Last time we spoke about the beginning of the battle of Moscow. German offensives toward Moscow and Rostov press on despite severe logistical strains: scarce trains, fuel, and winter clothing; heavy snow and Rasputitsa slow movements; and a growing strain on supply lines. The Red Army, led by Zhukov and Rokossovsky, resists with fortified defenses, minefields, and deliberate countermeasures, while STAVKA reshuffles commanders and maintains pressure to keep German forces tied down. By mid-November the Soviets begin exploiting a minor opening near Tikhvin, stretching German lines, but German reinforcements and the stubborn defense around key corridors prevent a decisive breakthrough. In Moscow’s vicinity, German plans for a rapid encirclement confront entrenched Soviet defenses and fuel shortages that limit panzer operations. Guderian’s group faces fuel and supply constraints, with tanks often immobilized, while Soviet counterattack planning intensifies, including a major southern push planned by Timoshenko to threaten Rostov and seize strategic rail links. Meanwhile, the Road of Life over Lake Ladoga begins to sustain Leningrad, and Allied materiel reaches Soviet hands, complicating the German strategic picture.
This episode is the First Great Victory of the Red Army
Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
The flanking armies defending Moscow crumpled as the Battle of Moscow began, and the Panzer commanders smelled blood in the water as they surged forward with renewed momentum. Meanwhile, Leeb found himself increasingly embattled as Red Army forces smashed into his overextended salient at Tikhvin. To the south, Kleist faced a poisoned chalice in Rostov, his now overextended Panzer Army coming under attack from multiple directions. On 25 November, Group Boeckmann was finally halted in its northward drive, six kilometers short of Volkhov and just short of the Voibokalo area. On 26 November, the Soviets counterattacked with the 3rd Guards Rifle Division, the 310th, and the 311th Rifle Divisions, joined by the 6th Naval Rifle Brigade, and these units slammed into the German 21st Infantry Division. Over the next few days, the Soviets thrust the Germans back several kilometers, but their momentum began to wane. As a result, Halder ordered Leeb to abandon the Volkhov push and reinforce the drive toward Volkliovstroi. Halder 19th diary entry "In AGp. North it is becoming increasingly obvious that the attack on Shum [location unknown but presumably between Volkhov and the Svir River] has miscarried. The main effort by von Boeckmann's group must be shifted against Volkliovstroi [near Voibokalo Station]. An order to this effect is issued. At the same time, Fediuninsky received the 80th Rifle Division transferred from the Leningrad Front, and along with this unit he was ordered to form a new Shock Group to drive the Germans back from Voibokalo Station.
For the entirety of this week, all three Shock Groups of the 4th Army continued their assaults, keeping the Germans around Tikhvin in a state of perpetual crisis but making little headway against stubborn resistance. The 52nd Army likewise pressed its pursuit of the 126th Division back toward the Volga, where a new German defensive line along the river halted the advance. Attacks aimed at the Sinyavino corridor persisted, characterized by ongoing, small, and largely futile probes against the German positions. These efforts achieved nothing substantial beyond pinning additional German troops and inflicting disproportionate casualties. These attacks were part of the ongoing Second Sinyavino offensive, active since October. Commander Shevaldin, dismissed for failures, was reassigned to lead the Arkhangelsk military district.
The first truck convoy crossed the Road of Life and reached Leningrad on 23 November 1941. The very next day, a second convoy arrived, carrying 19 tons of supplies. The road endured constant assaults from brutal weather, which required ongoing engineering work to maintain and widen it. To increase throughput, a second road had already been started on 18 November; it was completed on 28 November and stretched 28 kilometers from Kokkorevo to Kobona. As the ice thickened, an increasing number of routes were surveyed and constructed to expand the Road of Life. By the end of November, daily supply throughput stood at 128 tons, a figure that alleviated the worst famine but fell far short of meeting the food shortage’s scale. To ease demands on supplies, women, children, and the wounded were evacuated on the return journey, echoing the civilian evacuations when river barges operated before the ice formed. By the end of winter 514,000 people would be evacuated from Leningrad.
