Last time we spoke about the beginning of the battle for Kyiv. In August 1941, as Nazi Germany advanced towards Kyiv, their confidence in a swift victory began to wane. General Fedor von Bock's forces had captured Smolensk, yet the Soviet Red Army, led by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, mounted an unexpected and resilient defense. The Soviets, despite their heavy losses, rallied and mobilized millions, initiating counteroffensives that demonstrated their vast potential. Amidst the chaos, logistical troubles plagued the German troops, stretching their resources thin and leading to growing unrest among soldiers grappling with devastating casualties. As the battle for Kyiv intensified, the realization dawned on German commanders that their aggressive strategy was failing, with victory slipping from their grasp.
This episode is Zhukov, Guderian and the race to Kyiv
Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
Tension stretches from Berlin, the capital of Germany, to Moscow, the heart of Russia, as military commanders and powerful leaders strategize their next moves. One side contemplates a decisive action, while the other fears that too much territory has already been surrendered. The Red Army must now prepare to confront the Wehrmacht, in a critical battle just outside Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. Last week marked a turning point as fighting in the sector of Army Group Center came to a standstill, largely due to exhaustion among the troops. In response, Adolf Hitler commanded General Guderian to redirect his forces south toward Ukraine, while General Hermann Hoth provided support for Army Group North, advancing from the north.
On August 20, a report from the 2nd Army's 267th Infantry Division noted that over the preceding six days, the division had suffered around 1,000 casualties, bringing its total losses since the war began in the east to approximately 2,700 men. Within the LIII Army Corps, which included the 267th Infantry Division, overall losses reached 192 officers and 5,500 soldiers by August 22. At the war's outset, the average German infantry division consisted of about 17,000 troops. By the end of August 1941, the impact of casualties on these divisions was significant. In 14 of the divisions, losses had exceeded 4,000 men; in 40 divisions, over 3,000; in 30 divisions, over 2,000; and 58 divisions recorded losses of fewer than 2,000. On August 21, fighting around the Yel’nya salient, a bulge in the front line near the Smolensk region, began to ease as the Soviet 24th Army regrouped and received reinforcements in preparation for a major offensive expected by the end of the month. Even during this period of relative calm, the German IX Army Corps, tasked with defending the northern flank of the salient, was so severely understrength that engineers, desperately needed to build roads behind the front, were forced to fight as infantry for weeks.
The term “quiet” seems almost ironic considering the continuous losses being inflicted. The 137th Infantry Division was reportedly losing over 50 men daily in localized skirmishes between August 20 and 30, while the neighboring 263rd Infantry Division lost around 1,200 men from August 20 to 27, averaging about 150 losses per day. Following an inspection of the Yel’nya frontline, Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder was told, “Troops are very strained. Enemy artillery activity is unpleasant, and our munitions are limited. Mines and wire are absent.” As August came to a close, the anticipated Soviet offensive finally commenced, featuring eight rifle divisions, two tank divisions, and one motorized infantry division, all supported by 800 artillery guns, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers. The Soviet forces, under General Georgy Zhukov's Reserve Front, were organized into two shock groups positioned north and south of the salient. For the first time, this offensive was coordinated with simultaneous attacks by the Western Front in the north at Dukhovshchina and the Bryansk Front in the south at Roslavl and Novozybkov. On the offensive’s first day, August 30, the Soviets penetrated ten kilometers into the southern flank of General Günther von Kluge’s forces, prompting Field Marshal Fedor von Bock to dispatch two divisions, including the 10th Panzer Division, to stabilize the situation. Heavy fighting ensued until September 2, when Bock decided to abandon the Yel’nya salient, deeming it purposeless and noting that the divisions there were being "bled white" over time. Thus, after six weeks of fierce combat and staggering losses, the Yel’nya salient ultimately proved ineffective, an appalling illustration of the aimless strategic direction of Army Group Centre. As soldier Franz Frisch, who fought in these battles, later reflected…
“Officially it was called a ‘planned withdrawal’, and a ‘correction of the front lines.’ . . . But to me it was so much bullshit. The Russians were kicking us badly and we had to regroup . . . The next day – or maybe a few days later – we heard on the radio, in the ‘news from the front’ (Wehrmachtsbericht) about the ‘successful front correction’ in our Yel’nya defensive line, which was east of Smolensk, and the enormous losses we had inflicted on the enemy. But no single word was heard about a retreat, about the hopelessness of the situation, about the mental and emotional stagnation and numbness of the German soldiers. In short, it was again a ‘victory’. But we on the front line were running back like rabbits in front of the fox. This metamorphosis of the truth from ‘all shit’ to ‘it was a victory’ baffled me, and those of my comrades who dared to think”.
