Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Zhukov, Guderian and the race to Kyiv. In August 1941, as Nazi Germany marched toward Kyiv, their confidence began to falter. General Fedor von Bock’s forces, fresh from capturing Smolensk, faced a fierce defensive from the Soviet Red Army, led by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko. The grim reality of warfare set in as soldiers from both sides endured harrowing conditions. German units struggled with their dwindling resources, suffering immense casualties that shattered morale. Conversely, the Soviets demonstrated remarkable resilience, with commanders like Georgy Zhukov evolving their tactics to counteract German advances. By month's end, both armies faced staggering losses, with the Soviets suffering catastrophic casualties. This fierce battle would become a pivotal moment, illustrating the fierce determination of the Red Army and altering the course of history on the Eastern Front.
This episode is the Drive to Kyiv and Leningrad continues
Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
September has arrived on the Eastern Front, bringing with it the late summer rains. General Guderian is pushing his tanks southward, aiming to cut off the defenders of Kyiv. Behind him, Field Marshal von Bock is tasked with holding the line at Yelna, while the Soviet High Command is prepared to sacrifice tens of thousands of brave soldiers to reclaim it. Last week we talked about how the Bryansk Front struggled to fend off Guderian as his armored divisions advanced, threatening to encircle Kyiv. In the area of Army Group North, the push towards Leningrad is recovering from earlier setbacks. General Vatutin’s offensive was swiftly repelled by Manstein’s Panzers, and the 18th Army successfully cleared Estonia. The rapid advances of Leeb's offensive have devastated the Soviet forces. To address the dire situation, the Stavka has deployed three armies: the 54th, 52nd, and 4th Armies, arriving in early September to bolster defenses in front of Leningrad. Their focus is on the eastern side of Volkhov, aiming to prevent a connection between the Finnish and German forces.
In August, the Germans captured Mga, but an NKVD division briefly retook it for a day before being driven out by the 20th Motorized Division. A see-saw battle unfolded throughout the first week of September, but by the end of the week, the Germans had gained firm control. The 48th Army was struggling to maintain its position, and on September 7th, the combined might of the 20th Motorized and 12th Panzer Divisions captured Sinaivino, with Shisselburg next on their list. These towns were the last land connections to the rest of the Soviet Union. Losing Mga, the last rail connection, was a significant blow to the defense of Leningrad. With the fall of Shisselburg and Sinaivino, the options for leaving the city without traversing Axis lines grew grim. The only escape route left was across Lake Ladoga. Army Group North had originally advanced an average of 5 kilometers a day in July, which slowed to 2.2 kilometers in August, and dropped to just 1.5 kilometers a day in September. Lengthening supply lines, growing fatigue among soldiers, and fierce Soviet resistance have begun to take their toll. Now, with Leningrad isolated, many soldiers of Army Group North believe their mission is nearly complete. All that remains is to wait for Leningrad to starve, surrender, and for Army Group Center and South to achieve their objectives. The OKH announced "the Iron Ring around Leningrad has been closed”.
The Finnish forces had advanced across the Karelian Isthmus, posing a significant threat to Leningrad. Back on August 22, the Finnish 4th Corps entered Soviet territory north of Vyborg, swiftly advancing toward the Vuoksi River in the early stages of their offensive. By the 24th, the Finnish 8th Division successfully crossed Viipuri Bay, landing south of Vyborg and severing the coastal road leading to the city. In an attempt to re-establish this vital road link, the Soviet 43rd, 115th, and 123rd Rifle Divisions initiated a counter-offensive against the 8th Division. Despite being heavily outnumbered, the Finnish Light Brigade T managed to delay the Soviet advance for several crucial hours while 4th Corps continued its southward march on August 25.
In the ensuing days, both sides regrouped their forces and prepared for a clash in the heavily forested area surrounding Porlampi, located between the coastal and central Karelian highways. The battle began on August 30, when advanced elements of the Soviet 43rd Rifle Division encountered the Finnish 8th Division in the Porlampi forests. Both armies called in reinforcements, with the Soviets largely unaware that the Finnish troops they were engaging had crossed Viipuri Bay, mistakenly believing the 8th Division was part of the main body of the 4th Corps. In reality, 4th Corps was advancing uncontested to the north and east, posing a threat to encircle the Soviet forces. Over the next several days of intense combat in the Porlampi region, the Finns effectively employed motti skirmishing tactics to counter the numerical superiority of the Soviets. Finnish artillery proved particularly effective, disabling many Soviet vehicles, obstructing roads, and creating significant bottlenecks. By the late afternoon of August 30, the 43rd Rifle Division succeeded in pushing the 8th Division out of Porlampi and into the nearby village of Somme, located several miles northwest. Fighting continued fiercely throughout the night.
