“We will establish order in Cuba, and Nicaragua will also become ours. Next year we will have a new president in Colombia.”
— Senator Tim Scott, January 8, 20261
Five days after US forces captured Nicolás Maduro, Senator Tim Scott said the quiet part out loud. Cuba. Nicaragua. Colombia. Three countries, three regime changes, one timeline. This is not speculation about American intentions. This is an American senator describing American plans in public.
He was not alone. Senator Rick Scott, speaking the day before, laid out the same sequence: “What they did in Venezuela is gonna change Latin America. This is the start of changing Venezuela, then we’re gonna fix Cuba, Nicaragua will get fixed, next year we will have a new president in Colombia.”2
National Security Advisor Mike Waltz dismissed any international constraints: “We don’t care what they say. Trump will continue to ignore this ridiculous organization called the UN.”3
And Stephen Miller, architect of the administration’s immigration and sovereignty agenda, articulated the governing philosophy: “The use of force against other countries is the iron law of the world.”4
The Venezuela operation was not an endpoint. It was a proof of concept. The template is now proven, the infrastructure is operational, and Cuba is 90 miles from Florida. Everything that made Venezuela possible applies to Cuba, but easier.
The 32 Dead Cubans
The most significant intelligence revelation to emerge from the Venezuela operation was not about Venezuela. It was about Cuba.
Thirty-two Cuban military and intelligence personnel died defending Nicolás Maduro on January 3.5 Cuban special forces, embedded with Venezuelan security, were killed when US forces struck Caracas. The Cuban government has released the names and ranks of the dead. Their deaths reveal something the regime has spent decades hiding: the Cuban military is a hollow force.
“The blood of the 32 Cuban special forces troops and 40+ others who died during the US’s January 3 attack on Venezuela is barely cold, but Wall Street is already smacking its lips readying to feast on the Latin American resource giant’s carcass.”
— Geopolitics Prime analysis6
[CAPTION: On January 6th, Cuba published photos of the 32 killed militants in the raid on Maduro by US forces in Venezuela.]
These were Cuba’s best. They were deployed to protect Cuba’s most important ally, the source of the subsidized oil that keeps the lights on in Havana (when the lights are on at all). They failed. If 32 of Cuba’s elite personnel could not defend the Miraflores Palace against a US raid, they cannot defend the Palace of the Revolution.
The capability of the Cuban security apparatus to resist a similar operation is negligible. This is not American propaganda. It is the conclusion drawn from watching Cuban forces die in combat for the first time in decades.
The Military Reality
Cuba’s conventional forces exist on paper. In practice, they are an army of obsolescence and decay.
Troop strength officially stands at 40,000 to 50,000, but these numbers are inflated by conscripts suffering from malnutrition and lacking meaningful training.7 Equipment dates to the Vietnam era: T-55 and T-62 tanks largely non-operational due to lack of spare parts, a handful of MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft with minimal pilot flight hours, air defense systems from the 1960s (S-75 and S-125) that would be ineffective against modern American aircraft.8
The comparison to Venezuela is instructive. Venezuela had S-300VM air defense systems, Russian-supplied and relatively modern. Cuba has Soviet relics from the Kennedy administration. Venezuela is 1,300 miles from the US mainland, requiring complex logistics and aerial refueling. Cuba is 90 miles from Florida, within direct range of virtually every US military installation on the Gulf Coast.
Factor Venezuela Cuba Distance from US 1,300+ miles 90 miles Air Defense S-300VM (modern) S-75/S-125 (1960s) Logistics Complex refueling Direct from Florida Estimated timeline Hours Less than 24 hours
A hypothetical operation against Cuba would be simpler in every dimension, and the Venezuela template provides the blueprint.
How It Would Happen
The Venezuela operation was not an invasion. It was a decapitation strike: capture the leader, not the country. The same model applies to Cuba, but with easier logistics and a weaker target.
Phase One: Air Superiority
F-35s and F-22s from Homestead Air Reserve Base and Tyndall Air Force Base would neutralize Cuban air defenses within the first hour. The S-75 and S-125 systems that constitute Cuba’s air defense network were designed to shoot down aircraft that no longer exist. Against fifth-generation stealth fighters, they are effectively useless. Cuba’s handful of operational MiG-21s and MiG-23s would not leave the ground; their pilots know that takeoff means death.9
The distance advantage is overwhelming. Venezuela required aerial refueling, carrier-based aircraft, and complex logistics chains spanning 1,300 miles. Cuba is 90 miles from Key West. Every air asset on the Florida Gulf Coast can reach Havana, complete its mission, and return without refueling. The operation can be sustained indefinitely from existing bases.
Phase Two: Decapitation
With air superiority established, special operations forces would execute simultaneous raids on three targets.
The Palace of the Revolution in Havana’s Plaza de la Revolución houses the Council of State and Council of Ministers. This is the administrative heart of the Cuban government. The Ministry of the Interior (MININT), located nearby, controls state security, intelligence, and the internal repression apparatus. Punto Cero, the compound in western Havana where Fidel Castro lived and where current leadership maintains residences, represents the symbolic and personal center of regime power.10
Delta Force operators, the same unit that extracted Maduro from Miraflores Palace, would hit all three locations within a narrow time window. The goal is not to hold territory but to remove leadership: Díaz-Canel, key ministers, and senior military commanders. Those captured would be transported directly to US custody, likely landing at Homestead or Miami within hours of the operation’s commencement.
The legal framework is already in place. Díaz-Canel can be indicted on narco-terrorism charges (Cuba’s State Sponsor of Terrorism designation provides the hook), extracted under the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, and arraigned in federal court before the sun sets on the day of the operation.
Phase Three: Blockade and Stabilization
The immediate concern following leadership removal is migration. The 1980 Mariel boatlift brought 125,000 Cubans to Florida in six months; a 2026 collapse could trigger movement of that scale within days.11 US Navy vessels would establish a maritime quarantine within hours of the strike, intercepting vessels before they reach international waters.
This is not occupation. The administration has no interest in governing Cuba. The Venezuela model made this explicit: Trump said the US would “run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper and judicious transition,” but provided no details because the details do not matter.12 The goal is regime removal, not nation-building. Install a transitional government composed of Cuban exiles and pliable internal figures, secure the debt claims and asset recovery that American investors are waiting for, and withdraw to a posture of economic and diplomatic supervision.
Secretary of State Rubio described the Venezuela approach as “control through economic pressure” and an “oil quarantine,” explicitly stating “this is not an occupation.”13 Cuba would receive the same treatment: decapitation, blockade, transition, withdrawal. The US takes the head; Cubans deal with the body.
Why Not a Full Invasion?
Full-scale military occupation of Cuba would require 100,000+ troops, cost billions per month, generate an insurgency, and create a political nightmare with no exit strategy. The Pentagon learned these less…