Can perceptual noise and a non-representational notion of acquaintance explain why experience feels so authoritative while still undercutting higher-order theories of consciousness?
My links: https://linktr.ee/frictionphilosophy.
1. Guest
Benj Hellie is professor of philosophy at the University of Toronto and his research focuses primarily on mind, epistemology, and semantics.
2. Interview Summary
Benj Hellie starts by walking through his work on perception, with a focus on how perceptual noise should change what we think perceptual experience represents. He frames the discussion around Delia Graff Fara’s treatment of “Nelson-type” cases—where a subject can’t discriminate A from B and can’t discriminate B from C, yet can discriminate A from C—and argues that this pushes against theories that treat “looks the same” as straightforwardly intransitive. His preferred diagnosis is that what’s really non-transitive here is discriminability, and noise gives a natural explanation of why those patterns show up. He also distinguishes a “naturalistic” motivation (signal chains are imperfect, so exact representation is too much to expect) from a “phenomenological” motivation (the felt “jumpiness” or instability in experience can seem to get in the way of latching onto the color itself).
The interview then shifts to higher-order intentionality and the idea that consciousness requires a mental state to represent itself. After the host introduces William Lycan’s quick argument from “awareness” → “intentional object” → “representation” → higher-order representation, Hellie’s main pushback targets the move that treats awareness as necessarily intentional/representational. Drawing on Gilbert Harman’s “star/dagger” contrast, he suggests there’s a non-intentional relational sense of seeing (the kind that requires the object to be present) as opposed to the non-factive, objectless kind you get in hallucination (the “dagger” case, illustrated with Macbeth). In that spirit, he floats an explanatory line: the “epistemic power” of phenomenal character—its seeming like an “immovable basis” for justification—is better accounted for if our access is a non-intentional acquaintance relation rather than another representational state aimed at it.
In the later discussion, Hellie reflects on how far he’s moved from some of the metaphysical background assumptions that shaped those older papers. He says he’s less drawn to positing “objects of mentation,” and more inclined to treat the action as being about contents rather than a special ontology of intentional objects. More radically, he describes coming to see “phenomenal character” talk (and even “mental properties” talk) as a kind of semantic confusion, which pushes him toward an expressivist/anti-realist attitude about mental discourse: talk like “Fred believes that p” isn’t describing Fred as instantiating an inner property so much as expressing a stance grounded in simulation/empathy. This broader orientation connects to his interest in treating one’s present mental state as “theoretical bedrock” for exploring the space of intelligible mental states and to the idea that logic/inference might be better understood in terms of what you’re committed to endorsing (rather than truth-preservation alone).
3. Interview Chapters
00:00 - Introduction
00:35 - Perceptual noise
06:29 - Indiscriminability is non-transitive
08:51 - Sense data theory
11:45 - Coarse color concepts
15:44 - Arguments for inexactness
17:17 - Intentional and non-intentional awareness
21:16 - Intentional objects
22:57 - Intentionality as ubiquitous
25:13 - Higher order theories of intentionality
29:01 - Relation of acquaintance
31:55 - Higher order theories and skepticism
35:06 - Current view
38:34 - Qualia
43:46 - “Must”
47:06 - Semantic dispute?
51:53 - Modality
55:22 - Possible criticism
57:08 - Logic as rules of endorsement preservation
1:00:13 - Possible counterexample
1:04:52 - Counterintuitive?
1:07:05 - Discovering inference rules
1:12:48 - Is modality relative?
1:14:32 - Modal system
1:16:54 - Upcoming book
1:19:00 - Metaphysical modality
1:25:42 - Notion as circular?
1:27:28 - Primitive vs. reductive
1:29:00 - Conventionalism
1:30:48 - Value of philosophy
1:37:11 - Conclusion