On the morning of August 31, the main body of the IV Corps arrived, launching attacks on the 123rd Rifle Division at Porlampi and the 115th Rifle Division at Ylasomme. This assault effectively collapsed the northern flank of the Soviet army, forcing a retreat. However, the 8th Division remained engaged in heavy combat with the 43rd Rifle Division northwest of Porlampi and was unable to complete the encirclement. Utilizing the dense forest terrain, the Soviet 123rd and 115th Rifle Divisions withdrew southwest toward Koivisto. Vyborg fell on August 31, allowing more Finnish forces to focus on the remaining troops of the 23rd Army. The 43rd Rifle Division, which had advanced the farthest west, was nearly annihilated by Finnish forces on September 1. A handful of survivors retreated south and were evacuated by the Soviet Navy from the Baltic coast in November. The Red Army incurred heavy losses during the engagement, with 7,000 soldiers killed, 1,000 wounded, and 9,000 captured, primarily from the decimated 43rd Rifle Division. In comparison, the Finnish 4th Corps suffered 700 fatalities and 2,700 injuries. The Finns also seized a substantial amount of Soviet equipment, including 164 artillery pieces of various calibers. Notably, they captured Major General Vladimir Kirpichnikov, marking him as the highest-ranking Soviet prisoner of war taken during both the Winter War and the Continuation War.
On September 2, Finnish forces marched to the village and port of Koivisto but did not pursue the remnants of the Soviet divisions that had fled into the surrounding archipelago; these units were later evacuated by the Soviets in November. While fighting near Viipuri continued, the Finnish advance toward Leningrad persisted. The Finnish IV Corps spearheaded the advance along the western shore, the II Corps operated in the center, and the recently arrived I Corps moved along the eastern side of the Isthmus. Finnish Commander-in-Chief Marshal Mannerheim ordered the forces to hold their position short of the Soviet fortifications. The Finnish troops reached the old border on August 31 and halted their advance shortly thereafter at the Soviet fortifications.
Back on August 20, General W. Erfurth informed Mannerheim that Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel would send a letter outlining where Finland would be requested to attack Leningrad. Mannerheim, articulating the practical challenges of this proposal, highlighted the opposition from both political and military leadership regarding any assault on the city. The government had previously decided against attacking Leningrad, and only after pressure from military leaders did they agree to make a limited advance across the old border to secure better defensive positions. The Social Democrats were particularly opposed to crossing the border. When Keitel's letter arrived, President Risto Ryti and Mannerheim prepared a negative response.
On August 31, Erfurth contacted Mannerheim again and suggested canceling the attack on East Karelia in favor of an attack on Leningrad, but both Ryti and Mannerheim refused. On the same day, Mannerheim ordered that the offensive be halted at a line stretching from the mouth of the Rajajoki River to Ohta. The exact boundary between Ohta and Lake Ladoga would be determined later when the Finns had reached the old border in that area. This strategy aimed to shorten the front line without having to assault the Soviet fortifications north of Leningrad. In this last phase, the Soviets had six infantry divisions along with various separate battalions and regiments defending Leningrad from the north, but all were operating at half strength due to the recent heavy fighting with Finnish forces.
The Finnish 12th Division reached its target on September 1, while attacks elsewhere commenced on September 2. The 18th Division captured Mainila on the same day and took Valkeasaari the following day. By September 7, both the 18th and the 2nd Divisions had reached their objectives between the Rajajoki and Ohta. The commander of I Corps, Colonel Mäkinen, instructed his troops to advance to the Ohta-Lake Lempaalanjärvi-old border line at Lake Ladoga, adding that if they encountered strong defenses, the offensive could be halted. The attack began on September 4, and on September 6, the 10th Division encircled and destroyed the Soviet 941st Rifle Regiment at Kirjasalo. By September 9, the objective line was secured across the board, and Finnish forces transitioned to a defensive posture. Soviet military leadership quickly recognized the diminished Finnish pressure, and by September 5, two divisions were redeployed from the Karelian Isthmus to bolster defenses south of the city against the Germans. Although Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus did not directly partake in the Siege of Leningrad, their mere presence contributed to the siege by disrupting supply lines to the city around and across Lake Ladoga.
