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A summary of our conversation is available here.

Note: Our conversation took place on the eve of Trump’s “Liberation Day.” Due to Patrick’s connectivity issues, the conversation was conducted via phone call, leading to less than ideal audio quality. The transcript below has been cleaned up and can be referred to for a more polished version of our conversation.

Jersey Lee

Today we're delighted to be talking with Patrick Buchan. So Patrick, could you briefly give us a bit on your background?

Patrick Buchan

Thanks, it's great to be on your podcast. I'm a keen listener to the podcast, and I think you guys do a great job; it's also good to be working with my old outfit, CSIS. My career has been varied across foreign policy. I'm currently working here, in Australia, we've got our big federal election, so I'm working in the campaign for the Liberal Party; today I speak to you not as a member of the Liberal Party, but as a former member of CSIS.

I, like many people of my generation, we grew up in the era when Australia was making its great political and diplomatic entries into Asia. I went to university in the late 1990s where I studied politics and very much focused on those big geostrategic shifts from the Post Cold War era as Australia engaged into Asia, particularly into Southeast Asia, but also deepening our relationships with countries, particularly Japan, which by that stage was our largest trading partner, and also newer countries that we hadn't so much engaged with, like South Korea and so on. But Indonesia was very much the focus of my background. From there I went to the Department of Defence in Canberra, where of course, promptly having studied Indonesia and focused on Indonesian strategic issues, they put me on the Iraq desk.

Jersey Lee

From there, you later moved to the US to work in the Pentagon and then to CSIS, as you mentioned. Is that right?

Patrick Buchan

Well, that's exactly right. I did time at the Department of Defense where I worked on numerous policy teams and issues from Iraq to counter terrorism to ballistic missile defence, a lot on the US alliance engagement.

I worked at the department of Prime Minister and cabinet, where I did work on Southeast Asia, and then in 2014 I went to Washington, where I arrived in the Pentagon, into the office of the Secretary of Defense during the Obama administration. And from there I worked on great power relations, so very much focused on China. At that point, I guess the issues regarding US China relations were not as profound as they are now; we were trying to work out at that point what the US relationship with China is, and what it is not. We were still in the great era of the Global war on terrorism, and those of us working on China and great power relations were still sort of sitting in the 2nd row of policy, as the Obama administration was very much struggling with how to bring the global War on Terror to its finality.

Jersey Lee

Since you've worked both in the Australian and American defense departments, could you give us a bit of a comparison between the two, and what it's like to work in the two?

Patrick Buchan

Obviously the United States system is so much bigger. I think the key thing that I found at the start was, as an Australian official, your focus was very much twofold: it was on the US Alliance and on South East Asia. Once I got to the Pentagon, I had to broaden my horizon, to realize that all of the world's foreign and defense policy problems could only be solved here, that is in the Pentagon or at the White House. So I found myself very much having to lift my gaze. And that did take me a little while, because, again, as an Australian policy practitioner, your whole focus is just primarily focused on the US and Southeast Asia.

Jersey Lee

With Australia facing a new and more challenging era, could Australians have something to learn from this American broader vision?

Patrick Buchan

Certainly, there's no question that that the world is going through a great geostrategic shift. One of the things I would note with U.S. policy in Asia, and what Australian policy practitioners and politicians can learn from, is that most of the Trump administration is very much focused on bilateral engagement, it doesn't do multilateralism. One of the things I think the Australians have done so well for so long, in the post Second World War era, is doing its business through associations such as ASEAN, and now the Quad, but its bilateral engagement has also been world class, in its diplomacy and the way it does its defense diplomacy. So I think we're actually quite well set.

We haven't put all of our eggs in the basket, like many Europeans have, where their primary focus has been working through multilateral systems, be it NATO or be it EU. I think for Australian policy practitioners, that sense of experience and long-term way of doing business bilaterally, which is very much how the Trump administration likes to do its business, sets us up quite well.

Of course, if you're an Australian practitioner, you are certainly not sitting at the top of the great power tree, so there's always going to be a key difference in the way you do business. But I personally think that the Australian system is very well placed to manage this new order that we're seeing.

That said, I actually don't think that the breakdown in some of the systems we're seeing, in the way the Americans have done business in Europe, is as impactful as it is here in Asia. And again, the reason I say that is because the American hubs and spokes model in Asia is very much geared towards bilateralism. So what we're seeing in Europe, with Washington very much—whether they're dismantling it or not, I'll leave that for others to comment—but we're very much seeing NATO fade to a point where it really has to have a long think about how it wants to reinvent itself.

Jersey Lee

Right now, there's a live debate in Australia on AUKUS, that's been brought back by recent moves by the Trump administration, primarily in Europe; people are again debating on whether we should even have AUKUS. That's a parallel debate to what's going on in Europe, where a lot of people are questioning the wisdom of relying on American F-35s, whether there's a potential Pentagon kill switch or some other way in which Americans could use their leverage against European defence; this has really negatively impacted the American Defense Industrial complex. For Australia, given that one of AUKUS's primary selling points has been that it's going to be a sovereign Australian capability going forward, is there some way for Australia to make it even more sovereign, in terms of the system operations, the maintenance and the components manufacturing, such that regardless of what happens to the alliance with America, Australia will have submarines that are fully its own?

Patrick Buchan

I know there's a lot of debate around, in certain sections of the media and in the commentariat, regarding AUKUS and at the heart of it Australia's sovereignty. What I would add to that is what's called full knowledge and concurrence, FK&C. FK&C came about in the early 1960s, during the Menzies Liberal Government of Australia, when the United States proposed very sensitive facilities such as Pine Gap, at the heart of Australia and the United States’ most sensitive areas of alliance cooperation. Full knowledge and concurrence was an Australian caveat which was that no US activities could occur without the full knowledge and concurrence of Australian officials and the Australian government.

That mentality has seeped through the entire Australian defense system establishment, and is very well understood with the Americans. So some of these lines I do hear about AUKUS undermining Australian sovereignty, I'm just not sure I buy that. Additionally, when you look at Australia's most sensitive capabilities, be they aircraft, be they ships, be they satellite systems, the reality is that the overwhelming majority of those systems are US systems …



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