Iran’s Three-Phased Plan
Iran has a flexible, grand strategic plan to expand its global influence. These tactics include cultural, economic, military, and diplomatic elements. In some parts of the world, the Qods Force uses nonmilitary tactics, techniques, and procedures to build influence. National security analyst Joseph M. Humire, testifying before the U.S. Congress on the Guards’ penetration in Latin America, outlined Iran’s three-phased strategy to gain influence there. Humire’s model has broad applicability to Iran’s efforts to gain sway in many Third World, non-Muslim-majority states.
The phases—cultural and economic, diplomatic, and military—usually progress sequentially, but these activities often occur concurrently. The first phase is developing cultural and economic influence. Iran uses cultural activities to infiltrate and proselytize. In this phase, Iran first cultivates prominent Shia in foreign states. From there, operatives introduce themselves to the broader Shia community. This may involve outflanking Sunni sheiks and mosques in those communities. Iran subsidizes the construction of new mosques to be run under the direct or indirect control of Tehran. In 2015, Gen. John Kelly, then commander of Southern Command, testified that Iran has built eighty cultural centers in Latin America alone.
As the Qods Force establishes a cultural beachhead in targeted countries, it expands its economic influence through both illicit and legal activities. In Latin America, this includes exploiting corrupt systems to influence political outcomes. According to Transparency International, Latin America is among the world’s most corrupt regions. In Venezuela and Argentina, Iran has funneled funds to politicians in hopes of securing favors. In the Middle East, Iran’s intelligence services, the Guards and the MOIS, also target host nations’ intelligence and security services.
The second phase is diplomatic. Some diplomatic activity in Iranian embassies, consulates, and associated offices is legitimate. However, under the guise of diplomatic activity, Iran also conducts intelligence and influence operations. Sometimes the Guards and the MOIS partner with host-nation intelligence services. Other times they act autonomously and in violation of the host nation’s laws and agreements. Iran employs diplomatic personnel to promote film festivals, book fairs, and youth festivals to expand its influence. Iranian staff working in embassies target three particular communities—youth, women, and, in the case of Latin America, indigenous groups. Iran’s embassies also serve as hubs for military sales and purchases of strategic minerals.
The third phase is military penetration. In many Middle Eastern states, particularly Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, Iran’s military assistance and guidance to Hezbollah are well known and often openly acknowledged. In other countries, Iran’s military and intelligence footprints are concealed. Humire points to cooperation between the Basij and Venezuelan political, military, and intelligence leaders. For example, Basij and Venezuelan paramilitary personnel have exchanged lessons learned on counterprotest tactics.
Shia Liberation Army
Since its founding, the Islamic Republic has championed Shia militias abroad. Major General Jafari described the Qods Force’s mission as aiding “revolutionary movements, the resistance movements, and the oppressed worldwide.” In January 2019, Major General Salami threatened to “eliminate” Israel if Israel went to war with Iran. Guards are stationed in Latin America, North Africa, Central Asia, and South Asia. Other Shia from Bahrain, India, Kuwait, and Pakistan have served under Iranian command in the Shia Liberation Army (SLA).
The SLA is an organization in which non-Iranian military personnel take orders from high-level officers. During the war with Iraq, Iran trained, funded, and equipped Shia recruits from abroad. It still does, and many serve with the SLA, answering the call of Iran’s mullahs to fight alongside Iranian soldiers. Nearly 4,600 foreign nationals have been killed serving in Iranian-commanded units, generally in the SLA. Most were Shia Afghans and Iraqis who had taken refuge in Iran and served in the SLA. By 2018, in Syria alone, there were about seven to ten thousand foreigners and Syrians in various groups working with the Iranians, often with the SLA but also with indigenous groups. The SLA is headquartered in Iran and deploys forces across the region, particularly in Syria.
The SLA’s three divisions are supplied with armored personnel carriers, artillery, antitank guided missiles, man-portable air-defense systems, and small arms. Some SLA recruits are sent to one of the Qods Force’s military training camps inside Iran. Basic training courses last twenty to forty-five days. Those who pass proceed to advanced training courses in logistics and support, explosives, and advanced-weapons skills. More advanced courses cover explosives, mortars, tactics and warfare, and sniper skills. Iran also engages in charity in the region to gain local support; to that end, the SLA operates soup kitchens and medical dispensaries.