Franz Frisch was not the only German soldier to be taken aback by the stark contrast between the glorified wartime propaganda and the harsh reality faced at the front lines. Georg Grossjohann, an officer who had been stationed in France during the early weeks of Operation Barbarossa, later recounted his experiences after the war: “When I was moved to the east [in the late summer of 1941] I was actually convinced that I would be too late to see action. Reichspressechef [German press chief] Dr Dietrich declared on the radio that all that was needed in Russia from that point in the late summer would be ‘police actions’. Well, I was taught differently when I arrived there . . . There was tremendous bitterness amongst the infantry soldiers at the front over the misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the realities of their situation”.
In the late summer of 1941, images of victorious advances into enemy territory had become relics of past wars, often propagandized in news reels. For the average German soldier, or Landser, the grim reality of life on the Eastern Front began to mirror the harrowing experiences of trench warfare. Corporal W.F. expressed his despair on August 22, stating, “We have suffered greatly under the Russian artillery fire, and we must live day and night in our foxholes for protection from shrapnel. The holes are filled with water, and lice and other vermin have already made their way in.” Another soldier, Erich Mende, observed how digging deeper was nearly impossible, as ground water would appear after just 50 centimeters. Meanwhile, fellow soldier Harald Henry wrote in a letter home on August 18, “It would be no overstatement to say that ‘a dog wouldn’t want to go on living like this,’ as no creature could endure such primitive conditions. All day long, we huddle in the ground, twisted in narrow holes, facing the sun and rain without respite, desperately trying to sleep.” If the living conditions were harsh, they were only compounded by the constant terrors of combat that dominated life on the front. Just days later, on August 22, Henry expressed his mental anguish in another letter, capturing the toll of war on his psyche. “Yesterday was a day so immersed in blood, so full of dead and wounded, so blasted by crackling salvoes, shrapnel from shells and groans and shrieks of the wounded, that I can not yet write about it . . . As if by a wonder I was drawn from the heaviest fighting in the afternoon and remain until now unhurt . . . At any rate my old non-commissioned officer Grabke and many other comrades are dead.”
In contrast to the chaotic early weeks of the war, when Soviet armies struggled with command and control, the stabilization of the front alleviated much of the pressure on the Soviet forces, enabling them to improve the coordination of their operations. This shift was evident in German assessments of Soviet combat performance. On August 6, Strauss reported that the Red Army had become a "well-led, tough, powerful enemy with a great deal of artillery and a strong air force." Three days later, a command conference at Panzer Group 3 described the enemy as a "[g]reat mass" still capable of fighting. Their armaments were characterized as “good,” and their artillery was reported to be "much more proficient than in the early days" of the conflict. This analysis reflected a radical shift from the dismissive evaluations made just three weeks earlier.
A crucial question arose: "How much longer until the Russian fighting strength is broken?" The answer was uncertain, with a statement declaring, "We must stand behind the Fuhrer in this, the hardest struggle in our history." Given Germany’s high military standards, the numerous mentions in war diaries of the bravery and resilience of the average Red Army soldier are particularly revealing. Leeb noted in his diary on August 5 the challenges of battle and the tenacity of the Russians, remarking on the daily report from the 18th Army that cited "40 prisoners and 500 dead Russians at Muru." Another German general reflected after the war, "The Russian civilian was tough, and the Russian soldier even tougher. He seemed to have an illimitable capacity for obedience and endurance." While the German invaders begrudgingly accepted the fanatical commitment of fighting to the last man, many aspects of the war in the East shocked and revolted them, highlighting the totality of the Soviet approach to warfare.