While they had no intention of launching an assault on the city, Soviet intelligence was unaware of this crucial detail. In response to the situation, Lieutenant General M. Popov was ordered to push the Finns back to relieve pressure on Leningrad. Unfortunately, he had limited forces available for this challenging task. In late August, the Northern Front was reorganized into two subfronts, officially becoming the Leningrad and Karelian fronts by September 1st. This restructuring did not replace the Northwestern Front; rather, it underscored how the Stavka viewed the evolving threat to Leningrad. Effectively, the Northwestern Front had been detached from the city’s defense. General Vatutin’s recent offensive had been a desperate attempt to reform those defensive lines, but it ultimately failed. Now, the front faced a difficult reality, trapped in both the figurative and literal wilderness east of Lake Ilmen.
As September began, Field Marshal Bock faced immense challenges. Timoshenko and the revamped Western Front were relentlessly striking along his lines east of Smolensk. Meanwhile, General Guderian was pressuring the Army Group Center’s staff and commanders for reinforcements and additional support as the situation in the Yelna salient approached a crisis point. On September 6th, Hitler issued a crucial directive for the campaign, War Directive 35. “Combined with the progressive encirclement of the Leningrad area, the initial successes against the enemy forces in the area between the flanks of Army Groups South and Center have provided favorable conditions for a decisive operation against the Timoshenko Army Group which is attacking on the Central front. This Army Group must be defeated and annihilated in the limited time which remains before the onset of winter weather. For this purpose it is necessary to concentrate all the forces of the Army and Air force which can be spared on the flanks and which can be brought up in time. On the basis of the report of Commander In Chief Army, I issue the following orders for the preparation and execution of these operations….”.
Hitler had completely reversed his earlier stance and reaffirmed the intention to capture Moscow. It was becoming increasingly evident to all involved that the war would not conclude by the year's end. While Hitler's directive did not explicitly acknowledge this reality, it hinted at it indirectly. His goal was to finish the year on a victorious note. If his armies could capture both Moscow and Kyiv while maintaining the siege of Leningrad, he could convincingly declare to the German people that the war was nearly won. The directive laid out the campaign's objectives, yet the specifics of the operation would fall to Bock’s staff for planning and approval. Hitler established strict limits on the forces available and outlined the key objectives. Once Guderian completed his task of dismantling the Southwestern Front, he would rejoin the efforts at the center.
Field Marshal Bock was set to receive Hoepner’s 4th Panzer Group and Hoth’s 3rd Panzer Group. Meanwhile, the 1st Panzer Group would remain with Army Group South to continue its offensive operations in Ukraine, reaching as far south as Crimea. The plan detailed in Hitler’s directive called for a dual envelopment strategy aimed at crushing Timoshenko’s forces. Notably, it mandated that the destruction of the Western Front be achieved through close encirclement. This emphasis on proximity was not lost on Bock or his chief of staff, Halder. Earlier in the year, following the initial battles for Minsk, this had been a point of contention. The choice between a tighter operational encirclement and a more extensive strategic encirclement had sparked disagreements between Hitler and his field commanders since the invasion of France. Nevertheless, Bock had secured what he desired: the advance towards Moscow would resume, and his command would once again serve as the central focus of the entire campaign.
Meanwhile, Army Group Center was under relentless pressure from Timoshenko and Zhukov. Yelna remained the focal point for the Red Army, and the Wehrmacht was holding on by a thread. Zhukov temporarily paused his operations to regroup and receive reinforcements from Stavka reserves. Once these forces were in place, he renewed his assaults. On September 1st, every segment of Army Group Center’s front lines came under attack. The Soviet 16th, 19th, and 20th Armies of the Western Front launched an offensive from Iartsevo to Dukhovshchin. In the salient itself, the main effort came from the 24th Army, with support from the 43rd Army. Defending this strategic position were only four German infantry divisions: the 268th, 292nd, 78th, and 137th. These units had been hastily assembled from various infantry corps of the 4th and 9th Armies, sent in to relieve the encircled Panzers. As the attacks intensified, it became increasingly impossible for the defenders to withstand the overwhelming numbers arrayed against them. Officers expressed their frustration to superiors, noting that the fighting had devolved into desperate trench defenses, with artillery supplies being rationed and no armor support available along the line. Each assault created opportunities for local penetrations, and every penetration posed a risk of becoming a breakthrough that could ultimately spell the end for the salient.
