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With the Office Product Unit in place, and the outline of a plan to release with Chicago in about a year (whenever Chicago was finishing, which was unclear) and a second major release of Office a year after that, we still had to sell the team on the whole approach. This included allocating resources both to OPU as well as the app teams. From the Windows (and thus Microsoft) perspective, anything less than betting 100% on Chicago was seen as a hedge, yet that was exactly what DAD intended to do. This was decidedly about managing the applications business instead of viewing that business as simply supporting evidence for a new release of Windows. Many firmly believed in a wait and see approach to Chicago which was already, and customarily, very late and the existing Office products would run great anyway. This post wraps up the chapter on building the organization and plan for building two releases in parallel. Looking ahead, the chapters tell the story of building those products.

Back to 033. Creating the Office Product Unit (OPU)

The use of year-of-release code names was not arbitrary but reflected a broad consensus within leadership that Microsoft needed to move to product releases that reflected more of an annuity or subscription relationship with customers. The idea of using the year moniker was based on how car companies used model years. We had yet to prove software could be released in this fashion, reliably, and we still lacked a way to distribute products so quickly, but the idea became a cornerstone of planning what to build and how to articulate value. The early naming research for Chicago was heading down the path of using a year name, and similarly Office 4.x would be the last “version number” release.

Marketing had mixed feelings about the year names. The biggest issue was that for some period of time customers would hold off purchasing a product knowing the current version was old. It was also quite stressful for the development teams that had no idea how to ship so much software on real deadlines.

Taking the idea of one release in 12 months and a second one 12 months later, both starting from the same date in late 1993 led naturally to naming the releases 94/96, or Office94 and Office96 (no spaces since this was all for file names and source projects). The 94/96 plan was in place. Sync within 30 days of Chicago in the spring of 1995 or thereabouts. Then Office96 12 months later.

The team’s passion was around Office96, with Office94 being somewhat of a strategy tax while at the same time being viewed as an excellent opportunity to prove out Office as a product and OPU as a team. The plan covered what was necessary and sufficient, albeit with a huge risk—what if Office94 took too long as Windows slipped, bumping up against Office96? You can see the schedule chicken already being played with the assumption that Windows would slip their schedule but Office would not, though there was little history across Word, Excel, and PowerPoint to think Office schedules were that robust and zero experience shipping the entire Office suite at once. History would show that no matter how far off Apps might be, Windows was going to be further off.

To execute required employing a great deal of finesse and some game theory. A plan emerged prior to me joining the team but one I sold to BillG as his TA. The Office team’s 94/96 plan split the resources across releases substantially in favor of Office96. Each Product Unit (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and OPU) devoted one “feature team” to Office94 and the remaining teams were on Office96. A feature team was the organizational unit of a dev team and it is made up of a software development lead and anywhere from three to seven software developers. There was an equal amount of testing and two to three program managers. This was phrased (marketed internally) as “15 percent of the resources dedicated to Chicago” or “85 percent of the resources on Office96.” See what was done there? Everyone got something. When talking to Windows we emphasized the dedicated Chicago team. When speaking across DAD and especially to marketing, we emphasized the 85% on Office96.

Depending on perspective, this was either a relief, albeit still a high cost to pay to get moving on Office96, or a total snub aimed at Chicago. “What, only 15 percent of the team!?” One view was that the unreliability of the Chicago schedule was such that to “sacrifice” any more resources would not be prudent. The worst case would be, ironically, if Chicago did hit the date then too many people trying to do too much in Office would never finish within 30 days.

A different view was that 15 percent was hardly sufficient. Chicago was aiming to be the most important release for consumers (Windows NT was for business) and since the Office business was still a consumer-driven phenomenon it didn’t make sense to be so frugal. In the 15 percent there was a lot for Systems to dislike. If the requirement was to ship simultaneously and reliably with Chicago, then a small team doing the minimal amount was the most prudent, though such thinking was never in line with how Systems worked, which was an “all in, or not in” mindset.

More importantly with DAD, the major challenge with the Office96 part of the plan was the general view that 15 percent of the resources, reductions on top of the shift to OPU, would significantly impact the ability to be competitive within categories, a further reminder about the teams being reduced to “fund” OPU.

If your head is spinning reading this, then you can see why the whole plan of 12/24 was causing heads to spin and adding in the animosity (or just complexity) of the new OPU and shift to suites only made things worse.

We still needed a way to structure the detailed schedule. Normally we would have three milestones of about 10 weeks each. Given the mandate to sync with Chicago the schedule worked out to a single development milestone, instead of the traditional three-milestone schedule. Not only was a small portion of the team on the project but they would be doing a lot less work. Aside from syncing up the final date, the other issue was being available for pre-release testing on the Chicago schedule as they were going to want reviewers to see proof of 32-bit applications. This requirement further justified the schedule and resource constraints. That did little to appease Systems that felt we were totally hedging.

Without a feature list or specification written, things seemed shaky. Picking dates with resource levels set is the first rule of shipping.

Up until this point, most Apps releases had been dictated by the improvements in ease of use while adding productivity features that were the most logical next steps—there was innovation in category features across Word and Excel, but there was also a decade of history in the category, whereas PowerPoint was still establishing the category and faced different challenges. While most of 94/96 was chosen on business and customer grounds of the apps, the prioritization of what to do was heading in a new direction with the emphasis of the suite. …



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