Many German soldiers reacted with indignation upon encountering Soviet women serving as combatants. Karl Fuchs, a soldier in the 7th Panzer Division, wrote home to his wife: “When I get home, I will tell you endless horror stories about Russia. Yesterday, for instance, we saw our first women soldiers, Russian women, their hair shorn, in uniform! And these pigs fired on our decent German soldiers from ambush positions.” Hans von Luck, also in the 7th Panzer Division, recounted an encounter with a dog in an abandoned village that ran up to meet them, only to disappear under one of their armored vehicles. This triggered an explosion that damaged the vehicle. Luck explained incredulously, “We ran to it and discovered that the dead dog had an explosive charge concealed in the fur on its back, with a movable pin as a detonator. When the dog crawled, the detonator tipped over and triggered the explosion. The dog had been trained to find meat under armored vehicles.”
The "Molotov cocktail" emerged as another sign of Soviet desperation in the face of inadequate anti-tank defenses. This improvised explosive device, filled with gasoline or kerosene, was ignited on impact through a burning wick. Originally used by Franco's troops in the Spanish Civil War, it was later employed more effectively by the Finnish army during the Winter War, where it gained its name, an unflattering reference to Soviet Foreign Minister Vjacheslav Molotov. During the early days of Operation Barbarossa, even Molotov cocktails were in short supply, but their success later prompted factories to produce them at a rate of 120,000 per day. The fanaticism of Soviet resistance was evident not only in their novel use of improvised weaponry but also in their combat tactics. Accounts describe Soviet soldiers pretending to surrender only to open fire or stab their captors at close range. Numerous reports attest to "dead" Soviet soldiers suddenly springing back to life and ambushing unsuspecting Germans. In his memoir, Manstein recounted that "there were more than enough cases where Soviet soldiers, after throwing up their hands as if to surrender, reached for their arms as soon as our infantry came close, or where Soviet wounded feigned death and then fired on our troops when our backs were turned." Warfare on the Eastern Front was as ferocious as it was brutal, with combatants on both sides often unwilling to give quarter or observe the usual conventions of war. The Germans had initiated a war of annihilation in the east, intent on starving millions and enslaving those who remained. Yet, unlike their previous campaigns, this time they faced a determined opposition employing every possible means of resistance.
Theodor Mogge, a non-commissioned artillery officer serving with the 2nd Army, poignantly remarked, “Every day brought new victims.” By the end of August, after just nine weeks of conflict against the Soviet Union, German losses had amounted to 14,457 officers and nearly 400,000 soldiers. Statistically, this meant that slightly more than one in every ten men was now a casualty. Reserves from the Replacement Army were already marching eastward to help fill some of these vacancies, but the supply of manpower was dwindling rapidly, and the war had only just begun. The prolonged, bloody battles and the staggering death toll profoundly affected the soldiers, who were repeatedly reminded of how expendable life was on the Eastern Front. Having witnessed so much death during the march to Smolensk, Siegfried Knappe came to terms with the likelihood that his own fate would also be sealed by the war. “I had to become fatalistic about it and assume that eventually it would happen to me and there was nothing I could do to prevent it . . . I knew that I was going to be killed or badly wounded sooner or later. The odds against my escaping unscathed were impossibly high, and I accepted my eventual death or maiming as part of my fate. Once I forced myself to accept that, I could put it out of my mind and go on about my duties”.
By the end of August 1941, German sources estimated that they had taken around 872,000 prisoners of war. This staggering figure represents a devastating blow to the Red Army, which had fielded nearly 2.7 million troops along the western front on June 22. In just nine weeks of relentless fighting, this means that about 33% of the Western Red Army became prisoners of war. When taking into account the estimated dead and wounded, the situation appears even bleaker. Although various reports present differing figures, the lowest credible estimate indicates that approximately 1.4 million Red Army soldiers perished in combat or from injuries sustained during this time frame, from June 22 to August 31. Additionally, around 680,000 soldiers were wounded but survived. When we calculate total casualties as a percentage of the Red Army's initial strength at the start of Operation Barbarossa, it reveals a staggering 109%. Few military campaigns in history can match the scale of this defeat and devastation. For comparison, during World War I, the Imperial Russian Army mobilized about 16 million soldiers over four years, resulting in approximately 9 million casualties, including prisoners of war. However, in just over two months during Operation Barbarossa, the Red Army experienced nearly one-third of that total number of casualties. This cannot be viewed as anything less than a catastrophic disaster for the Red Army and the people of the Soviet Union. In these western territories of the USSR, the reality of war unfolded as a hellish experience unlike any seen before.
