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Few recall our products being developed at the end of the 20th century, but they were the foundation of modern Microsoft: Windows NT 5.0 (Windows 2000 Server and Workstation), Office9 (Office 2000), and Exchange Platinum (Exchange 2000). These products had none of the glitz or bang that consumers experienced with the 1995 wave of products, but the company used the intervening years to mature and “pivot” from that consumer company to an enterprise company. It has been said (by many) the best products don’t always win, but the products that win become the best products. Take these relatively uninspiring products and launch them with a hungry, organized, and focused global sales force waiting for the opportunity to prove Microsoft was an enterprise company and we had the makings of, well, the future of Microsoft. For Office the first step, however, was to figure out how to even build products for these new customers.

Back to 047. Don’t Ship the Org Chart

A characteristic of the early computing era was how much of it was created and built simply for our collective enjoyment or our view of what the products should do and how they should work. Looking back, it is easy to see the limitations of such an approach. How could a bunch of math and computer science majors with no previous work experience build a word processor for lawyers or a spreadsheet for bankers? This was even more true in tools and operating systems where just doing the work to make other stuff function was not only miraculous enough to constitute a product release, but also kind of fun. Even Microsoft’s biggest bets, such as the graphical user interface, were not based on any sort of “what the customer wants” or even customer problems, as much as building it because we (or more correctly conventional wisdom among hackers) thought it made sense or simply because we could.

This approach, which I previously referred to as testosterone-based development, hinged on the most assertive argument or fastest to write code dictating what we did, served the company and industry extremely well. Then one day we looked around and the universe of people buying computers was much larger than our fellow techies. The people with all the money were interested in a more nuanced approach to software, and that included meeting what they perceived were their needs. They wanted computers to contribute to the business bottom line, and to do so cost-effectively.

Our approach to building the platform and apps led to a complexity that even we could not understand at times. I recall once struggling in my office to build a histogram with Excel. I just couldn’t do it (there was no internet to ask). I finally asked a teammate who was one of the original Excel developers to help me. We spent hours that night, some of it in the Excel debugger, trying to figure out how to make Excel do something we knew (or so we thought) it could do. It was a weird moment that left a real mark on me but in hindsight it was no surprise that even an Excel developer wasn’t an expert in actually using Excel. This pattern repeated itself across the whole Microsoft product line. Our “power users” and those that authored the 1000-page how-to books were far more expert in what we were doing and the limitations than we were. One group in particular had raced well ahead of us in understanding Office, the corporate IT administrator of our new LORG customers—those tasked with putting a PC on every desk. Much to our surprise, the complexity of issuing a PC to every worker was vastly more than going to the store and buying one for home or even managing the 5 PCs in a typical developer office. It was, in a favorite Microsoft-ism, non-linear complexity—the more PCs a company had the ever more complexity each additional PC created.

We needed to wrap our collective minds around both the suite and LORGs in a new way. What did it mean to build Office for LORGs? To be concrete, what features would sell? What were customer pain points that if we solved would cause more customers to upgrade?

Teams like Windows Server and especially Microsoft Exchange fully embraced the complete trappings of LORG product teams. The leaders were showing up in the newly renovated Executive Briefing Center where potential customers came to spend a day learning about our strategy. Teams engaged with the industry analysts at firms like Gartner Group, Meta, and Forrester. These groups acted almost as referees of enterprise product strategy and roadmaps, charging enterprise IT, our customers, handsomely for interpretation and explanation of vendor strategies. Microsoft even paid to have their strategy heard and critiqued knowing customers were paying for an objective interpretation—this was the enterprise game, or racket. These activities spun up and were driven by a newly LORG-focused Office marketing team with dedicated leadership for LORGs, staffed with people who previously worked in field sales. Server groups spent considerable energy on these efforts, particularly from program management.

It would be impossible to overstate the effort and results from the Server and Exchange teams deeply embedding themselves into customer environments. Organizationally from the top down there was a melding of the minds with the deeply technical IT leaders that were making career bets on deploying Windows servers and Exchange email. There were people on the Exchange team, for example, that spent far more time at Boeing than they ever did at Microsoft. There were LORG customers that were so frequently seen in the Server hallways that one could mistake them for full time employees or vendors (and some even had Microsoft credentials).

Office needed to find a path more suited to the products we were building. The server products were both purchased and used by IT professionals. Office differed between the buyer and the user. BradWe, of Office design, was fond of saying we needed to be building products that were “useful, usable, and desirable,” and then reminded us of that when the purchaser and the end-user were different people or organizations. IT people were both end-users of Office and also corporate gatekeepers. The most fascinating thing about working with them was keeping track of which hat they would be wearing for any given conversation. We had plenty of inputs and a much deeper understanding of end-users, but it was not uncommon for IT people to flip from talking about deployment or performance to suggestions for formatting features or ease of use. That was always the tricky balance for us.

The Apps teams pioneered smart processes for learning from end-users. Word used instrumentation to learn from individuals while also learning from specific customer types such as lawyers to understand the nuances of multipage footnotes, specific formatting of tables of citations, or the crazy complexity of nested numbering in briefs. Excel mastered getting inside the heads of the power users of Wall Street and the sophisticated models they created. PowerPoint from the start understood consultants and trainers (and preachers!) in addition to the art and science of graphical presentation. These techniques formed the foundation of learning from customers in a systematic manner that helped avoid product design by feedback and anecdotes.

With the rise of a highly engaged sales force and the deeply connected product teams, we had an onslaught of anecdotes. Executives were fanned out around the world “visiting customers” as we would say when referring to the highly stylized ritual of an executive hopping on a plane and visiting a few countries and 8-10 customers in a swing through a geography account teams in tow. Execs would routinely share the horror stories from these visits about products that didn’t work, competitive threats, or simply customer demands for must-have features. The target for these visits were the Fortune 500 or even the Global 2000, and the leading government agencies in most every country of the wor…



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