Back to 017. Eyes On Competition, Architecture, and Left Field
One of the first things I did as Technical Assistant was to set up time with each of the leaders of the Office of the President and key executives to see what they could tell me that would help me to work with Bill. Mike Maples offered me a great and lifelong lesson in being in a supporting role while also explaining in his unique way the culture that was at the root of Microsoft—the culture across Apps and Systems where I would spend my whole career.
I had to figure out how to have a high bandwidth (a BillG word) relationship with BillG and the key execs in his orbit, known as the Office of the President created in early 1992. I felt I should reach out to leaders and meet with them to see if they had any idea how to do this job. Microsoft was organized into a triumvirate or troika of executives (something about using a Russian word just after the fall of the Berlin wall seemed exciting to the press): Steve Ballmer (SteveB) leading Worldwide Sales Support Group (WWSSG), MikeMap leading the Worldwide Products Group (WWPG), and Frank Gaudette (FrankGa) leading all the financial and administrative functions. Collectively, this was the Office of the President, which Microsoft promptly turned into the acronym BOOP for Bill and the Office of the President.
The BOOP filled a gap left by the retirement of Jon Shirley (JonS) who, from 1983, served as president and chief operating officer through 1991. JonS brought a level of scale and discipline to Microsoft’s execution that established the solid foundation upon which everything was subsequently built. Jon remained on the board through most of my time at the company. I, and many others, benefited enormously from his wisdom. After Jon retired, Michael Hallman joined to fill Jon’s role. His tenure was only two years and was not a match from the early days. The reports at the time focused on that failing and to some degree viewed the new organization as Microsoft giving up on hiring external executives. As it would turn out, that was probably true.
It was no surprise, but MikeMap reached out even before I had a chance to reach out to him. He was like that. Walking over to his office I was running through the scope of his job in my head.
As I became Technical Assistant, TA, MikeMap was almost a year into managing all product groups and organized them into divisions: Systems, Desktop Applications, Database and Development Tools, Consumer Software Division, and Workgroup Applications. This was an enormous job by Microsoft standards, but relative to Mike’s previous employer IBM ($60 billion in sales, 250,000 employees in 1993) this probably didn’t seem so huge. It was the first time all product development was under one executive who was not BillG. That was actually huge.
WWPG was a sprawling organization. Fiscal 1993, which was only half over at this point, brought in more than $3.75 billion in product revenue, with more than half coming from Applications ($2.17 billion) and about 34 percent from Systems ($1.27 billion). The remainder from hardware and consumer. It had 14,000 employees. While Microsoft did not break out the profitability of each group, the reality was (and for years remained) that the operating systems were more profitable because of the OEM model, the original equipment manufacturers or PC makers. Few inside or outside would realize the revenue size of the applications business relative to MS-DOS and Windows, a theme that would be consistent for another 20 years. By most every account and every action, the operating systems group came first, and applications were the gravy. BillG understood the brilliance of developing both and building the network effect and ecosystem, but emotionally Apps played backup to Systems regardless of revenue, perhaps because of the profit.
Taken all together, this was MikeMap’s WWPG world. The Research & Development budget was $470 million that year, or more than 4,000 people. He also had the marketing for all the WWPG, though there was a significant shift in budget, ownership, and accountability for marketing with SteveB leading sales—distributing much of the spend and accountability to country managers.
Mike brought with him a wealth of experience from IBM. Many believed that wealth of experience demonstrated what we should not be doing or copying. This was decidedly true for the Systems teams who had forged a beneficial, albeit dysfunctional, relationship with IBM over the past decade, most recently with respect to OS/2, which by this time was circling the drain along with the IBM-Microsoft Joint Development Agreement. In practice, MikeMap’s experience in managing organizations at massive scale was not only relevant but essential for Microsoft at this point. He had seen it all when it came to org dynamics and dysfunction. Not only was he in the right place at a much-needed time, but he was exactly the right person.
Mike didn’t fear change. In his first year, he restructured his Apps division from a largely functional organization (for example, one large team of engineers and one large team of marketing) to a group of independent business units. The reason was clear—these were independent businesses. They had distinct customers, with distinct product schedules, and distinct competitive dynamics in the marketplace. There were some shared resources for localization and tooling, but they essentially operated independently.
Leading up to this change in 1989, MikeMap created a brilliant vision presentation, outlining at a deep technical level a vision for the evolution of Office. This was simply a presentation, but the slides and notes remained relevant for years and many, me included, were greatly influenced by it. As a seasoned exec, he knew the necessity and value of repetition, so in many ways this became his stump speech for Apps as he created the new organizational groups. As a result, everyone in Apps knew the vision and reasoning behind the organization Mike put in place and the future direction of products.
The names of these groups are seared into my memory as they became the lingua franca when talking about Apps for many years. Each business unit (BU) represented one product family (Mac and Windows plus some secondary products): Analysis or Excel (ABU), Office, not what might be thought of as Office down the road but Word and the nascent email business (OBU), Graphics or PowerPoint (GBU), Entry or Works (EBU), and the new Data Access or database (DABU). Conversations were littered with the use of ABU, OBU, DABU, EBU to the point of sounding like a language unto itself, or maybe a Beatles song (aboo, ohboo, daboo, eeboo). The leaders of these groups, known as a business unit manager (BUM), were ultimately the key product leaders in Apps and were responsible for the product in every aspect. Mike chose these leaders with care, making sure they came from a variety of backgrounds, not only engineering or marketing.
To my surprise, one thing Mike knew well was my TA job. In fact, he seemed to have more insight than even Bill…