Army Group Center was fully aware of the precarious situation surrounding Yelna, yet they had no resources to spare for a counter-offensive. Timoshenko’s Western Front push left Bock without any reserves. Both the staff of Army Group Center and the 20th Infantry Corps felt powerless, knowing a retreat was necessary. Time was pressing; if they delayed much longer, the Red Army could exploit their successes and break through across the Desna River, leading to open space beyond, a situation that was simply unacceptable. The situation along Army Group Center’s front was dire. At one point, Field Marshal Bock called Halder, inquiring what he should do if the front line were to collapse. This dramatic plea was not from a nervous subordinate but from a seasoned officer. Bock had earned his rank the traditional way, having been awarded Imperial Germany’s highest honor for military valor in 1916. He had faced some of the toughest fighting on the Eastern Front during World War I. While he may have been considered a Nazi accomplice, he was neither a coward nor someone prone to exaggerating his circumstances. On September 4th, Bock issued orders for a withdrawal back across the river, effectively saving his infantrymen from certain annihilation at the hands of Zhukov’s forces.
As Franz Frisch, who fought in those battles, later wrote: “Officially it was called a ‘planned withdrawal’, and a ‘correction of the front lines.’ . . . But to me it was so much bullshit. The Russians were kicking us badly and we had to regroup . . . The next day – or maybe a few days later – we heard on the radio, in the ‘news from the front’ “Wehrmachtsbericht” about the ‘successful front correction’ in our Yel’nya defensive line, which was east of Smolensk, and the enormous losses we had inflicted on the enemy. But no single word was heard about a retreat, about the hopelessness of the situation, about the mental and emotional stagnation and numbness of the German soldiers. In short, it was again a ‘victory’. But we on the front line were running back like rabbits in front of the fox. This metamorphosis of the truth from ‘all shit’ to ‘it was a victory’ baffled me, and those of my comrades who dared to think”.
The retreat was executed orderly, with the infantry divisions moving to new positions on the western side of the Desna, reestablishing the line along the Ustrom and Striana rivers. Yelna was liberated on September 5th. Zhukov had achieved the seemingly impossible: he forced back significant German forces from their prepared positions. It came at a steep cost, however, with the Red Army suffering nearly thirty-two thousand casualties and losing two strong tank divisions, but the objective was accomplished. The Germans, for their part, paid a heavy price to hold the salient as long as they did, with the fighting around Yelna from July to September resulting in close to ten thousand casualties for the Wehrmacht. Despite this notable success, the stavka was frustrated that German forces had managed to escape intact, rather than achieving the intended encirclement and destruction of the defenders in the salient.
Guderian’s drive south faced significant challenges in the last week of August. The Bryansk Front successfully blocked Schweppenburg’s Panzer Corps from advancing across the Desna River in force. On Guderian’s flank, the 2nd Army struggled to keep pace, prompting complaints about vulnerabilities to counterattacks. In light of these emerging threats, Guderian requested additional mobile formations from Army Group Center. However, he received only the SS Das Reich division and the Grossdeutschland regiment, as Army Group Center needed to retain the remaining Panzers to counter potential breakthroughs by the Western and Reserve Fronts. As Timoshenko and Zhukov intensified their assaults on the front lines, Bock’s forces were pushed to their breaking point. On September 1st, Schweppenburg managed to push the 3rd and 4th Panzer divisions across the river, although serious challenges plagued his advance. Between the two divisions, he could muster only 86 operational tanks. Nevertheless, they continued to push forward. From September 1st onward, both divisions faced Soviet counterattacks. The 21st Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Gerasimenko, launched an assault against the 4th Panzer near Korop, which was led by Major General Erlencamp. In a confusing attack, Erlencamp’s men managed to capture over twelve hundred prisoners from the 21st Army. The 4th Panzer, under Model’s command, did not perform as well. Meanwhile, the 10th Tank Division, now a shadow of its former self, managed to hold off Model’s advances for several days. The disparities in outcomes from these minor battles are difficult to assess. However, factors such as terrain, logistics, and tactical leadership on both sides played crucial roles in determining the results.
