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Strategically, the bundling-unbundling arc or cycle is one of the most common dynamics in technology. Something that starts off as a single product or category inevitably becomes part of a bundle of features or products. Only later that bundled product faces intense competition from a stand-alone product introducing a different point of view. Choosing when to compete with a bundle and how to innovate within category occupied our collective mind in Applications in 1994. A big bet was made to market the Office Suite (or bundle) while the categories were still in play. Organizationally and culturally, we were still very much a set of categories. Had the market settled on Suites or not? This is a question faced by most every company with a single successful product and provides some interesting experiences and lessons.

Back to 031. Synchronizing Windows and Office (the First Time) [Chapter V]

There were two major shifts taking place in the early 1990s together altering the market landscape for business software. The most visible was the move by the business market to Windows, beginning with Windows 3.0 but picking up the pace dramatically with each subsequent release, Windows 3.1 and Windows 3.11. Bringing networking to the operating system, a seemingly simple ability for PCs in an office to share files and printers, was becoming a force.

By 1993, Windows/DOS PCs were outselling Macintosh ten to one and Windows was on 30 million of the 120 million PCs worldwide, with Windows dominating new PC sales.

That transition itself did not instantly shift the Applications market, though. The leaders of each category, particularly WordPerfect for word processing and Lotus with its 1-2-3 spreadsheet, as well as Borland with both Paradox and dBase databases, were not only entrenched but had passionate customer followings. Law schools were using WordPerfect and newly minted lawyers were proficient in the inner workings of the mysteries of formatting a brief with reveal codes (WordPerfect’s mysterious codes that showed formatting before WYSIWYG, or what you see is what you get in GUI). MBA students were masters of the 1-2-3 slash commands for navigating a financial model. That Windows 3.x ran these products extremely well, because compatibility with MS-DOS was a key design point, only solidified them. Windows 3.x made running MS-DOS products even better by supporting multiple programs running at the same time.

However, the graphical interface was beginning to put pressure on existing MS-DOS leaders. The improved support for printing (supporting more printers from various manufacturers), as well as the ease at moving information from one app to another with the clipboard were tangible benefits. With the rise of laser printers, the era of producing business and school reports that included charts, graphs, and tables in-line with the text—all prepared camera ready—was a new baseline expectation. This was vastly easier with GUI apps.

As a result, product reviews began to evaluate the MS-DOS and Windows products in the same category. The word processor category, for example, included Word for Windows and WordPerfect for MS-DOS. The reviews would compare features but also compare ease of use at complex scenarios, often including the ability for documents to incorporate information from other sources. Even though the Windows applications were behind on features and had different user-interfaces from MS-DOS, there was an uptick in perception based on ease of use of GUI.

To be fair, the tech elites of the time greatly resisted the GUI—often claiming the mouse and all those graphics were counter to productivity. I had witnessed this myself in 1984 at Cornell when people looked at the mouse and shook their heads, referring to it as a toy, and to the inefficiency of lifting their hands from the keyboard. Working within the disconnect between evolving technology and entrenched elites proved to be a theme throughout my career.

At the same time, existing software leaders resisted or at least paced themselves with the move to Windows. Many over the years tried to either explain or rationalize this and much has been written. Microsoft committed a ton of energy trying to get the likes of Lotus and WordPerfect to be launch partners with Windows versions or to just commit to Windows, even as Microsoft was building Windows versions of its own apps. There was no head fake on the part of Microsoft—it was believed that Windows would be best with Windows versions of leading apps and the Microsoft apps would, as they had been on MS-DOS, do everything they could to compete and win. Even with all the effort, leading vendors viewed Windows as yet another platform and most were also not wild about adopting the Mac (this was the opening that was created for Microsoft) and were still focused on character mode platforms. The reluctance of betting on a platform Microsoft controlled with its apps was real, but in hindsight proved . . . limiting.

Ironically, the success Apps achieved on the Mac provided a winning strategy roadmap for Windows—both the applications and the operating system—in creating the right ingredients to take advantage of the market change from individual products to suites, the second shift of the early 1990s in business software. Whereas the killer app on MS-DOS was Lotus 1-2-3, on Windows it was really Office that proved to be that. The Excel team might say that they created the defining app, and that is arguably correct.

On the Mac, both Excel and Word had proven successful products on their own. In modern terminology, these products had clearly demonstrated product-market fit. PMF was coined by Andy Rachleff, cofounder of the legendary venture firm Benchmark. Product-market fit means a product so clearly satisfies a market need that the market literally pulls the product from the company, no matter any incidental flaws or execution challenges. I wish I had the term PMF to work with as so much of what I experienced is rooted in an understanding of what it means to work on something before, during, and after PMF.

PMF for Office on the Mac was a statement about the role of GUI in business (then only on the Mac) and the feature set of each of these products. Professionals were as passionate and committed, perhaps more so, to Word and Excel (and PowerPoint) on the Mac as professionals were to 1-2-3 and WordPerfect on MS-DOS.

The interesting business challenge was that a majority of customers were not purchasing both Word and Excel, and fewer were purchasing PowerPoint. We weren’t sure why that was—market size or price. Did fewer people need a spreadsheet than needed a word processor? Probably not. More likely, the retail price of $495 per product was the problem. The computer cost about $3,000 at the time. The notion that the software would become a significant portion of the price of the computer was perplexing at the retail counter, no matter how much Microsoft was spending on Research & Development or how much that metric might not make sense. The industry was not quite ready for software to become a bigger business than hardware—it was the computer business.

Creating the Office Suite…



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