Is quantum mechanics a complete description of reality, or just a remarkably reliable calculation tool still waiting for a clear account of what actually exists?
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1. Guest
Tim Maudlin is Professor of Philosophy at New York University, and his work has focused on the foundations of physics and science more generally, metaphysics, and logic.
2. Interview Summary
Maudlin argues that what physicists often teach as “quantum mechanics” is largely a predictive recipe—a mathematical procedure that outputs correct predictions but doesn’t yet tell you what the world is like. He illustrates this with familiar “electron orbital” diagrams: the same picture could be read as a smeared-out cloud, a long-exposure trace of a particle orbit, a kind of “bubbling” appearance, or even a composite over many atoms—yet the picture itself doesn’t settle which story is right. For Maudlin, that’s exactly the point: without an explicit ontology and dynamics, you don’t yet have a full physical theory, and “shut up and calculate” is (historically) a retreat from the earlier foundational demand—pressed by Albert Einstein and debated by Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg—to say whether the wavefunction is complete.
A big chunk of the interview is spent clarifying what the wavefunction is supposed to represent. Maudlin stresses that the wavefunction is a mathematical object (a function), and the interpretive question is what physical reality—if any—it corresponds to. He sketches three broad options: it represents a real physical feature of an individual system, it encodes statistical features of ensembles, or it reflects an agent’s credences (as in quantum Bayesian approaches). On his view, the “quantum state” (whatever the wavefunction represents, if it represents anything physical) is unlike anything in classical physics, and it’s bound up with nonlocality: John Bell’s result is taken to show that the actual physics of the world cannot be causally local in Bell’s sense, so we should be prepared for genuinely novel kinds of physical structure.
From there, Maudlin frames the measurement problem as a forced choice: to avoid Schrödinger-cat-style “smeared” outcomes, you must deny at least one of three theses—(i) the wavefunction is complete, (ii) it always evolves linearly by Schrödinger evolution, or (iii) measurements have single definite outcomes. He’s especially skeptical of many-worlds programs that keep (i) and (ii) and then try to recover probabilities via decision theory; he treats this as the kind of “degenerating research program” Imre Lakatos warned about, and he’s unconvinced that bringing rational betting behavior into the story explains objective frequencies (as in work associated with Sean Carroll and David Wallace). By contrast, he presents pilot-wave theory (tracing Louis de Broglie and David Bohm) as a comparatively straightforward completion strategy—nonlocal, yes, but after Bell that becomes “a feature, not a bug”—and he also treats objective-collapse approaches as a clear alternative. He closes with a broadly Sellarsian point: properly understood, physics doesn’t (and can’t) just “undermine” the manifest image, because experimental evidence and ordinary descriptions remain indispensable to doing physics at all.
3. Interview Chapters
00:00 - Introduction
00:40 - Quantum mechanics as a theory
07:00 - Shut up and calculate
11:02 - Wave-function realism
18:49 - What the wave-function represents
21:50 - Ontology
27:04 - Fields
32:20 - Probabilities
39:53 - Many-worlds
44:18 - Simplicity
47:00 - Recovering probabilities
50:49 - Preferred approach
55:08 - Pilot wave theory
1:04:23 - Manifest image
1:07:46 - Other ways of talking
1:13:29 - Scientific anti-realism
1:16:42 - Anti-realism and physics
1:20:28 - Modality
1:26:18 - Metaphysical possibility
1:31:30 - Essences
1:33:07 - Fundamentality
1:37:40 - Concepts
1:41:16 - Vagueness
1:49:59 - Making language precise
1:52:20 - Classical logic
1:53:04 - Value of philosophy
1:57:20 - Conclusion
