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Welcome to planning Office10 and going inside the strategy, synergy, unification engine that characterized the early 2000s Microsoft (beginning in late 1998). This is a beefy post (too long for email) and even includes an embedded PDF (a new Substack feature 🔥) of the entire Office10 Vision document.

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Sync with Windows 2000. Sync with Whistler (the codename for Windows XP). Sync with Windows Server. Sync with Exchange Platinum (codename for Exchange 2000). Sync with Exchange Titanium (the one after that). Sync with SQL 2000. Sync with the one after that that didn’t even have a codename yet. Sync. Sync. Sync. That was what we heard from every corner of the company when it came to building the next release of Office. Sync wasn’t just about schedule. Sync implied deep strategic connections in the code and user experience—it was all about product synergy.

A remarkable accomplishment of Microsoft’s earliest days was entering all the major lines of software at the time. In a c. 1981 video produced by Microsoft, “A Hard Line on Software”, the company touted its product line.

A full line of system software not just one or two products, and all of our products are designed to work together…a full line. Microsoft products cover all three areas of system software: languages, operating systems, and end-user tools.

Microsoft’s core DNA was having products in all the major areas of software while also committing to products worked better together. This was BillG to the core.

By the late 1990s, Microsoft had spawned two businesses greater than $10 billion in Windows and Office and breaking those down further one could find multiple businesses closing in on $1 billion in revenue from Visual Studio and developer tools to the various servers such as Exchange and SQL to the new business of MSN and games. The breadth part of the DNA was firing on all cylinders.

The other part of our DNA was proving to be more difficult and at the same time the demands for products to work together were only increasing. This was happening as product complexity skyrocketed and the predictability of product releases was not improving. More importantly, each of these big products began to have significant overlap: Exchange and SQL, Basic and C++, Word and Publisher (and anything that edited text), Excel and the Access database (and Visual Basic), Internet Information Server and Windows file server, and the list goes on and on. Mind you, the overlap was not entirely obvious to most as the market clearly saw these as different products. Inside Microsoft, however, the overlap was at some deep architectural level worthy of debate and ultimately synergy and unification.

As enterprise customers came to dominate the business, strategy was no longer just about features. Strategy was how products were deployed, managed, and integrated into business scenarios. Something entirely clear at a usage level such as e-mail, a database for line of business data, and file storage became a galactically hard strategy problem when customers wanted to deploy and manage one scaled “place to store data”.

The technical leaders of the company spent most of our executive time on the collisions between products when it came to deployment and management and the seams between them when it came to user-experience and scenarios. Having more than one way to do something or failing to have clarity in prescriptive guidance to the field sales organization was reason enough for a big meeting or offsite.

Call it what you will, synergy, strategy, unification, consistency, or simply efficiency were the key attributes everyone was to aim for. It was assumed achieving this was part of the schedule, though this operational aspect was almost never discussed or even challenged. Unify was definitely BillG’s favorite way to describe his goal.

For better or worse, those of us with our experience in Office made oft-repeated calls that synergy comes from synchronizing ship dates across products. Surprisingly it seemed to have sunk in now that a big wave of server products (Windows 2000 and the 2000 servers) were nearing completion. So now everyone wanted to know when the next Office was shipping and importantly, would that date align with what they were planning on for the next releases. Such scheduling was of course impossible. Not only was no one in the company hitting ship dates but having any two groups first agree on a target and then hit that target was akin to bullets colliding mid-air downrange, on purpose. Important here is that we’re not talking about new groups or small teams, but massive billion-dollar products and customers spending tens of millions of dollars per year on their Enterprise Agreements. Each of the product teams approached 1,000 people at this point. The scale was immense.

As it would turn out and much to our collective surprise, the next releases of both Windows and Office (the releases being planned in the timeframe of this chapter) would in fact hit their target ship dates. Both of our teams came to the exact conclusion, independently, in the heat of synergy overload—shipping was all that mattered. Windows put in place a plan to add all the key consumer support missing from Windows 2000—the last features that remained from the 16-bit code base—along with a broad range of features and technologies from around the Windows team. This plan was codenamed Whistler, nominally named after the Canadian town and ski resort favored by many Seattleites. It was both remarkable and commendable to see this little part of Windows carved out and allowed to be, given all the strategic initiatives going on. To be honest, for most of the time we were working on Office it always seemed like the other shoe would drop and the product would slip. In hindsight, that was probably unfair. On the other hand, it might be the first release of Windows to ever ship on time.

In Office we were smarting from the lukewarm reviews for Office 2000, despite the groundswell of support from our enterprise customers for the complete Desktop 2000 that was just starting to deploy. Knowing that most customers were just beginning to deploy we could have taken out time with the next release, but I felt a strong need to get back in the market with end-user appeal and to bring some focus and attention to innovation in productivity and of course the internet. There were still deep concerns about the potential for relevancy of Office in an internet-centric world.

All this pressure about synergy and synchronizing pushed us to start planning for a new release in the summer of 1998 which turned out to be seven months before finishing Office 2000. My reluctance to even provide a code name, which would then probably leak, excite the field sales force, make it into the press, and so on, caused me to plainly title the memo “Next Release of Office”. Cleverly, the team immediately took the code name of the release to be the ambiguous “NRO”. I admit it now, but I kind of liked that. Security by obscurity. In short order the team started calling the next release Office10, because it was the one that came after Office9. That was good enough for us.

There was much we could focus on. There was also a great deal of low-hanging fruit we could pick off in terms of enterprise customers. This was in practice our big challenge. How can we find a way to balance all the various forms of feedback, knowing that the bulk …



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