The prisoners of war faced a gruesome fate. Reports from the Nazi bureaucracy revealed that some Red Army prisoners were receiving a daily ration of just around 100 grams of bread. This absurdly low ration was intentionally designed to kill many prisoners without the use of bullets. The Nazis understood the importance of keeping their civilian population well-fed, especially as Germany was grappling with a minor food crisis. To maintain adequate calorie levels for German citizens, food had to be imported from the conquered territories in the east. Unfortunately, there was very little left for the prisoners of war. Nazi leaders even questioned the necessity of providing this meager amount to the captives. It has been estimated that fewer than one in three of these prisoners would survive a year in German captivity.
The new forces mobilized thus far had elevated the operational strength of the Red Army across all fronts to approximately 6.7 million men. While the initial quality of these forces was lacking, they improved with each encounter. This enhancement was largely attributed to the growing experience at the tactical unit leader level. Additionally, there were likely surviving non-commissioned and junior officers who contributed their understanding to the lowest tiers of combat. As in all wars, the infantry bore the brunt of the fighting and casualties. However, the armor and artillery branches of the Red Army suffered significant losses in proportion to their infantry counterparts. Every single mechanized corps had been rendered ineffective as a fighting force, even before the Stavka, the Soviet High Command, could carry out the planned disbandment of those units.
The Wehrmacht was certainly in better shape compared to their opponents. They had suffered far fewer casualties in every battle throughout the war. However, this did not mean there were no manpower issues at the front. The Heer, or German Army, had never been sufficiently large to achieve the ambitious objectives set by its leaders. Aware of this limitation, they nonetheless managed to convince themselves that decisive action could lead to the defeat of the Red Army in the western regions of the Soviet Union. Accomplishing this would allow them to avoid the need for a continuous advance across the entire expanse of the country. Yet by the end of August, this ambition was beginning to resemble a fool's errand. General Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff, acknowledged early in the month that the Nazi war machine had significantly underestimated both the size of the Red Army and the resilience of the Soviet state.
The last week of August was relatively calm across the central front. Generals Georgy Zhukov and Semyon Timoshenko had to pause their relentless assault on Army Group Center near Smolensk to reorganize and rehabilitate their forces for another push. Meanwhile, Army Group Center found itself in no position to launch an attack, having had the panzers of Generals Guderian and Hoth reassigned to support the other two Army Groups struggling with their own faltering offensives. Zhukov, demonstrating remarkable boldness, requested additional forces from the strategic reserve, and somewhat surprisingly, he was granted them. Joseph Stalin was not typically one to reinforce failure, but perhaps he recognized that Zhukov was his best field commander at that moment. It was crucial to give Zhukov a better chance of breaking through Army Group Center. The specifics of any promises made remain unclear, but Zhukov was confident he could seize Yelna. He may have persuaded Stalin that capturing this small town could lead to a strategic breakthrough in the center. Regardless, he received the extra troops he requested. Zhukov would not resume his offensive until August 30, and during the preceding week, he concentrated on positioning his forces.
At Velikye Luki, the Germans had encircled the garrison by August 24. After two days of defending against the encroaching forces, the Red Army commanders decided to attempt a breakout. Ershakov’s 22nd Army and Colonel Yakovlev’s 48th Tank Division had been significantly weakened by weeks of fierce fighting for the city, but they resolved to fight their way out. On August 26, the breakout began. After intense combat, Yakovlev managed to escape with only two tanks and 2,400 men; the rest of the 22nd Army was captured. General Stumme, leading the German assault, took 25,000 soldiers prisoner along with his panzers. When Timoshenko learned that Yakovlev had abandoned the city, he ordered him to turn back and retake it. This order underscored the troubling disconnect between the Red Army’s highest leaders and the realities faced by forces on the ground. Yakovlev’s unit was a ragtag band of survivors, far from a ready military force for an offensive operation. Demonstrating remarkable personal bravery, Yakovlev refused Timoshenko’s commands. Unfortunately, he was arrested and executed. Nevertheless, Yakovlev had illustrated that effective tactical leadership could transform the Red Army into a formidable weapon against the Germans. He led an understrength tank division, armed with no more than the equivalent of a regiment’s vehicles, to recapture a city defended by strong infantry forces. It took two panzer divisions and the full attention of the Wehrmacht to finally root him out, yet he was rewarded for his skill only with the grim fate of an assassin’s thanks.
