Back to 019. BillG the Manager
As technical assistant I spent most of my time navigating our operating system strategy and progress during late-1992 to mid-1994. There were three main OS development projects going on at the time. Chicago was the code name of the successor to Windows 3.1 (shipped April 1992), rooted in the MS-DOS architecture and trying to build up from there. Windows NT building a portable, secure, and robust operating system from scratch aiming for the workstation and server market (version 3.5 to ship September 1994). These were both products under development unified by the Win32 API strategy announced at the professional developer conference. Cairo was a new project built on the core parts of NT but innovating (and inventing) in most every possible dimension. An entire book could be written about any one of these projects, but all were happening at once. This post is about what that was like. I don’t take this lightly when I say this, even after all these years many people I know still have emotional reactions to this period of time and the traumatic experiences of this project and how played out.
It wasn’t like Microsoft’s operating system strategy was ever simple, at least to me. Perhaps it was asking too much for a cleaner or more straight forward strategy to emerge with the move away from OS/2 and the early success of Windows 3.0, and now 3.1. Being complacent or content was not in Microsoft’s DNA—a bold vision for Windows was, however, and with that came even greater product complexity.
Microsoft had a simple external message of “Win32.” The problem was the product had not yet caught up to that message. Windows NT was just shipping its first version while the market was predicting NT would soon dominate the desktop. Microsoft was also anxious for that, first almost always talking about Windows NT after selling Windows 3.1. The “real” 32-bits, advanced networking. client-server developer strategy were all great selling points, but Windows NT was a new code base and lacked compatibility with huge numbers of applications and devices that represented the richness and key strategic value of the 16-bit Windows (and MS-DOS) ecosystem. Beyond that, Windows NT had the capability to run on non-Intel microprocessors which only fueled more punditry over the future of the PC. This left many believing the operating system market still seemed up for grabs and buying a PC remained a complex decision.
In the meantime, Microsoft had fallen woefully behind Apple Macintosh when it came to ease of use and the day-to-day effort required to keep a PC working—not behind in sales, but that was not what counted for currency with BillG. Microsoft had yet to release a simple files and folders experience that matched Macintosh and was still mired in the vestiges of MS-DOS, such as file names restricted to “8.3” (eight characters plus three for the file type). It is a cliché even today, but Macintosh just seemed to work, and PCs always seemed to be crashing, hanging, or flaking out, or just much more difficult to use. Just as PCs became common in schools and the workplace, “the dog ate my homework” was replaced with “my PC crashed and ate my work” or something like that.
Microsoft’s core Windows project for consumers was Chicago (eventually Windows 95). Chicago would bring the compatibility and ecosystem support enjoyed by Windows 3.1 together with the new Win32 API, while at the same time addressing ease of use shortcomings of Windows compared to Macintosh. Chicago had the goal of being a PC that was better than Macintosh plus bringing with it all the benefits of Windows that had cemented leadership in the market. The project was still early enough that most attention was on the just released and bolder Windows NT, primarily because so many believed that the 16-bit heritage of Chicago was a fragile legacy code base ill-suited for the modern 32-bit world. Microsoft’s own efforts around marketing NT only emphasized this point.
For any company that would be enough of a big bet, not for Microsoft or BillG though. Chicago was just one part of an all-out assault on the operating system market, one Microsoft already dominated: Chicago for consumers, Windows NT Workstation for professionals, Windows NT Server for the back office, along with numerous early-stage efforts on both living room and handheld computing devices going on in NathanM’s advanced technology group. These all came about as a direct reflection of BillG’s scalable Windows strategy best expressed by a slide from the Win32 Professional Developers Conference showing one Windows scaling from the smallest devices to the biggest computers—a slide that would in some form carry Microsoft’s vision for the remainder of Bill’s leadership.
Then there was Cairo. Whereas the major axis that defined everything along the scalable strategy was simply how much computer horsepower a device had, Cairo set out to redefine how people interacted with computers and how developers wrote programs. Cairo was to be a new paradigm from user-interface, to data storage, to networking computers together.
In an era where computers hardly worked and every developer at Microsoft was struggling to figure out how to write reliable code, ship that code, and meet a schedule, Cairo was by any measure an audacious bet, and that is probably an understatement.
Exactly where Cairo fit in and how, and even if that was possible, would occupy a huge amount of Bill’s time and thus my time. Given how I had just navigated the operating system strategy to do my little part to ship tools, I was fortunate to be well-versed in the technology and the teams. But where I found myself was in the awkward and impossible spot of having to help evaluate the practical realities of shipping for a CEO who wasn’t generally focused on those aspects of projects.
Landing on my desk early in 1993 was the first of many drafts of Cairo plans and documents. Cairo took the maturity of the NT product process—heavy on documentation and architectural planning—and amped it up. Like a well-oiled machine, the Cairo team was in short order producing reams of documents assembled into three-inch binders detailing all the initiatives of the product. Whenever I would meet with people from Cairo, they would exude confidence in planning and their processes. The confidence took on such a level that people began to refer to Cairo unofficially as the updated version 4.0 of Windows NT.
At a college recruiting trip at Cornell, I remember spending an evening at the Statler Hotel bar with one member of the NT team and one member of the Cairo team (both fellow Cornell graduates) debating over schedules. Would Cairo be NT 4.0? Would NT 4 beat Chicago to market? Would Chicago be dead on arrival because of Cairo or its MS-DOS legacy? Or would “real” NT 4.0 beat Cairo to market? This was engineer bravado at its best. It was also Microsoft’s operating system ro…