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Welcome to Chapter X!

The turn of a new century and survival of “Y2K” begins a massive expansion of the Office product line, a dramatic change in the products we built, and a reinvention of how we market Office, while simultaneously tripling and quadrupling down on enterprise customers. The result of this transformation sets the stage for the most formative years culturally for the Microsoft that takes us to today’s products (365, Azure), but unknowingly constrained us going forward.

Back to 068. The XP eXPerience

One early company meeting as the CFO Mike Brown (MikeBro) was going over the numbers he had a chart of the Fortune 500 showing that Microsoft finally made it into the rankings. He showed the top 5 companies or so, which dwarfed Microsoft then just barely in the top half. Sitting next to my first Microsoft friend KirkG, I recall asking him if he thought there would ever be a software company the size of AT&T or General Motors. His answer, “hell yes.”

Though Microsoft was number 84 by sales, it had achieved the unimaginable as the largest company by market capitalization. Thinking about that even today is still difficult to fathom—bigger than the oil companies, bigger than the entire auto industry, bigger than the phone company. It was obviously more than humbling. It was terrifying.

There was, nevertheless, a swagger across the company. Sure, the trial and settlement were still going on but the worst seemed over. There was such an incredible wave of success from the new enterprise business, both the licensing of enterprise agreements and the product offerings on the Windows/Office 2000 platform, along with Exchange and several other key products. For product people these were the magical product releases. There were “investments” as SteveB called them across every imaginable product category. The combination of Microsoft pivoting to internet technologies, the dot com crash, and simply winning against competitors is what I believe really caused a change in how we thought about ourselves, by rising to the moment and vanquishing competitors: Netscape, Sun, and Novel on servers, Apple on desktops, Borland on tools, Lotus on email, and so many other smaller companies. We saw success in everything we were doing. It became difficult even to find competitive products to get the team sincerely fired up. The biggest competitor was no one company but alliances such as anyone using Java or open source, but these were diffused and fragmented battles. Microsoft’s oxygen came from competing and winning and we’d sucked all the oxygen out of the market by winning so soundly. The market capitalization was a realization of that.

It would be a mistake to think success would not change how we built products. When you chase a competitor, even if you’ve got better ideas for how to express, implement, or sell a product as we did for Excel versus 1-2-3, the idea for the product in the first place came from the competitor. Microsoft didn’t invent from whole cloth many products. Most every product has a lineage of some form, so this is never an entirely fair way to judge. Most every successful product could be traced to a direct competitor with scale. On the other hand, many of our biggest failures were products that lacked a competitor where we would often get lost on a meandering journey trying to figure out what to even build. The Blackbird internet authoring tool previously described was a good example of this.

We had competitors of course, and some were spectacularly good. Oracle would forever remain the top SQL database company. Linux and open source were clearly a huge issue, but as should have been anticipated they would not win head-to-head but would only win when a paradigm shift—cloud and mobile—enabled them to flourish in business software. SAP and the whole space of software that ran the back office of enterprise and CRM software escaped us even with their deep connections to Office and email.

Increasingly Microsoft’s strategies became so daunting and all-encompassing it was nearly impossible to imagine a single competitor that could offer anything close to our strategy slides, and equally impossible for any single person to track. We were in a constant state of tuning the message and product line. Platforms lurched from Distributed interNet Architecture (DNA), to Next Generation Windows Services (NGWS), to .NET to .NET MyServices (aka Hailstorm), with stops along the way such as putting “+” on the name of every new endeavor, for example COM+, or adding XML to expand an existing strategy. At each iteration, everything was rebranded, expanded, and re-factored. An area like accessing data stored in a database cycled through acronyms representing increased capability and complexity, and varying compatibility and tools support: ODBC, OLEDB, DAO, ADO, ADO.NET, RDO, and more. The complexity of naming was only matched by the increasing complexity of software. The original Windows 3.0 APIs numbering about 350 had expanded to a literally uncountable breadth of platform services. No single developer could comprehend this. Definitely no one in Office and we began to feel distant from the very platform strategy we depended upon. Office had historically been the source of killer apps for platform strategies, but now the platform team looked to the biggest consumer web sites and largest commercial web applications as the desktop and client were deprioritized.

The evolution of the much beloved Visual Basic provided a lesson in this divergence. Office had just managed to add VB to all the products with solid performance, a major cross-company success. VB was in the process of being updated, really replaced, by a newly rearchitected product called Visual Basic .NET or VB.NET, which gained synergy with the .NET strategy and new iteration of the language for use on servers. This product was so different from the classic and wildly popular Visual Basic that one of Microsoft’s own and much-loved MVPs (the leaders in the community carefully selected to offer the best knowledge and support for products) dubbed the new product Visual Fred in an infamous blog post that rallied the community but divided it from Microsoft. Other posts began to meticulously track the differences in the new product and the time and effort required to migrate existing projects.

Office could not possibly retrofit this incompatible tool into the product—customers would have lost their minds as we had just completed migrating from …



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