Late in August, Eremenko received a direct order from Stalin to “smash Guderian and his group to smithereens.” Determined not to disappoint the dictator, he quickly devised a plan. Guderian’s northern flank was alarmingly long, extending over one hundred kilometers. To defend this vulnerable flank, Guderian had assigned General of Panzers Lemelsen and his 47th Corps. Eremenko opted to exploit Lemelsen’s exposed position by assembling a mobile exploitation force comprising the 4th Cavalry Division, the 108th Tank Division, and the 141st Tank Brigade. The primary target was the 7th Panzer Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Arnim. However, Arnim had only 50 operational tanks to cover more than sixty kilometers. To complicate matters, only half of these were Panzer IIIs; the remainder were outdated light models. In stark contrast, the Soviets had more T-34s than the Germans had tanks, alongside KV-1s and some BT light tanks, significantly enhancing their offensive capabilities. Eremenko initiated a reconnaissance in force before August came to a close, but his efforts were swiftly thwarted by the Germans. German small units effectively leveraged their superior organization and combined arms coordination to repel the limited initial attacks over the first few days. After successfully pushing back the uncoordinated probes from Eremenko’s forces, the Germans quickly shifted to the offensive.
By September 1st, the 108th Tank Division found itself surrounded in the woods. Eremenko, reluctant to disrupt his timeline, chose not to intervene to save the division. On the morning of September 2nd, he launched his own offensive. However, the attack faltered due to inadequate reconnaissance and the Soviet standard failure to coordinate their efforts effectively. On the night of September 4th, the 108th Tank Division managed to break out of its encirclement, bringing along only eleven tanks and twelve hundred men. The 141st Tank Brigade fared similarly poorly, dwindling from an authorized strength of ninety-four tanks to just thirty-eight. This was a significant disaster. Despite the setback, Eremenko continued his assault, but it had devolved into localized attacks at the small unit level. The Red Army's ongoing inability to coordinate its subordinate units enabled Lemelsen to repel Eremenko’s assaults with relative ease.
By the end of the first week, the true scale of the disaster became evident. On September 5th, Eremenko requested and received permission to deploy blocking detachments to prevent unauthorized retreats in a desperate attempt to stabilize his faltering command. This botched offensive resulted in a staggering one hundred thousand casualties with little to show for it. Although the 47th Panzer Corps had been stretched, it remained unbroken. Lemelsen had managed the battle effectively, keeping his forces balanced enough to secure the flank of Guderian’s advance. However, had Stalin not consistently forbidden the withdrawal of the Soviet Southwestern Front, it’s plausible that Eremenko’s offensive might have provided enough time for Kirponos to safely withdraw the majority of his forces.
Around Kyiv, a combination of difficult terrain, escalating logistical issues, and determined enemy resistance was causing Rundstedt to worry that Red Army forces ahead of him could escape the encirclement promised by Guderian’s advance south. To counter this, he ordered the 1st Panzer Group, along with the 6th and 17th Armies, to cross the Dnipro River across as many sectors as possible, regardless of the condition of these formations. The goal was to establish a bridgehead of sufficient depth at Kremenchug, providing the Germans a starting point for an offensive towards Kyiv. This maneuver occurred despite vigorous counterattacks from the overstretched 38th Army. One of the largest counterattacks consisted of eighty Soviet tanks, which was ultimately repulsed, resulting in the destruction of sixty tanks. Constant air interdiction by the Luftwaffe, coupled with the diversion of all Soviet reserves in the local theater towards Guderian’s drive south, helped prevent any larger offensives against the bridgehead. By September 7th, the infantry of the 17th Army had successfully expanded the bridgehead enough to facilitate further large-scale operations.
Initially, the plan called for the 1st Panzer to secure the flanks of the offensive by capturing Poltava, while the 17th Army was tasked with advancing towards Mirgorod and Lubny. The goal was to link up with Guderian and create a large pocket centered on Kyiv. However, increasing Soviet resistance and the realization that the river line was being strongly defended led Rundstedt to conclude that any breakout needed to be executed rapidly to avoid becoming bogged down, which would give the Red Army more time to escape. As a result, the orders for the 1st Panzer and 17th Army were swapped. Despite the urgent need to initiate the operation, the offensive faced delays due to challenges in building sufficient supplies and reinforcing the bridges to accommodate the vehicles of the Panzer divisions. This included the construction of two 16-ton bridges.