In Arkhangelsk, the 59th Army formed from Ural and Siberian recruits under Galanin, trained primarily for defense. Likewise, the 2nd Shock Army, raised in the Volga district from southern men unaccustomed to northern winters, suffered under Sokolov’s inept leadership, who dismissed problems with the refrain. Apparently they would carry their skis even when marching over deep snow as they were so unfamiliar with them. This obviously negates any benefits of being issued with them while just serving to increase the weight they would carry. "This is Stalin's order, we should fulfill it.frontline commanders, such as Hoepner, began to believe their offensive would fall short of its". With the Battle of Moscow already underway, on 23 November Bock met with Halder and Brauchitsch to press the gap between the OKH map room and reality. He argued against overestimating division strengths, calling the offensive the army’s “11th hour.” All divisions were overstretched, suffering heavy officer losses, and enduring the brutal cold. More German soldiers were now being treated for sickness than from wounds due to the Cold. Even this was brushed away by Halder as the ratio of 1:1.4 wounded to sick was better than WW1’s 1:4. Some companies had been reduced to 20 or 30 men. Yet neither Halder nor Brauchitsch appeared receptive to his concerns. Bock’s Diary “Brauchitsch, like Halder, nevertheless advocated a continuation of the panzer army’s attack, even at the risk that it might be pulled back later. Both stressed once again that the important thing was to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy. When I said to Halder that I am doing what I can, he replied. ‘Yes, we are very pleased about that”.
Halder would later admit that Germany would never again muster a force equal to what it had at the start of Operation Barbarossa. The war in the east, he suggested, would likely become one of endurance. Yet this insight was undercut by the continued insistence that attacks would proceed to secure favorable ground for the next offensive immediately afterward. Halder also admitted that it would be impossible to secure 100% of the USSR due to its size or its endless manpower. This train of thought however was not continued to its logical conclusion by any general at the meeting… In Halder’s view, the goals of that offensive included achieving a link-up with the Finnish forces at Lake Ladoga, encircling Moscow, and advancing to capture the Don and Oka regions, as well as Maykop. Notably, there was little consideration given to the state of German industry or access to raw materials, factors that would prove vital in sustaining a war of endurance.
However, several frontline commanders, such as Hoepner, began to believe their offensive would fall short of its goal. Morale among the soldiers was collapsing as more and more tried to avoid going to the front, offering excuses like accompanying the wounded back to the rear lines. The losses of junior officers and NCOs hindered any attempts to reverse this decline in enthusiasm. For many, reaching Moscow had shifted from a strategic aim to a promise of warmth and safety. Despondency also grew over the lack of mail from home for periods up to six weeks. The cold had improved the distribution of post which only improved by the end of November. By the very end of November it took on average 3 weeks for a letter from Germany to reach a soldier at the front line. The censorship office would have a nightmare when the postal service recovered, due to the flood of letters bearing the soldiers’ suffering. Yet that very outpouring in their letters home would help stabilize many German soldiers’ mental state.
Hitler was increasingly unsettled about the offensive’s prospects, yet too frightened to repeat the perceived WWI Marne mistake by backing off at such a critical moment. A comment by Bock to Hitler “the last battalion that can be thrown in will be decisive”. The last reserves had to be committed, and the attack pressed home with iron will to force a win. He grew irritable at the looming possibility of failure and began lashing out at anyone he saw as a scapegoat. Unable to accept blame, he browbeat those around him into submission, and a culture emerged in which everyone began agreeing with whatever he said, or else they faced removal or public disgrace. They even coached newcomers on what to say. Meanwhile, Jodl and Keitel from OKH started filtering bad news before it reached Hitler, while Halder and Brauchitsch habitually ignored what did reach them. Hitler’s mood would be worsened by news of successes of Operation Crusader relieving Tobruk along with his minister for armaments and munitions. Again for those interested over at my podcast Echoes of War we did a 10 part series on the entire north africa campaign and it surprisingly effected the Eastern Front.
