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Viruses were nothing new in the late twentieth century, but we were about to cross a line where they were far more than annoyances. This is the story leading up to and crossing that line and the very difficult decisions we had to make relative to the value propositions in our products and that customers appreciated. It sounds easy today, but at the time it was enormously difficult. Breaking your own code is never a trivial matter. This story is also a bit of a sleuthing adventure as tracking down this virus is an important part of understanding the dynamics and context of making difficult changes—there’s always a conspiracy theory. We will follow the story through John Markoff’s excellent NY Times reporting, which was rather frustrating to me at the time.

It is somewhat odd to be writing about viruses for computers when we face such a tragic biological virus. At the same time, we are still unwinding from an incredible zero-day exploit so the lessons herein seem quite relevant as well.

This post, slightly edited, appeared as an excerpt in Fast Company in May 2020, on the 20th anniversary of ILOVEYOU with a related Q&A Steven Sinofsky lived Microsoft history. Now he’s writing it. Many thanks to Harry McCracken (@harrymccracken), global technology editor at Fast Company.

Back to 059. Scaling…Everything

One morning during the first week of May of the new millennium, I received a call at my apartment while I was getting ready for work. I heard a reporter tell me their name, and then listened to hyperventilating and (apparently) proclaiming their love for me repeatedly, “I love you. I love you.”

That’s what I heard, anyway. The call. A reporter. Early morning. It was all weird.

Unfortunately, LOVE broke out all over the internet. Over the span of a weekend, inboxes around the world of Outlook and Exchange email users were inundated with dozens of copies of email messages with the subject line, “ILOVEYOU.”

I learned from the reporter that the LOVE email incident was deemed so serious that the PR lead gave them my home number and simultaneously sent me a briefing via email. In the era of dial-up, I could not read the email and talk on the phone because I only had one analog phone line at home. I had no idea what was going on, so I agreed to return the call after I dialed up and downloaded my email.

That’s when I realized the magnitude of the issue.

For all the positives of the PC in business, IT professionals still wrestled with the freedom of PCs, not only the freedom to create presentations and spreadsheets but the freedom to potentially wreak havoc on networks of connected PCs because of computer viruses. Viruses were hardly new, part of PCs from the earliest days. As a new hire in the Apps Development College training, I completed a unit on early MS-DOS viruses. The combination of many more PCs in the workplace, networking, and then email created a new opportunityfor those wishing to do harm with viruses. By their nature, and by analogy to the word virus, most viruses are not fatal to a PC, but they could cause significant damage, loss of time, and take a good deal of effort to clean up.

By the late 1990s even amongst government and academia, the risk posed by viruses to the nation’s infrastructure were front and center. Fred B. Schneider, a Cornell faculty member (and former sponsor of our chapter of Association of Computer Science Undergraduates), chaired a working committee going back to 1996 on the topic of trustworthy information systems (the word trustworthy will make an appearance in much of Microsoft’s reaction to the stories shared here). The committee included faculty from many universities and representatives from across industry, including Microsoft’s George Spix (GSpix). The work was convened by Computer Science and Technical Communications Board of the National Research Council whose members included Butler Lampson (BLampson), Jim Gray (Gray) and Ray Ozzie. The effort resulted in a 300-page report that was widely influential, once the commercial world caught up with these challenges.

Enterprise IT was increasingly uneasy about viruses and had the expectation that Microsoft must do something. The openness of the PC platform was a hallmark feature responsible for the utility and breadth of the PC ecosystem, even if some bad actors (as they were called) might exploit that openness. Microsoft took a laissez-faire approach to this annoyance.

Office shared this permissive attitude until the mid-1990s and the rise of networks when sharing files became common. With everyone connected, an annoyance morphed into a virus that shared itself automatically between computers. A virus infected Microsoft Word 6.0 called WM/Concept.A—viruses often had cryptic names. In this case the WM stood for Word Macro, and presumably Concept referred to the fact that this was testing a new concept for viruses.

This was a new type of virus. It did not exploit bugs or programming mistakes in Word. Concept used Word macros as they were designed. Macros were present in software for ages, going as far back to the MS-DOS days of WordPerfect and Lotus 1-2-3. Macros, called programmability or extensibility in Microsoft lingo, were a prized accomplishment and something BillG believed in pushing extensibility for all products. Programmability made a product sticky when customers invested time and effort to write macros. Macros were used to automate repetitive tasks, for example, if a company wrote similar letters to customers for past due notices, one could write a macro, which generated letters with all the right address fields and salutations. Another example might be to automate collecting sources in a document and creating a bibliography. The uses for macros were endless and an entire industry developed consulting and training in Word automation. Word macros used a derivative of BASIC.

Some macros were written to automatically run as soon as a file was opened, making systems appear more automatic to end-users. The WM/Concept.A virus took advantage of a combination of features to create an exceedingly simple and yet maximally annoying experience including: macros, automatic start-up, and networked file sharing.

The original author of WM/Concept.A probably crafted a tantalizing document with the virus and shared it on a network knowing others would open the document, sort of a patient zero. Once anyone opened that document, every document they created or opened became infected. Any document they shared became infected and infected every PC that opened that document. Like the old shampoo commercial, “ . . . and they told two friends, and they told two friends, and so on, and so on.” Well, that is exactly what happened. WM/Concept.A circled the globe relentlessly.

Contrary to what was commonly believed, successful viruses didn’t usually do anything harmful like delete all your files or format your hard drive. If they did, the viruses failed to spread and serve their purpose. WM/Concept.A did only one annoying thing other than propagate, and that was to display a message that looked like a broken Word error message—a simple window with the character “1” and button labeled “OK.” That was it. The message showed up once during the initial infection.

While there was no direct harm to PCs or any documents, the obvious implications of this Concept virus were that viruses could easily spread and, if the author wished, could do significant harm or at the very least truly interrupt workflow, and at most, do …



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