Welcome to Chapter VII, 1995 to 1997 and Office 97. As PC sales surge, growing at a rate of 60 percent in 1996, the enormity of the internet becomes widely realized and will soon dwarf the impact of everything that came before it.
The Apps and the Office team were 110% focused on what should have been the last months of Office96 as part of our 12/24 plan of parallel releases. The product turned out to be much more difficult to finish and the new Office-centric organization met with much more resistance than planned. On top of that, Office 95 took our entire Test team to get out the door, putting us behind on quality. In other words, the 24-month project was going to take longer but we did not yet know how much longer.
Something about Windows 95 shipping changed Microsoft, especially at the top and how the company thought strategically. It was as though with the success of Windows 95 came the need, though not necessarily the ability, to think big thoughts and to develop big plans for the future. The products we were working on were a given, but just not interesting. Everything interesting was yet to begin.
Or was that really the case? A post about planning for a big future while trying to build a product that was already late.
Back to 039. Start Me Up
It was as though we had not been working on Office96 for the past year. With all the excitement of Windows 95 (oh, and Office 95) the conversation quickly turned to asking what would Office do next, after the release we hadn’t even finished and was late. It was kind of weird.
In a relatively short time many things changed. MikeMap retired and with that a slight change in the organization to accommodate, with BillG taking on product groups directly. Microsoft Research was a few years old and occupying more and more of BillG’s headspace. Windows NT 4.0 was on a path to completion and with that a solid spot in the minds of IT leaders, especially for the most anticipated business product of all, Microsoft Exchange email. The much-anticipated Cairo project began to fade in interest and what became more interesting (and ultimately much more important) would be bringing the Windows 95 user experience to the Windows NT operating system kernel. The browser war between Internet Explorer and Netscape and the broader competition over back-end server technologies for the Internet was well underway. Windows would kick off a series of updates to Windows 95 primarily for the benefit of holiday or back-to-school PC Sales (Windows 98, Windows 98 SE, and finally Windows Me). For Office, by many accounts it appeared as though Office had successfully taken the leadership position in the new product category of suites. We were still paranoid about competition especially that Lotus was now owned by IBM and had a huge sales motion behind it.
That seems like a lot of work going on and it was, but from a company strategy perspective it was as though that was all known and thus, for lack of a better word, boring. The real excitement and interesting work was answering the question from BillG “What is Next?”. There was an almost insatiable demand to know our plans for a few years from now, not our current development efforts. It was rather sudden, but soon the altitude of our company dialog was less about the products under development and more about what products should be under development. The concern or even fear was not losing in the next release cycle but in the ones that came later. Intellectually that seemed prudent, but practically it was enormously frustrating as I would alternate between significant execution challenges and vague discussions about an infeasible future.
There were people in parts of the company that had what were considered great visions for where to go, but it always seemed to me like there were practical ways to get to 90% in much less time. Others had ideas for how things should be done, but clearly there was no way to build those now because of some limitation like how different everything else would need to be to be able to build that. Innovations like work from General Magic captivated BillG and everyone but were not selling well (even with a big IPO). As I’d become accustom, a failure in the marketplace was not a failure for BillG so that meant we needed to treat it like a potential competitor. I needed to find a way to engage in this dialog and to represent applications and productivity effectively as “thought leadership” (a popular buzzword).
We were still deep in building Office96, the second part of the 12/24 strategy of working on a pair of releases in parallel. In fairness to me, this was occupying every cycle I had. We were almost two years into the project by the end of 1995 and it was clear we were going to ship much later than planned. Yet, no one really wanted to talk about Office96. Rather, everyone wanted to talk about what would be next. What would be big and bold. To us, Office96 was huge. The scale of the product was greater than anything we had ever done, greater than anything done in the industry.
Office96 did not have any of the a priori constraints of Office94, other than shipping as a suite all at the same time. At the start of any release in early 1994, product teams were thinking big. This time, in addition to each app, there was also the new OPU team (Office Product Unit) team thinking big. Aligning these big thoughts would be add to the challenges.
Our Desktop Applications process was a unique expression of a product development lifecycle. It was not the historic and inappropriately applied moniker of “waterfall”—a legacy process where first requirements are gathered then specifications written, and then code developed until testing signs off. It is also not what would be thought of as agile, in more current terms, when products are increasingly built up over time constrained by short cycles or sprints (primarily because we took a long time, though some also would say because we did not change the software in response to external inputs along the way as well). Throughout the development schedule the product was kept stable and usable by the team but not in a shippable state until defined milestones or beta tests.
The Apps/Office process of setting large aspirations that span 18 to 24 months and scaling implementation as the project evolved was unique at Microsoft and clearly the source of the stability of the products and the position in the market that continues to benefit the company today. Apple remains a lone exception and has brilliantly mastered a delicate balancing act of consistent yearly releases (unbelievably amazing) and long-term product plans patiently released over multiple years. Business is a social science and as such drawing causal relationships between processes used at different companies is risky thinking.
Whatever one might call this process (it just became known as the Office process), the assumption BillG had was that whatever we were able to articulate to him was already booked. On the one hand, this was great and it meant he could count on us to deliver. On the other hand, it was incredibly frustrating for him for two reasons. First, the ability to articulate a product extremely concretely—literally with early working code that he knew would ship, screen shots, and endless specifications—meant it was going to feel done and immune to his tweaks and inputs. Second, the very existence of a working and reliable product meant that it was time to move on. It was almost a curse of being perceived as reliable and focused on execution. Still, we were very…