To the north of Moscow, Reinhardt and Hoepner continued their drive forward. The pace of the advance remained slow through the dense forests and swampland that dominated the terrain, forcing constant head-on engagements with little opportunity for flanking maneuvers. Hoepner averaged 4km a day since the start of the offensive. Reinhardt would average 6km a day. German troops lamented how effectively Soviet forces could camouflage themselves and their defenses in these conditions, and small ambushes were frequent. Soviet troops fought with increasing fanatical resolve, and a rising number of counterattacks were launched against the Panzer spearheads, inflicting further losses on the advancing formations. An example was Martjuschino. This village was captured on the 24th with 500 soviets found dead and only 150 of its defenders surrenderedFlak 88 guns in an anti-tank role had severely depleted many divisions’ air defence. VVS attacks were near constant while the Luftwaffe was effectively absent from the sector. The 6th Panzer Division reported being strafed every 15 minutes on the 27th, while the 7th Panzer Division reported 18 separate large air attacks in a single day. The need for Flak 88s in an anti-tank role had severely depleted many divisions’ air-defense capabilities.
As a result of the attrition, the 6th Panzer Division had only 13 functional tanks left by the 26th, down from an initial 100. Similarly, the 7th Panzer had begun the offensive with 120 tanks, but by the 25th it reported only 40 functional tanks. The 56th Panzer Corps had lost 160 tanks in 10 days at the spearhead of Panzer Group 3. Exact figures for Panzer Group 4 were not known, but were also believed to be heavily depleted. The tank shortage and the weakness of the infantry led to the creation of Tank Crew Battalions, which were badly equipped and not trained for the tasks, resulting in extreme casualties for these formations. One company of 160 was formed mid November. By January only 18 were left. Most losses were from frostbite as they lacked the skills to survive in winter as an infantryman rather than being able to sleep in the relative warmth of their tank. Also their black uniforms were not the best camouflage in the white snow of winter. In parallel, the Wehrmacht scavenged manpower from rear-area formations and even from the Luftwaffe to replace front-line losses degrading the Army's overall capabilities by losing rear-area specialists and leaving a pool of poor-quality frontline infantry who suffered disproportionate casualties. Baron Von Richthofen diary entry about sending pilots and aircraft maintenance crews into the frontline as infantry.“People will enjoy the opportunity to have a go again at the enemy, from 150m with a rifle”. In the same pattern of degradation, most of the motorised infantry had long since been reduced to advancing on foot due to a lack of trucks and fuel.
Still, both Panzer Groups pressed forward. Klin fell to the 7th Panzer Division on the 23rd, while the 2nd Panzer Division captured Solnechnogorsk. Afterward, Rokossovsky was finally allowed to retreat to a new line from the south of Solnechnogorsk to Istra, where his 16th Army would link up with the 5th Army. A scratch force comprising engineers, anti-aircraft gunners, and reserves from other sectors of the Front was thrown into the line to cover Rokossovsky’s withdrawal. A platoon from every single division across the Western Front had been withdrawn from their commands in order to help create this force and to bolster the depleted 16th Army. Meanwhile, the 30th Army was forced northward, creating a 45 km breach between the two Soviet Armies into which Reinhardt surged. By the 26th, terrain opened up for Schaal’s 51st Panzer Corps, which aimed to sever the Volga-Moscow canal. It had been originally thought to it was an obstacle to the encirclement of Moscow. Now bock thought it a vital flank protection for Reinhardt’s Panzer Group as it turned towards Moscow. On the 28th, they reached the canal’s western bank at Iakhroma and secured a crossing, placing Reinhardt now only 35 km from Moscow. Reinhardt begged to be allowed to continue east, but Bock insisted he turn toward Moscow. As had become the habit for Panzer commanders, Bock’s orders were ignored, as Reinhardt privately issued orders for the following week to attack eastward over the canal.