In the north, Manstein had decisively crushed Vatutin’s attack at Lake Ilmen, inflicting severe losses on the Red Army by the start of this week. Along the Luga line, the Red Army was beginning to crumble. While the approaches to Leningrad exerted significant pressure on the advancing Germans, they continued to push forward. Despite suffering losses when Manstein's forces faced a counterattack at Lake Ilmen, the advance toward Leningrad persisted. On August 24, the city of Luga fell to German control. It seemed that the pause before resuming the offensive had benefited Army Group North while afflicting the Soviets. Although some resistance remained in front of the city, Army Group North was expected to encounter roadblocks as they crossed the Luga River.
The Red Army’s last remaining armor in the area was under the command of Major General Baranov. His 1st Tank Division represented the last, best hope for defending the city. Unfortunately, he was becoming increasingly worn down. In the last week, he decided to avoid major engagements and conserve his resources through smaller delaying actions. These platoon-sized attacks proved effective, enabling savvy small unit leaders to choose situations that provided advantages in numbers, positioning, and preparation. Meanwhile, the 8th Panzer Division had finally recovered from its drubbing at Soltsy and was reintegrated into the fighting. Once again, however, it faced significant challenges. Lieutenant Kolobanov, leading a small platoon of KV-1 tanks in the defense of Krasnogvardeysk, achieved remarkable success by destroying approximately 40 German tanks. The defense of the city continued to hold firm through the end of the month.
To the east, the battle to encircle Leningrad continued as General Schmidt’s 39th Panzer Corps advanced from the south. After cutting the main Leningrad-Moscow rail line, they pushed towards Mga, the center of the last operational rail junction serving Leningrad. On August 30, the town fell to the men of the 12th Panzer Division. Leningrad was now isolated, a status that would persist until 1944. Although the siege of the city had not yet begun, it was effectively cut off from the outside world. Notably, just before the 12th Panzer Division arrived at Mga, workers and machinery from the Kirov tank plant successfully evacuated via rail to Chelyabinsk. Once there, they were able to rebuild the factory and resume production of KV-1 tanks. This sort of initiative was critical to the long-term war effort. Remarkably, the Germans remained largely oblivious to this and other industrial relocation efforts that were underway. With this accomplishment, Generals Leeb and Hoepner began to consider whether a direct assault on the city was feasible. This decision sparked debate; it was argued that the Panzers had successfully captured Minsk, Smolensk, and other smaller towns with relative ease. If they moved quickly and in force, they might overwhelm the defenders of Leningrad in a similar fashion. Ultimately, it was agreed that an attempt would be made to take the city. However, this effort would be postponed until mid-September, as the ongoing fighting at Krasnogvardeysk still held back the primary thrust of Army Group North.
Stalin and Hitler were captivated by the unfolding drama of Guderian’s drive south. It was evident that stopping him would signify the end of the war of maneuver. An attrition war was already taking shape east of Smolensk, and it would soon become a slogging match of equal proportions between Army Group North and the Northwestern Front. All hopes of the Stavka rested on Lieutenant General Eremenko. Eremenko was a cavalryman with a reputation as an up-and-comer in the Red Army. He was part of the same circle of officers who had followed in the footsteps of Timoshenko and Budenny, a path that emphasized personal loyalty to Stalin above all else. Despite this political aspect, Eremenko was a reasonably competent officer, having proven himself during the Civil War and at Smolensk. This was his opportunity to secure a place among the elite officers of the Red Army.
He took command of the Bryansk Front and devised a plan to halt the ambitious panzer general. Guderian's assault began on August 25, led by Schweppenburg's 24th Panzer Corps, which was operating at reduced strength due to the 4th Panzer and 10th Infantry divisions still assembling in their starting areas. Despite this, Guderian and Schweppenburg decided to proceed with the 3rd Panzer Division under Lieutenant General Model. On the morning of August 26, the forward battle group of Model’s division seized a massive bridge over the Desna River at Novogrod Severisky. Model was leading from the front and arrived on site just hours after the bridge's capture. However, the Red Army responded swiftly, targeting the bridge with artillery fire. While they failed to destroy the structure, they killed one of the regimental commanders and wounded Model.
