not just beliefs. She suggests this hasn’t been mainstream largely because perception feels “given”—you open your eyes and the world simply shows up—so the mind’s constructive contribution is easy to miss. Once you take seriously what the sciences of perception reveal about that constructive machinery, the live philosophical question becomes: which constructive aspects are epistemically assessable, and why?
A big part of the interview is her model for how experiences can inherit epistemic status from the processes that generate them. She motivates the “downgrade” thesis: when an experience is produced as the conclusion of a psychologically real-time inference that relies on epistemically bad “premises” (misinformation, prejudice, fear), that very same type of experience has less justificatory power than it otherwise would. To make the inference idea plausible, she resists the “reckoning” view on which inference requires an extra, articulable state that one’s premises support one’s conclusion; instead, she emphasizes a distinctive inferential responsiveness that can occur without any such reckoning state. She also pushes back on treating “association” as a grab-bag category for everything non-inferential, distinguishing psychologist-style associative learning from broader (often misleading) philosophical uses—and she sketches an “outlook + input → what comes to mind” (XYZ) framework she’s developing in a book on salience.
The conversation then turns to objections and real-world stakes. One thread asks whether the “bad-making feature” in biased perception might instead be framed in terms of prior obligations or failures of agency (rather than the inference structure itself), and Siegel teases apart when that would be an add-on versus a substitute explanation. Another thread concerns how to weigh intuitive “clear cases” (like familiar “tomato” scenarios) against more morally charged examples, and Siegel situates her view as neither straightforward reliabilism nor simple introspection-based internalism—many epistemically relevant processes can be “internal to the mind” while still inaccessible to introspection. She stresses that once you focus on high-stakes cases—e.g., perception shaped by fear and prejudice in policing—the framework has implications for how we should think about standards like the “reasonable person” in law. Closing out, she ties the project to a broader picture of philosophy’s value: as an intellectual practice that clarifies problems by mapping the space of potential solutions, and helps us reflect on which questions are worth pursuing in the first place.
3. Interview Chapters
00:00 - Introduction
00:37 - Rationality of perception
05:26 - Myth of the given
07:22 - Downgrade thesis
12:15 - Inference without reckoning
20:42 - Inference vs. learned associations
29:04 - Vagueness
32:59 - Oversimplification?
36:02 - Another view
45:13 - Fixing the obligations
49:53 - Epistemic externalism
57:37 - Weighing intuitions
1:00:49 - Explaining false intuitions
1:03:15 - Connection to epistemology more generally
1:05:54 - Attention and perceptual justification
1:12:11 - Epistemic weight of attention
1:19:04 - Value of philosophy
1:23:36 - Conclusion
