It is time to examine in detail the eleven critical junctures of the battle, starting with the most northern fight along the original line of attack, Hofen the northern hinge.
The first essential fight involved a dangerous avenue over and around Elsenborn Ridge, along the extreme northern shoulder of the German offensive. The attackers placed priority on swinging open the northern shoulder of defenders as though they represented a giant door, widened with multiple consequences, all of which were bad for the Allied strategic effort against Germany. The door’s hinge was at Hofen, where German success on this extreme northern arm of the offensive would permit a sweep across Hohes Venn open land to Verviers and Eupen, while trapping U.S. forces already positioned on Elsenborn Ridge.
A series of furious attacks against Hofen met stiff America resistance. The main defending unit, the 395th Regiment of the U.S. 99th Infantry Division, was aided by a company from the U.S. 9th Division, tanks of the U.S. 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, and at least one anti-tank gun from the U.S. 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion, whose men also served as infantry. These combined units were supported by field artillery positioned to their rear on Elsenborn Ridge.
In below-freezing temperatures, the German 326th Volksgrenadier Division attacked out of Monschau and Kanzen, emerging from the Monschau Forest to be stopped completely by the 395th Regiment, despite outnumbering the Americans five to one.
One participant of that battle, George will, an infantryman in a rifle platoon of the 395th Infantry Regiment, wrote a book that described the opening day of the Bulge, starting with a pre-dawn German artillery barrage advancing in front of a full regiment of infantry attacking at five points through snow illuminated by searchlights bouncing off overhead clouds. A second attack came at noon on the 16th, broken up by artillery and 81 mm mortar fire from the weapons platoon, leaving 104 Germans killed and 160 wounded."
On the third day, December 18, the Germans tried one last time. At 8:30 a.m. after a heavy artillery and rocket barrage, two regiments of Volksgrenadiers accompanied by 10-12 tanks made an assault against two U.S. companies. Within one hour most of the attackers had been liquidated by artillery, mortars, and small arms, but only after the American regimental commander had been forced to call in six five-minute artillery barrages on his own position. After a rain of 1,025 4.5-inch rounds fired by the U.S. 18th Field Artillery Battalion and 8-inch shells from U.S. 5th Corps guns, the bodies of 250 Germans lay strewn from 50 yards in front to 200 yards behind U.S. foxholes. Try to imagine the tired mixture of relief and repulsion when emerging alive from a hole in the snow to such a scene.
Neil credited U.S. success to skilled artillery and mortar teams knowing how to support infantry, offering special tribute to the 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion’s anti-tank guns and the 9th Division’s twelve 3-inch guns for blocking 20 German tanks en-route to the battle.
He offered another clue, citing the excellent training the 99th Division had received at Camp Wolters, Texas, Camp Van Dorn, Mississippi, and Camp Maxey, Texas before being shipped overseas. He had, he said, learned there about digging and attacking foxholes, patrolling enemy territory, using and surviving live rifle fire, and working field artillery with both infantry and tanks. The trainees even rode in tanks to observe how little tank gunners could actually see, and to experience a tank’s vulnerability from the sides and rear. While participating in mock battle with the U.S. 12th Armored Division in winter maneuvers, the 99th recruits had perfected their lessons on how to fight with and against armor, prepare secondary lines of defense, set booby traps, and set anti-personnel mines.