Further south at Dnepropetrovsk, the 3rd Motorised Corps attempted once again to expand their bridgehead. Initially captured in late August, the Corps had failed to sufficiently broaden it to facilitate the crossing of additional formations. This limitation was partly due to the entire Corps relying on just a single footbridge and a captured floating bridge, which severely restricted logistics, exacerbating the usual challenges in transporting supplies to such an eastern position. Additionally, Dnepropetrovsk was regarded as secondary to the priorities of the 1st Panzer and 17th Army. Another significant factor was the relentless assaults from Red Army forces, who did not view this sector as a mere sideshow. A German army meeting with senior leaders from Army Group South, held on the 8th, highlighted the intensity of the fighting in this area. Reports indicated that the floating bridge was destroyed ten times by artillery, three times by bombers, once by the crash of a shot-down plane, and finally by a storm. Heavy tank-led assaults were frequent; one managed to overrun the forward positions of the 198th Infantry Division, leading to heavy German casualties, including one company of the 308th Regiment, which was reduced to just 20 men.
VVs’ activity was on the rise, with other units in the Area of Army Group South reporting similar numbers of air attacks each day. However, this activity paled in comparison to the VVS's main focus, which involved flying 4,000 sorties against Guderian's Panzer Group 2 between August 29th and September 4th. The fierce fighting at Dnepropetrovsk resulted in an average of more than 300 German casualties every single day throughout the battle. These heavy losses prompted the Corps’ commander, Zeitzler, to repeatedly request permission to withdraw to the German-controlled side of the river. However, Rundstedt consistently denied these requests, as he was under orders from Halder to hold the bridgehead. It remains unclear whether the bridgehead was intended as a potential second breakout position or merely as a distraction for the Soviet forces.
At the end of the first week of September, the double envelopment of the Southwestern Front was progressing poorly. Guderian experienced limited success as he pushed southward. His long flanks were extending, he received little support from Army Group Center, and Eremenko’s unsuccessful but persistent attacks served as a constant distraction. In the south, Stülpnagel’s 17th Army had breached the first layer of containment at Kremenchug. However, the 38th Army was strengthening its resistance and proving to be less than easy prey for the worn-out infantry. To complicate matters further, the rain had begun to fall. Curzio Malaparte was an Italian writer and filmmaker who spent approximately two years as a correspondent for Italian newspapers on the Eastern Front. Many of his articles were suppressed by Mussolini’s censorship due to their candid portrayal of the war. He had this to say during this time period. “All of a sudden, it starts to rain. At first, it is a gentle shower, silent and almost furtive. But soon it develops into a regular hurricane, a veritable cloudburst... The German soldiers look up at the sky shouting and cursing. The artillery-trains come to an abrupt halt, the horses slither about in the mud that has formed as if by magic, the lorries skid on the slippery surface”. Unlike the summer rains, which would vanish in a day, the rains of September persisted nearly nonstop for the first two weeks in Ukraine. Movement became almost impossible; in some areas along Guderian’s advance, it was reported that it took ten hours to cover just twenty kilometers. This situation was intolerable, yet it had to be endured. The advance continued throughout the first week of September, with the rain adversely affecting both sides as they attempted to maneuver and supply their forward elements.
At this point, thousands of small, nameless battles were raging across the front. These skirmishes consistently proved costly for the Red Army. However, the sheer attrition was beginning to impact German forces as well. Some divisions started to dissolve battalions in order to bolster the strength of their remaining battalions. The lightning-fast mobile warfare that characterized earlier phases of the conflict was being replaced by slow positional warfare or even static trench fighting reminiscent of the First World War. The commander of the 53rd Army Corps, General of Infantry Karl Weisenberger, noted on September 3rd, “We are fighting the war of the poor man. We must manage on less so that other positions can advance rapidly.” Already, German soldiers in these more static areas began to complain about enduring large artillery barrages. If this trend continued, the technical superiority and mobility of the German forces might diminish in significance compared to the demographic and industrial advantages of the Soviet Union.
It is rather ironic, Hitler and the top German commanders were facing a problem that 129 years prior plagued Napoleon Bonaparte. The most obvious example is Napoleon’s ill-fated invasion of Russia in 1812. The German High Command’s inability to recognize the essential hallmarks of this military calamity highlights their flawed conceptualization and planning in anticipation of Operation Barbarossa. Much like Hitler, Napoleon was a conqueror of Europe, believing that his war on Russia was key to compelling England to negotiate. He invaded with the intention of concluding the war swiftly, aiming for a decisive battle in western Russia. However, as the Russians withdrew, Napoleon's supply lines lengthened and his strength dwindled week by week. The poor roads and harsh environment took a deadly toll on both horses and men, while politically, Russia’s oppressed serfs remained, for the most part, loyal to the aristocracy.
