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The question of why there is something rather than nothing is familiar in metaphysics. First asked by Leibniz, it was made more famous by Heidegger. More fundamental than the question of why there are beings rather than nothing is, in my view, the question of why there is being in the first place. Related is the question of why there are qualities, or qualia. So far, science hasn’t provided us with an answer to this latter question. As for being itself, it remains invisible to disciplines focused on beings rather than being. They measure the causes and effects of qualities, but why there are qualities and from where qualities come rank among the most intractable metaphysical questions. They rank with the question of why there is being in the first place and not just beings. Not only must we distinguish between beings and being, we must also inquire into what allows being to be? These questions will appear meaningless to some readers, but others will find them engrossing issues that appeal to the essence of ontology, metaphysics, and philosophy in their truest sense.

Over the years, my ontological reflections have been formed fundamentally by the Vedāntic teachings in the Upaniṣads. Reflecting on these Hindu books has provided me with my clearest insights into being. My early upbringing in a traditional pre-Vatican II Catholic milieu in New York influenced me unconsciously as I imbibed aspects of Thomistic and Aristotelian philosophy. These were not communicated directly by my teachers or the parish priests but were implicit in the formation that I received in that traditional Catholic setting. My first conscious interaction with metaphysics came through reading, first as a teenager and then more seriously as I grew older, the Upaniṣads. The insights they afforded me were fortified through the practice of jñāna-yoga and bhakti-yoga, which draw upon Vedānta and the Upaniṣads.

My intellectual awakening to the question of being happened while reading Étienne Gilson’s Being and Some Philosophers. I spent many months in the 1980s poring over this book and meditating over virtually every sentence. It took a couple of years before I sensed that I had grasped the import of Gilson’s critical views of essentialism. It took more years of rereading and reflection to comprehend the significance of the Thomist existentialism that he defended in the last chapters of the book. But understanding does not equal agreement, for the more I understood Gilson’s views, the less I agreed with him. That’s because I am congenitally a Platonist and not an Aristotelian. Those two words code contrary approaches to metaphysics. My early predilection for the Upaniṣads already predicts my penchant for a Platonic rather than an Aristotelian metaphysics. Despite my appreciation of Aristotelian defenses of universals against austere, deflationary ontologies, I see universals as subsisting whether or not there’s a physical world. Universals—along with qualia—don’t require instantiation in the physical universe because they subsist independently of it. On this central ontological issue, I depart from Aristotle and move decisively toward Plato, whom I find to be much closer than Aristotle to the the spirit of the Upaniṣads.

This is the background for the issue that I want to talk about today. This isn’t the question of why there are beings, which is a mysterious issue, but rather the question of why there is being in the first place. To have any chance of answering that question, we first have to suggest an answer the question, “What is being?” Heidegger famously raised this question in Being and Time, but in an unsatisfactory way in my view. By temporalizing being, he reduced being to the status of a being. But being can’t be a being. It can’t be a something like numbers, essences, substances, or human beings because it is the ground of these various types of entities. Were it possible for being to become a being, a something, it would stand on the same level with other beings, or somethings, and would fall—which is impossible—from its status as being itself. A fundamental ontological truth is that being can’t be anything other than itself. This insight authorized Heidegger’s ontological difference and evoked Gilson’s relentless analysis of virtually every metaphysical school that he was familiar with as ultimately reducing being to beings. (In Advaita Vedānta this is the error of failing to perceive the difference between saguṇa-brahman and nirguṇa-brahman, which transforms Brahman into something less than itself.)

Despite diversionary moves arising in deflationary, positivist, analytic, and scientific variants of metaphysics, the most fundamental questions in ontology and metaphysics are what being is and, crucially, why there is being. The clue that hints at answers to these questions is suggested by considering qualities, qualia. It’s a delightful spring morning at the Yoga Vidya ashram in northern Germany where I have been on retreat for the last four months. I am outside standing in the fresh spring grass gazing at a stand of flowering trees. When I consider the greenness of the leaves and the grass, I am not looking for a biological answer but rather for the source of the greenness of the leaves and the grass—for greenness itself. What is green? What is it to be green? Where does green come from? How is it that there’s a quality of greenness that suffuses these leaves, the grass on which I’m standing, the green shirt that I’m wearing, and the green lawn chair standing at my side. What is this quality of greenness?

Related questions concern the other qualities that we experience in life. We might ask, “What is a virtue?” “What is goodness?” “What is honesty?” and “Where do virtues come from ontologically?” We can ask after the source of other qualities such as the devotion of religious people, the integrity of a reliable person, the feeling of friendship, the feeling of connectedness, the feeling of wanting to do something for others. We might ask after the source of melody, rhythm, language, cognition, and obligation. Besides these vexing issues concerning the source of qualities are questions about numbers and universals. When we analyze everyday experience, we see that it is pervaded with an ensemble of ethical, aesthetic, scientific, mathematical, and metaphysical qualities. None of these qualities can be excised from our experience through a monotonic physicalist understanding of life. We can’t easily and plausibly explain them away. Physicalist attempts to reduce them to something else inevitably fails. How do you reduce a virtue to a physical process? It’s just not possible. Attempts to explain away qualities as referring to or reliant on physical processes will fail for anyone with a classical formation, whether Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, Catholic, or Orthodox Christian because they fail to come to terms with the fundamental, existential, phenomenological, and ontological reality of qualities, which pervade our existence and make our lives meaningful.

Inquiring into their source and persistently asking why they exist leads me into deep meditative reveries in which I become quiet and still. These reveries kindle philosophical, metaphysical, and ontological insight at their highest pitch. Philosophy at this contemplative level is not the analysis of words and arguments. It’s not a reductive program dissolving all phenomena into physical processes. These contemplations lead to the contemplation of being itself, or Brahman in Sanskrit.

As I am using the term being, it is equivalent to the most fundamental standpoint, which is the ground from which everything else emerges. The word itself is not as important as being’s status as that which is always prior to whatever is or exists. When the word being is reduced to a mere abstraction, we can drop it and speak instead of whatever it is that is prior to this reduce…



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