Hopner, meanwhile, maintained the pressure against Rokossovsky in a direct push toward the capital. This advance was much slower, with constant frontal attacks against prepared positions. Istra fell to the SS Das Reich on the 26th, leaving the Germans 35 km from the outskirts of Moscow and 50 km from Red Square. However, the town had required several days of bloody fighting to secure, and after the final Soviet soldier had been driven out, thousands of explosives detonated over the course of several days. 1,100 mines and 250kg of high explosives had been removed by German engineers. Even in victory, the German soldiers were denied shelter from the cold by the Soviets. On the 28th, the advanced elements of the Das Reich claimed to reach a village 15 km from Moscow and managed to fire artillery at one of the suburbs. Countless historians and enthusiasts pointed to Skorzeny’s claim as apparent proof that the Germans were close to capturing Moscow and thus magically winning the entire war. This viewpoint overlooks the tens of thousands of uncommitted Red Army soldiers garrisoning the city and ignores the fact that Moscow had been turned into a fortress over several months. Reaching the suburbs was by no means equivalent to capturing or holding the Soviet capital, and it also ignores the ten uncommitted Soviet Armies waiting in reserve.
Otto Skorzeny’s memoir admitted that their offensive had come to an end, with the 10th Panzer Division reduced to only 20 tanks while his own division had lost most of its artillery due to a lack of tractors to move the guns. By the 28th 11th Panzer had 15 tanks, 10th Panzer 20 tanks, 5th Panzer had 70 tanks. The 20th was down to 54 tanks. In total, both Panzer Groups ended November with only 235 tanks, fewer than several of the individual Panzer divisions at the start of Barbarossa. Bock would call Halder to inform him that the offensive was likely near its end and would have to be called off within a matter of days if the Soviets did not collapse. Bock believed any further attacks would be a “soulless frontal clash with an enemy who it seems commands inexhaustible reserves of men and material; it must not come to a second Verdun”. As the Panzers ran out of steam, their commanders repeatedly pressured Kluge to commit his extremely weak left wing into the offensive. OKH and Bock were also making their impatience with his caution known. Eventually, he would succumb to the pressure and order an attack on December 1 unless forbidden from doing so. No serious thought was given to the possibility of a Soviet counteroffensive by any senior German general at this point.
As the Germans were worn down assaulting layer after layer of defenses, five Soviet Armies were ordered to form up along the Volga in the last week of November. Three were positioned behind Moscow, the 10th Army along the Oka River, and the 61st Army was sent to protect the flank of the South Western Front. The Germans remained blissfully unaware of their existence. STAVKA grew increasingly ruthless. As early as the 17th, Stalin had ordered a concentrated effort to destroy all possible shelter available to the Germans, regardless of the civilian suffering this policy would cause. The VVS and artillery were to barrage any settlement in the proscribed zone while ski troops and partisans infiltrated behind lines to destroy buildings they could reach. By the 29th, over 400 villages had been razed. One German soldier described the character of the fighting at the time as such:“operations themselves often centred around groups of houses, the possession of which was the main object of the fight. The winners could move into the shelters against the deadly cold, the losers would have to run back to undisputed shelters”.
On the 23rd, the already fluctuating Guderian reported to Bock that he could reach his initial objectives, though he admitted a alarming reduction in strength across all his divisions. Across the entire Panzer Army, each company averaged only 35 to 40 men, and only about one third of its artillery was functional. There were just 37 tanks available across all four panzer divisions. Direct firing from Soviet flak guns had taken a heavy toll on the German tanks, compounded by adverse weather conditions. There was concern about Guderian’s lengthening southern flank, but Bock decided that the 2nd Army would simply extend its lines northward. This meant seven weak infantry divisions would be stretched over 350 km of the frontline between the 2nd Panzer Division and the immobile northern wing of Army Group South. Bock admitted in his diary that this arrangement could not hold in the long run, but believed it was worth the risk to enable Guderian’s offensive to succeed. Bock’s Diary“If the [Second Panzer] army really does reach the Oka [River] between Ryazan and Kolomna, it will be left hanging there in an exposed position – unless this drive also causes the enemy to withdraw in front of Fourth Army. All that is available to cover the Second Panzer Army’s southern flank are the forces of the Second Army, meaning seven quite weak divisions manning about 350 km of front – the distance to the immovably fixed northern wing of Army Group South. All this won’t work in the long run. But as long as there is a chance that the enemy in front of Fourth Army might give ground in the face of Second Panzerby the 49th and 50th Armies repeatedly struck Guderian’s panzer forces Army’s attack, Guderian’s drive must be continued, even if the panzer army might be pulled back again after reaching the Oka and after thoroughly destroying the railroad between Ryazan and Kolomna”. Bock and Guderian sought approval for the plan from Halder, who approved it. Halder warned that they would not be able to withstand any counterattack, but did not believe one was likely to occur.