Even after defeating the Russian army at Smolensk and Borodino, Napoleon did not achieve a decisive result, leaving him with the dilemma of either retreating or pushing deeper into Russia. Neither option was truly acceptable, the retreat was politically untenable, while the advance was militarily unwise. Yet, in each instance, Napoleon chose to advance. In doing so, the French emperor outdid even Hitler, successfully capturing the Russian capital in September 1812. However, this victory counted for little when the Russians simply refused to acknowledge defeat and prepared to continue fighting through the winter. By the time Napoleon left Moscow to begin his infamous retreat, the Russian campaign was doomed. As Clausewitz said “The Russia campaign of 1812 demonstrated in the first place that a country of such size could not be conquered (which might well have been foreseen), and in the second that the prospect of eventual success does not always decrease in proportion to lost battles, captured capitals, and occupied provinces, which is something that diplomats used to regard as dogma, and made them always ready to conclude a peace however bad. On the contrary, the Russians showed us that one often attains one’s greatest strength in the heart of one’s own country, when the enemy’s offensive power is exhausted, and the defensive can then switch with enormous energy to the offensive”.
Despite the intervening 129 years, the parallels between Hitler’s advance into the Soviet Union and earlier campaigns are unmistakable, a point almost entirely lost on the German generals. Despite reading accounts of the 1812 campaign and other Russian wars, they preferred to trust in their technological advancements and “natural” German superiority. The war of 1812 was certainly not the only invasion from which German generals could have drawn instructive lessons. The German army’s failure to successfully implement the famous Schlieffen Plan in 1914 also merits significant comparisons with Operation Barbarossa. Just as the defeat of France in 1940 had inflated the myth of superiority to dangerous levels within the German army, so too did the memories of 1870 influence planning and expectations on the eve of World War I.
As the powerful right flank of the German western front wheeled through Belgium in the initial stages of World War I, serious problems soon undermined the success of Schlieffen’s planned strategic envelopment. The German railways proved magnificent for mobilizing and concentrating the massive force of the army, but once there, the field armies had to march to war, leaving supply railheads further behind each day. Efforts to extend the railways suffered from poor planning and inadequate resources. Trucks were scarce and too slow over congested roads to effectively bridge the gap. The constant demands on transportation led to a high vehicle fallout rate, and by early September 1914, during the critical battle of the Marne, only 40 percent of the fleet remained serviceable.
Horses were, of course, the primary means of transportation for the army, but they were poorly cared for, and almost no provisions had been made for fodder during the march. This resulted in a large number of sick and weakened horses, many of which succumbed in high numbers. Allied resistance also took a toll on German offensive strength, with casualties throughout the German field armies reaching about 265,000 men by September 6, 1914. The expansion of the front further exacerbated this weakness, while French forces managed to replenish their ranks without committing too many reserves at the outset, allowing them to fall back toward the country’s interior. These factors, while not exhaustive, contributed to the German failure in 1914 and reflect essential problems later encountered, to varying degrees, in Operation Barbarossa. Summing up the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, historian Hew Strachan's judgment could just as easily apply to 1941 as it did to 1914. Strachan wrote “Moltke’s [the Chief of the German General Staff] lines of communication were lengthening by the day; his front broadened as the movement through France developed . . . The combination of the detached corps, the heavy losses . . . and exhaustion through the march and its attendant supply problems meant that a stage would be reached when the Germans had too few men. Thus, in almost every key index of military strength – in command, in communications, in manpower . . . the balance was swinging from Germany to France. Much of the swing was inherent in the advance itself and the plan which had given rise to it”.
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In August 1941, as Nazi Germany advanced toward Kyiv, General Guderian led a fierce battle against the resilient Soviet Red Army. Despite initial confidence, German forces faced enormous casualties and dwindling supplies. As September rains fell, the arduous struggle continued towards Leningrad, where Finnish forces joined the conflict. The battles, marked by immense suffering, determined the course of history on the Eastern Front, showcasing the relentless human spirit and the grim realities of war, ultimately foreshadowing a turning point in the larger conflict.
