Listen

Description

The most difficult transition for most new companies is going from a single product to multiple products, something Microsoft managed to pull off fairly early. Inevitably, the next transition is one based on combining products into a suite or bundle in an effort to deliver a better deal to customers while also simplifying (making more efficient) sales and marketing. In 1993 it became clear that Office for Windows would be as successful as Office for Macintosh, and the numbers from 1994 were proving that. The problem was there was a mismatch between what Microsoft was selling (Office) and what Microsoft was building (Word, Excel, PowerPoint). While there were many ways to potentially fix this, a reorganization was chosen. Reorgs are a most dreaded part of corporate life, but they are necessary. The most difficult reorgs are those that reflect strategic changes yet to come, versus “doing things better” that typify most reorgs. The Desktop Applications Division, by all accounts was doing fantastic, accomplishing this with the streamlined Business Unit organization MikeMap put in place. Why change now?

Back to 032. Winning with the Suite

The year 1994 marked the first time a new organizational structure also signaled a new product strategy for DAD. This was disconcerting to the existing BU structure as it created an unsolvable problem up front: What comes first, the suite or category?

It was challenging.

Just prior to when I joined the team, OPU was formed at the end of 1993. The leadership of the team was put in place and designed to make a statement by choosing Chris Peters (ChrisP) to lead the team as the division’s first product leader vice president (in 1994 there were 29 vice presidents among the over 15,000 employees). This was a huge deal at the time—an actual Microsoft engineer hired directly from college made it to product group vice president for the first time. ChrisP’s no-brainer choice to lead development for OPU would be Jon DeVaan (JonDe), who just finished up Excel 5.0 (for Windows). Leading testing was a new hire and a rare industry hire for DAD, Grant George (GrantG) who started on the team just before me. He joined Microsoft from a major project—huge in scale and in failure—the legendary Taligent project at Apple, which was cancelled in favor of Apple acquiring NeXT and thus returning Steve Jobs to the company. It wasn’t immediately clear, but Grant’s leadership and the elevated role of testing would be one of the most major contributions to making Office a reality of a product.

Staffing the team was a non-trivial choice. Do you draft people by skills and need or do you take only volunteers in the hopes of keeping everyone happy? Drafting people would have the effect of sending a clear message about priorities but no one performs well in a job they don’t want. Taking only volunteers would make OPU a happy place while all but guaranteeing the individual apps teams would lobby for people to stay in their jobs and solidify the discord between the apps and OPU. There was some experience in these staffing choices that came from the gentle persuasion that was used by leaders to nudge people from Excel to Word for example. The code bases, development processes, and cultures were different enough that changing jobs was viewed as a bit of a reset. Plus, why would one want to go from Excel to Word when a word processor is nothing more than a spreadsheet with one cell, as ChrisP used to say (Chris moved from Excel to be GM of Word prior to leading OPU).

The undercurrent of the staffing choice was that resources were being reallocated from individual apps to OPU. The apps teams were getting smaller to fund OPU, at least in the immediate term. This was a huge issue. The apps teams had plenty of work to do and could not understand how they would get all that work done while reducing staff size. Plus this all seemed insane to do right on the cusp of potentially winning in the market. The market in this case meant the market for stand-alone word processors or spreadsheets, not the suite market. The apps were not only committed to winning only in their category, but they had ample evidence the industry was not quite there yet as well. The feeling was at any minute Lotus could release a killer Windows spreadsheet or WordPerfect could release a Windows product that would lure all those existing MS-DOS customers to Windows. This was a legitimate concern. It was also not the bet Microsoft was making—the bet was on the suite.

Meanwhile every team continued to hire as many graduating engineers as we could, so we would have plenty of people to do all the work. In software development, the number of engineers is literally everything (perhaps, except for schedule time). The WOBU (Word Business Unit, renamed from OBU when the Mail product was moved to the new Messaging Business Unit) team had grown to over 65 software engineers (plus an equivalent number of Test Engineers and about 25 program managers). The Excel team was not quite as large and finished Excel 5.0 with about 50 software engineers. The new strategy and organization called for creating an OPU with 60 more engineers but seeded with 30 or so engineers from Word and Excel.

The reduction in the individual Apps team headcount immediately and decidedly created a negative view of this process. Teams felt they were being told to do more with less—there was no indication that OPU would be contributing to the mission of winning in categories or even adding useful features. When engineering teams are put in this position, they resist everything. In the case of Word and Excel, their default answer for everything asked of them was along the lines of “go ask OPU as they have all the resources.” At the same time, the apps assumed that OPU would in reality contribute little and what it did contribute would need to be reworked to perform well inside Word and Excel. In other words, OPU was viewed as a net negative, while resources were being taken away. At least that was the emotional argument at the time. It fell to JonDe to deliver and change this debate among developers.

Second, OPU was going to take the lead in orchestrating a planning and engineering process that would result in all the products shipping at the same time. Navigating the fine line between planning for a winning suite product and planning winning category products would be the main challenge. While resources had been set “from above,” what precisely to build and for how long were still open questions. This is what I needed to do.

Had the product plans been left to the business units, each would have chosen a release timeline of about 18 to 24 months with an error rate of perhaps three to six months. People always said, “plus minus” when talking about dates for projects, but in the history of software nothing finished early. Still, we continued to humor ourselves.

In some sense then, the suite could have come together if everyone hit the starting line at the same time and had planned on the same length of project, give or take six…



This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hardcoresoftware.learningbyshipping.com