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A more interesting aspect of being in a staff role is how your perspective changes from day-to-day execution to strategic milestones. From this perspective, one doesn’t see the daily progress as much as the experience of what the starting point was and then results. There are meetings and demos, and (tons of) daily builds in the middle (my favorite), but the experience lacks the context of daily trade-offs or even the realities of product development. It is very easy from a staff role to assume people don’t get it or they are messing up, but it just isn’t the role or even a valid perspective. This would be a valuable lesson I would learn in this job that I was not expecting.

Back to 028. Pivotal Offsite

The clock was ticking, and to get things done for Chicago meant starting immediately. Chicago, originally planned for early 1994 or maybe 1993 depending on who you ask, was not yet in beta and so practically speaking was not going to finish in 1994 given the time required for broad beta testing (recalling my previous Cornell recruiting trip and the debate over whether Cairo would ship before “Windows 4” aka Chicago later in 1993).

Evangelizing tactical work items for the internet strategy and making sure they landed with owners was my job as TA. With regards to the “Internet mania”, our mantra as per BillG was two-tiered: embrace and extend.

Much like killer app, the phrase embrace and extend proved to be far more loaded an expression than intended. Computing evolved by companies constantly finding ways to uniquely extend existing software and hardware, elements viewed as commodities, while at the same time always bowing to the existing investments of customers by claiming an embrace of any standards or winners. That was the view of how value was created—everyone built on all that came before. That was how everything worked. In a sense, each new product somehow related to the product it would supersede while extending it in uniquely valuable ways.

What had changed was the open-source movement that viewed everything as embrace with no advantage bestowed to any party, with any extensions going back to the community. As it would turn out, embrace and extend is precisely how nearly every open-source innovation was commercialized, particularly as software moved to the data center. Not everyone believes that is good, but it is what happened. In 1994, embrace and extend was synonymous with evil. Admittedly, it didn’t help that the phrase was sometimes attributed to Microsoft as “embrace, extend, and extinguish.”

With specific action items outlined, for the next couple of months I made sure the company was embracing the key protocols I had seen at Cornell (and that our brave corporate customers were beginning to demand): TCP/IP, email over SMTP, HTML for online documents, NNTP for discussions and bulletin boards, HTTP and Gopher on the server, and IRC for chat.

In doing so, I found myself in the role of shuttle diplomat or “glue” as we said looping around the cluster of single-X buildings, the location of the Chicago team, and the next version of Windows NT under development, Daytona, and over in building 16 where Peter Pathe (PPathe), the general manager of the Word team, sat. Many days I found myself almost in a constant swirl running between buildings in the misty drizzle of Redmond.

My agenda was to help identify issues and bring teams together to arrive at the common goals outlined at the offsite. I was to help, not do. It is a confusing a difficult spot to be in, especially as a self-described zealot, and particularly as someone with no responsibility for a product schedule.

Chicago was on a mission, a new mission to embrace the WWW. The team quickly came to its own point of view and strategy, which included the get on the internet capabilities, as well as coming up with a viewer and browser strategy. During the offsite the Chicago team affirmed this point of view, but the commitment was for after the initial Chicago release. The realities of the Chicago schedule meant that work that did not impact the product directly had a chance of being delivered simultaneously to customers because of the way OEMs ship new PCs, known as a service release in the OEM process—taking advantage of the ability to add features to Windows on new PCs even after the retail boxes of Windows were manufactured for upgrade customers who would later download those same changes or purchase the same-day add-on for Windows 95 called “Plus!” which in addition to those same internet capabilities including Internet Explorer 1.0, included games, screen savers, and other extras. While much would be made by regulators of these small changes in dates and what the “final product” was, this is what agility looked like in the age of massive software projects, a multi-month manufacturing channel required by ecosystem partners, and a schedule that was always a bit fluid until it wasn’t.

This became the plan of record led by a longtime engineer, Ben Slivka (BenS). In the short term, the strategy was to make sure developers around the world understood the underlying technologies provided by Chicago that made it easier to build viewers and browsers and to evangelize those—if Chicago could not have its own then at least it should have the widest range of choices from third parties. This was a tried-and-true strategy Microsoft had always followed—the best of first and most of third parties. The same type of work, meaning a combination of built-in capabilities as well as evangelizing third party capabilities, was going on with all sorts of extensions to the operating system from networking to USB support to Wi-Fi, but none of those would be contentious down the road.

Originally BenS was planning the features of the follow-on release, but seeing the situation of enormous growth in the internet, the already strong base infrastructure in Chicago, and the Chicago schedule, he devised a plan that involved licensing browser code as a way to kickstart the efforts for higher level viewers, especially WWW. In a series of negotiations (and after looking at some alternatives), the Chicago team ended up licensing the code to build Internet Explorer from Spyglass. In parallel, others looked at whether to expand on offerings for FTP, Gopher, or any number of other viewers/protocols.

With every passing day, it became abundantly clear that the WWW was the only viewer or internet technology that really mattered. The pace of adoption and growth of WWW servers compared to Gopher servers made this obvious.



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