Jersey Lee
Welcome to this episode of Pacific Polarity. Today we’re speaking with Dr. Kurt Campbell. During the Biden administration, Dr. Campbell served as the Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of State, as well as the White House Indo-Pacific Coordinator, during which he was a key figure in establishing the AUKUS Security Pact. He had previously also served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs during the Obama administration, during which he was a primary architect of the U.S. Pivot to Asia strategy. Dr. Campbell is currently chairman of the strategic advisory firm The Asia Group, which he founded. Dr. Campbell, great to have you on.
Kurt Campbell
It’s terrific to be with you. I’m looking forward to the conversation. Thank you very much.
Jersey Lee
This week, as you had just mentioned to me, Trump is going to be flying over to have first a bilateral meeting with President Xi of China, and then a trilateral meeting with President Xi and President Putin of Russia. What do you make of this and what do you think we could expect? Yeah, well, first of all, thank you.
Kurt Campbell
Let’s put this in a larger context. So last week we had one of the most dramatic elections—frankly, in U.S. history, it’s hard to find a precedent in which, frankly, it was a referendum, not just on President Trump, on Trumpism, on the candidates. Now, President Trump has not acknowledged that. In fact, if anything, he’s tried to avoid drawing any such conclusions. But I think most have viewed this as a seismic, tectonic change in both American domestic policy and likely foreign policy as well.
So President Trump departs on this international visit first to the Philippines and then to Shenzhen with a larger recognition that he is weakened and that many in Asian capitals are starting to look beyond his time in power, anticipating the upcoming presidential campaign as well as the new power centers on Capitol Hill in the Senate and House of Representatives. So it’s a very dramatic, dynamic change in the political context in which President Trump engages.
And before he sits down with President Xi, he’ll have a series of meetings about the economic terms of engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and then he’ll have a bilateral meeting with President Xi, and then this unprecedented trilateral engagement between President Trump, President Xi and President Putin.
But the context is this. Yes, these will attract a lot of headlines. But remember, some of the things that President Trump has implemented have had huge consequences for Asia; first and foremost are the tariffs, many of which are still not yet fully resolved and in place, but it has created a lot of consternation for allies and appears for Americans as well, given that that was one of the issues on which Americans voted on in pretty substantial numbers, condemning some of those steps as being inefficient and actually making it harder for American firms to export to the Indo-Pacific.
And then secondly, of course, is the war in Iran, which has had huge consequences for growth and productivity in Asia and has triggered inflationary consequences across the region. The war is now going on nine months and we’re seeing already how shortages of diesel, of petroleum, of natural gas, of sulfur, of oil, all of these things that emanate from the Persian Gulf are starting to have real trickle-down effects on the economies of the Indo-Pacific. Those issues are likely to be top of mind. And this is even before we get to AI and the trade truce between the United States and China.
Jersey Lee
I wanted to go back to a point you made at the start. So obviously the political context of this would weigh heavily on Trump. But I’m just thinking about the practical consequences of the Democrats’ emphatic victory. Because obviously U.S. presidents, not just Trump, but recent administrations have taken significant powers over foreign policy within just the Oval Office; it’s been termed the imperial presidency for a reason. Would Democrats’ win significantly and meaningfully change the course of American foreign policy, or can Trump largely continue what he’s been doing, doing what he wants by executive action?
Kurt Campbell
Look, it’s a very good question. And historically when presidents have faced challenges at home, they’ve often turned internationally for engagements. I think it’s going to prove to be more difficult for President Trump, largely because some of those relationships have been as fraught and tension-filled as anything. I will also say that, yes, I expect actors in Congress to assert influence on the formulation and execution of American foreign policy, and they’ll do that not just through the power of the purse, but through investigations and the bully pulpit. So, yes, I expect some of the key actors on the Hill to be much more active.
But I will point out to you this. It is not just that Democrats are assuming positions of power on Capitol Hill. It is also that the nature of the Republican Party will change as well. It has largely fallen in line out of either fear or favor. For President Trump, I don’t think that is going to be the case going forward. You’re going to have many more outspoken senators and congressmen that are going to challenge President Trump from the Republican side of the House, and so this will likely lead to more debate, more discussion. And there is even the prospect of some areas of bipartisan alignment; for instance, on technology policy with respect to China from Democrats and Republicans.
So it’s going to be a deeply consequential period in which there is going to be a rebalance away from this idea of the executive branch über alles, even though some of the Supreme Court judges seem to have accepted the conception of the United States being led by a unitary executive. I do not believe that our founders and our original architects of our guiding documents intended that. I think they believed that a high degree of contestation between the various branches of government was in the best interest of the American people.
Jersey Lee
During President Trump and President Xi’s last meeting on Chinese soil, they came up with the formulation of “constructive strategic stability” for the bilateral relationship—actually, probably the Chinese came up with it and Trump kind of just went along with it. So do you think that is a formulation that the Democrats could work with?
Kurt Campbell
I think the essential feature of the relationship between the United States and China is one of competition. And I think that that competition can be steady and stable. But I also believe that there will be moments of contestation that are more intense. I think that’s almost inevitable. And so I tend to believe that regarding the relationship as it is, is a very important element of statecraft.
I do not believe that these framing exercises that have been promoted largely on the Chinese side have been honest accounting of what, in fact, is animating the essential forces driving the U.S.-China relationship.
Jersey Lee
Obviously, over the past few years, Trump has swung from a hardline stance on China to a much softer position, partly because China demonstrated its leverage over America, over rare earth and the like. Do you think this was because Trump took the wrong approach, as many people have argued, or because recent administrations, including the Obama and Biden administrations, had failed to sufficiently maintain America’s leverage, including in rare earths, but in many other realms as well? And can America restore its leverage to the extent that they can try to negotiate from a “position of strength” again?
Kurt Campbell
It’s not just a question of leverage. It’s a question of national strategy. And I think the abiding belief for decades was that globalization would lead inevitably to certain kinds of manufacturing shifting to other places. I think a different calculus is now in play and a recognition that certain capabilities must…