Weather conditions further delayed Schweppenburg as he attempted to bring up his late reinforcements. Model’s division lacked the strength to break out across the river alone. Guderian had carefully planned the attack to exploit the gap between the 13th and 21st Armies, but the Soviets reacted quickly, repositioning their forces effectively under the circumstances. The Stavka assigned the 40th Army to Eremenko, who sought to position its troops in front of the crossing before Schweppenburg could reinforce Model. The 40th Army was one of many reserve armies, consisting of little more than several thousand infantry gathered into ad-hoc divisions with minimal organic support elements. In August 1941, the 40th Army had around 25,000 soldiers but virtually no radios below the division staff level and very few artillery and anti-tank guns available.
The 10th Infantry Division was next to attempt crossing the river. The fighting was fierce, and the outnumbered Germans were forced back. Lieutenant General Loeper could not hold his positions against the Soviet counterattacks and had to pull his men back across the bridge. It seemed that Eremenko was managing his task effectively. He requested and received support from the VVS. Large numbers of DB-3 tactical bombers were sent into the area for interdiction raids over the last three nights of the month. Unfortunately, they failed to inflict significant damage on Schweppenburg's men as he tried to consolidate them for a breakout across the river. The VVS continued to struggle with poor coordination and inadequate pilot training, along with many other issues stemming from the chaos of the invasion's early months. As the week progressed, Schweppenburg was able to gather his forces and prepare for a coordinated push across the Desna. By August 30, he was in position. Guderian wanted him to move faster, but, as demonstrated by the assault from the 10th Infantry, Schweppenburg needed more time. Guderian persistently pressed Bock for additional troops. However, Bock was still occupied with holding the line against Timoshenko’s assaults.
Although the Yelna salient had quieted, Bock was not blind to Zhukov’s plans for it. Army Group Center was being pushed to its breaking point, and its commander had little patience for Guderian’s demands. Nevertheless, Bock recognized that the sooner Guderian accomplished his mission, the sooner Hitler would agree to reinforce Army Group Center. Only then could Bock resume the drive on Moscow. Relenting to Guderian, Bock promised on August 30 that the Grossdeutschland Infantry Regiment would be dispatched to his command. He also permitted the SS Division Reich to be transferred to Guderian, though Bock attempted to delay the transfer of the last unit to maintain some defensive capability on his lines.
Army Group South was not allowed to remain idle while Guderian advanced south. The plan called for Kleist to cross the Dnipro and maneuver around Kyiv from the south. While the exact meeting point of the two panzer groups was not firmly established, the intention was to encircle the bulk of the Southwestern Front behind Kyiv to the east. The 17th Army would support Kleist as he advanced across the river. In the last week of the month, they launched an assault, managing to gain reasonable bridgeheads. Meanwhile, the Stavka attempted to replicate the 40th Army's success further north by forming the 38th Army, which was set in similar blocking positions across the Wehrmacht's Dnipro bridgeheads. Unfortunately, the Luftwaffe was more active in this area, and close air support relentlessly pounded the raw recruits of the 38th Army. Nevertheless, by the end of the month, the resistance to Kleist’s breakout was sufficient to convince Rundstedt to pull the 58th Panzer Corps from its developing positions. Instead, they would pass through the 17th Army's lines and break out from the more northern crossings.
North of Kyiv, the 6th Army under Reichenau was struggling. On August 25, the 111th Infantry Division was compelled to abandon its bridgehead across the Desna. The Soviet 5th Army was maintaining a strong defense, but as Guderian and Weichs advanced from the north, the Soviets were forced to extend their positions. Halder was uncertain how firmly the Southwestern Front would hold. He assumed that the Stavka was aware of the unfolding situation as Guderian continued his advance. It seemed only a matter of time before the pincers would close, trapping the entire Southwestern Front. The logical course of action would have been to avoid a massive encirclement. Kirponos needed authorization to abandon Kyiv and reform his lines behind the Dnieper River, but this was out of the question for Stalin. He insisted that Kirponos remain in position and defend the city.
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
In August 1941, as Nazi Germany advanced toward Kyiv, confidence waned amid fierce Soviet resistance led by Marshal Timoshenko. Despite heavy losses, the Red Army regrouped and initiated counteroffensives, outmatching the weary German troops struggling with logistics. Remarkably, both sides demonstrated unyielding fighting spirit, with the Soviet tactics evolving rapidly. As the battle raged, the grim reality of war unfolded, revealing the deep toll of combat and the determination of soldiers on both fronts, altering the course of history.