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On the morning of the midterm elections, between segments on a friendly cable show, President Trump announced that the United States would stop sending Israel its roughly $4 billion a year in military aid at the end of 2026, on the grounds that Israel is rich, does not need the money, and can pay cash or barter for American weapons from now on.[1] Netanyahu, he said, had asked for it. He also explained, in plainer language than he usually allows himself, why that particular morning: the aid had become a line Democrats were using against Republicans, and he named the Michigan Senate candidate Abdul El-Sayed as the one using it.[2] It was a campaign move wearing a foreign-policy costume.
By the next morning El-Sayed had won, which means the talking point Trump was trying to retire now has a six-year term and a seat on the committees that oversee arms sales. Democrats took both chambers. An announcement built to defuse the aid issue before the vote watched the vote detonate it anyway.
Strip away the timing and the shape underneath is stranger than the headline. Most of what Trump announced he cannot lawfully do, the part he can do is smaller than it sounds, and the one real consequence runs close to the opposite of what either camp heard. Washington is changing how it holds the leash rather than dropping it, and in the process shedding the single piece of the relationship that a hostile Congress could actually grab.
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Money Was Already Marginal
Start with the number, because the number is the least important part and everyone is staring at it.
The $3.8 billion Israel receives each year, $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing grants plus $500 million for missile defense, flows from a ten-year agreement signed in 2016 that runs through fiscal 2028 and totals $38 billion over the decade.[3] In the 1970s and 1980s that money financed more than a fifth of Israel's entire defense budget, and in some years closer to a third. It was decisive, and Israel could not have built its force without it.
That era is gone. Israel's economy now runs around $530 billion, and after two years of regional war its defense spending reached $48.3 billion in 2025, about 7.8 percent of GDP, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.[4] Against a budget that size the American grant covers roughly 8 percent, down from 22.9 percent as recently as 2016.[3] The same country that supposedly cannot survive without the subsidy posted record arms exports of $19.2 billion in 2025, its fourth straight record, much of it air-defense systems sold to European governments spooked by Russia.[5] A nation that cannot afford its own defense does not usually outsell its suppliers.
So when Trump says Israel does not need the money, the arithmetic is on his side. What he leaves out is that the money was never only money.
Leahy Leash Snaps
Here the critics are right, and it pays to state their case precisely, because the precise version is the only one that survives contact with the statute.
American aid arrives wrapped in a human-rights apparatus, and the most operational piece of it is the Leahy Law, which bars US assistance to any foreign military unit credibly implicated in a gross human-rights violation.[6] Leahy carries a hard limit in its own text: it applies only to appropriated assistance, and it does not reach weapons a foreign government buys with its own cash.[6] That boundary was drafted into the law, not discovered as a loophole afterward.
The cleanest consequence of ending the grant follows directly. Once Israel is buying American weapons with Israeli money instead of American money, Leahy unit-level vetting stops applying to those purchases, and the mechanism the executive branch uses to withhold specific equipment from specific units over specific conduct loses its grip. Anyone who reads the announcement as quietly removing a check on how US weapons get used has identified the one thing it genuinely does.
The catch is that Leahy was never the whole leash, and the rest of it stays on.
Section 502B Still Bites
The weapon a newly Democratic Congress will actually reach for is Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act, and unlike Leahy, it covers cash sales and commercial licenses as well as grants.[6]
Section 502B bars security assistance, defined broadly enough to include cash Foreign Military Sales and direct commercial export licenses, to any government engaged in a consistent pattern of gross human-rights violations.[6] It also comes with a trigger. Under 502B(c), a single committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, or the Senate as a whole, can pass a privileged resolution demanding a full human-rights report from the State Department within 30 days, and if State misses the deadline, every arms delivery and export license, cash sales included, is suspended by operation of law.[6] No presidential signature is needed to start it and no filibuster is available to stop the vote.
Congress keeps other tools that are indifferent to who pays. Any large arms sale, whether financed by grant or by Israeli cash, must still be notified to Congress, which can force a privileged floor vote on a resolution of disapproval.[6] Committee chairs can place informal holds that freeze a sale for months. And Congress can simply amend the Arms Export Control Act to ban a category of weapon, a 2,000-pound bomb or a tank round, to a specific destination, binding the licensing process however the buyer settles the invoice.
The accountability picture that emerges is narrower and more interesting than "Israel off the hook": the unit-level leash snaps, the country-level leash holds, and the body most likely to yank it just won both chambers. By taking away the easy lever, Trump handed Democrats a reason to reach for the harder one.
Trump Cannot Legally Do It
Now the part that turns the announcement into theater.
Congress did not merely appropriate Israel's aid year by year. In the 2021 defense authorization act it wrote the figure into permanent law: not less than $3.3 billion in FMF grants every year through fiscal 2028.[7] That statute remains on the books, and the 2016 agreement it codifies does not expire until September 30, 2028.
A president cannot cancel money Congress has appropriated because he finds it politically inconvenient. The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 allows exactly two moves: a temporary deferral for operational reasons, explicitly excluding policy disagreement, or a formal rescission request that dies on its own if both chambers fail to approve it within 45 days.[8] Should an administration simply refuse to spend the money, the Comptroller General can sue in federal court to force it out the door.[8] The power of the purse sits in Article I, which is the part of the Constitution that comes before the part presidents usually quote.
Translated, Trump can refuse to negotiate a new agreement past 2028, and that is a real and significant choice. What he cannot lawfully do is switch off the FMF already written into law for 2027 and 2028. "Ending it at the end of 2026" collides with a statute and then with a court. The announcement described an outcome the announcer lacks the authority to produce, a detail usually settled before the cameras arrive rather than after.
The "cash or barter" clause was emptier still. Neither the State Department nor the Pentagon has any procedure to barter fighter jets, and the Arms Export Control Act contains no mechanism for large-scale defense barter.[1] It was a word, not a plan.
Cash Bec…