Guderian changed his mind again on the 24th and sent his liaison officer to OKH to request that his offensive be called off. When nothing changed, Guderian absolved himself of any responsibility and blindly followed his orders. This new pessimism came even as Mikhaylov was captured by the 10th Motorised Division. Eberbach’s group had also forced their way through Soviet lines and was making substantial progress. Despite realizing that Soviet troops were massing along all sides of this salient, Eberbach ignored the danger and blithely charged forward. On the 27th, he slammed into the 10th Army near Kashira. After the ensuing battle, not only was his offensive halted, but his forces were forced to retreat all the way back to Mordves.
The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps had led the Soviet counterattack at Kashira under its commander, Belov, an effort that revived Soviet pre-war doctrines of a cavalry-mechanised group for deep and lasting penetrations of enemy lines. Eberbach’s forces had been so dispersed that Belov managed to infiltrate several squadrons behind the German lines before the attack even began. His offensive on the 27th was a complete success, while further counterattacks by the 49th and 50th Armies struck Guderian’s panzer forces repeatedly. On the same day, the encirclement of Stalinogorsk was shattered as the thinly stretched 29th Motorised Division suffered heavy losses. They had faced only the 239th Siberian Rifle Division, which had abandoned all its heavy equipment and vehicles in a desperate charge to break free. These twin defeats and the ensuing casualties on the 27th would lead Bock to label the day a Black Day for the 2nd Panzer Army. The 43rd Army had attempted to encircle Tula from the city’s northwest, but the offensive barely left its starting position in the face of strong Soviet resistance. Rather than admitting fault, Guderian rapidly blamed Kluge’s inaction for these failures. He demanded that Bock force Kluge to attack; otherwise, he argued, he would be forced to cancel his Tula operations. He also pressed for reinforcements from Kluge’s army. Bock refused both demands. Kluge was rapidly becoming a scapegoat.
While this drama outside Moscow unfolded, the offensive mounted by the Southern Front last week continued. Building on their earlier success, several rifle divisions, two cavalry divisions, and two tank brigades struck the SS Wiking and Slovak Motorised Division on the 27th. The 14th Army corps managed to avoid collapse but was steadily pushed back under the pressure. This left the 3rd Panzer Corps perilously exposed at the end of a long narrowing salient that threatened to be cut off. The 3rd Panzer Corps itself was also under heavy pressure, as the 13th Panzer had been pulled north from Rostov to aid the embattled 60th Motorised Division. This left the SS Leibstandarte to defend Rostov alone, though it had long since fallen to below two-thirds strength. The opposing 56th Army temporarily forced its way across the frozen Don River on the 25th before a counterattack sealed the breach in the line. Every day brought a fresh assault on the beleaguered SS troops in Rostov, who were not strong enough to endure prolonged urban fighting once the Soviets managed to cross the ice. Kleist had originally planned to move to the Tuzlov River on the 21st to contract his defensive line and free up troops for those worst-off sectors. This had not been sufficient to relieve the mounting pressure across his entire Army. By the 28th, it was clear to Kleist that he could not hold Rostov, as the pressure was too great. His Panzer divisions averaged only 12 to 24 operational tanks, and his infantry companies averaged around 50 men each. Meanwhile, 21 Soviet divisions were confronting the 3rd Panzer Corps around Rostov.
Thus, without waiting for authorization from higher command, Kleist ordered Mackenson to evacuate Rostov. The Panzer Army was to fall back to more defensible terrain along a shorter line. Despite what many sources claim, on the 28th Hitler had agreed with Rundstedt that it was Kleist’s responsibility to decide whether to retreat. Hitler had to explain to Halder that the situation did not require Rostov to be held at all costs and that there was not enough help to sustain the current German positions. The familiar friction between Hitler and Rundstedt would center on where exactly the retreat would stop, but that breakdown in relations would occur next week. Moving at a pace of 25 km per day, the retreat matched the tempo of the early Barbarossa days. On the 29th, Kleist informed Army Group South that he would fall back to Krym and the Mokryy Chaltyr river, and Rundstedt approved this plan. He would reach that line on the same day. By then, at a cost of 158,577 dead and missing since 28 September, the Southern Front had finally managed to halt the seemingly inexorable advance of Army Group South.
There had simply been no reserves to plug the breaches forming in Kleist's lines. Halder and the staff of Army Group South pressured Reichenau to attack with his 6th Army toward Kupyansk, but Reichenau refused, arguing that any offensive with his depleted and exhausted divisions was irresponsible and that the army lacked the supplies for offensive action. He even traveled to Army Group headquarters on the 27th to persuade Rundstedt not to order such an attack. His offer to attack Chuguev with two divisions was little more than a concession to Halder’s demands. Frustrated by the army's inaction, Halder demanded an investigation into the Army General Staff to determine any possible shortcomings. Halder believed himself and the chiefs of staffs at the Army Groups to be the central pillars maintaining the entire German War effort.
This investigation concluded that such a withdrawal had been inevitable. The General Staff had realised the situation was not tenable but agreed that an offensive solution was possible… if there were several more infantry divisions and a motorised Corp was available. The Panzer Army’s tanks were nearly immobilized due to a lack of maintenance and fuel, and starving horses mostly supplied the Army Group. There was also a desperate need for reinforcements and more mobile divisions, which were not being provided. Yet the concept of restraint appeared unknown to the General Staff, with one proposed solution being to encircle the entire Caucasus with the 11th Army to eliminate Soviet forces. In the end, even Halder was forced to admit that the Army Group did not have the strength or mobility to conduct an offensive.
Manstein’s hopes of an offensive on Sevastopol were foiled this week when plummeting temperatures ruined four of the five trains supplying his 9th Army. With such reduced capacity, it would take weeks before he could stockpile enough resources to mount an assault. With the 42nd Corps doing nothing, on the 23rd Heusinger suggested releasing the entire corps to the 1st Panzer Army. Sodenstern opposed this only if it was officially announced that the Kerch crossing was abandoned. Manstein bitterly opposed any and all suggestions of losing forces, insisting that he needed every division for the siege of Sevastopol. This sort of selfishness would characterize Manstein's career. He constantly would strip other sections of the line and horde resources to achieve his own goals at the expense of everyone else. In the end, only the 73rd Division was withdrawn from the 11th Army. The 42nd Corps would be left to guard the coastline of Crimea alongside the Romanian divisions attached to his Army. We ended the week with Zhukov deciding on the 29th that the time had come to begin final preparations for a massive counterattack across the breadth of the USSR. Stalin- “Are you sure that the enemy has reached a critical point and is in no position to bring some new large force into action?” Zhukov ”The enemy has been bled white. If we don’t eliminate them now the enemy can later reinforce his troops in the area of Moscow with large reserves at the expense of his north and south groupings”. Some of the 10 armies formed as a strategic reserve had already been committed, but the bulk remained in reserve. Town after town had fallen, and plea after plea for reinforcements was either ignored or met with only the bare minimum response. All of this was in preparation for vengeance. STAVKA’s nerve had held through months of disaster, buoyed by Zhukov’s confidence. By December start, 44 trained and well-equipped divisions would be ready in reserve, while another 31 had already been sent to the frontlines. There were no German reserves left.
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By month’s end, Soviet novas mass along the Volga while five armies prepare a broad counterattack; the Road of Life transports supplies to Leningrad. German forces suffer catastrophic attrition: tanks, crews, and equipment are squandered, prompting talks of retreat from Rostov and a potential end to major offensives. STAVKA wins patience, planning revenge.
