Last time we spoke about the continuation of Operation Bruckenschlag. From March 29 to April 4, 1942, the Eastern Front was paralyzed by the Rasputitsa spring thaw, turning battlefields into mud and disrupting logistics. In besieged Leningrad, reports revealed 70% of deaths from starvation, with declining fatalities and German bombings targeting supply routes on Lake Ladoga. Soviet efforts to relieve the encircled 2nd Shock Army near Lyuban faltered due to narrow corridors and poor coordination, amid heavy losses in the "Meat Grinder" at Miasnoi Bor. At Demyansk Pocket, German Operation BRÜCKENSCHLAG stalled short of relief, with Soviet airborne forces suffering catastrophic casualties—only 400 of 5,000 survived. Mud hampered advances, prompting air tactic shifts and reinforcements. In Kholm, defenders repelled assaults using improvised tactics amid melting defenses. Hitler issued Directive 41 (Fall Blau), prioritizing the Caucasus oil fields while Army Group North targeted Leningrad. In Crimea, no major assaults occurred as both sides recovered; Manstein prepared Operation TRAPPENJAGD, questioning Romanian reliability. The period highlighted logistical woes, high casualties, and dueling preparations for summer campaigns.
This episode is Timoshenko assumes Direct Control
Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
Even as the Rasputitsa worsened, fighting raged along most of the frontline. The Volkhov Front continued its efforts to rescue the 2nd Shock Army, while Group Seydlitz renewed its drive towards Demyansk. Behind Army Group Center, Belov and the 4th Airborne Corps sought to fend off a German offensive aimed at separating them. In Ukraine, the front remained relatively quiet as both sides awaited better weather.
This week, the Karelian Front received orders to drive the Finns and Germans back to the prewar borders between the Zapadnaya Litsa River and Kestenga. Frolov’s forces steadily received reinforcements from the 26th Army at Kestenga with two new divisions, and while the ski battalions facing the 46th Mountain Corps were reinforced to brigade strength. He also received a guards rifle division and two ski brigades along the Zapadnaya Litsa River. While small compared to buildups elsewhere in the USSR, it was massive compared to most of the fighting in the far north and only possible due to the Murmansk railway. Lacking a similar infrastructure, neither the Finns nor the Germans could match it. From the 11th to the 21st, the Soviet 7th Army attacked the small Finnish bridgehead over the Svir River with no tangible results.
With the Road of Life about to melt, plans were made to improve the logistical flow into Leningrad. On the 9th, the State Defense Committee approved a new transport plan, setting daily targets of 2,500 tons of food, 300 tons of ammunition, 100 tons of military equipment, 100 tons of coal and fuel oil, and 300 tons of lubricants to be transported into Leningrad per day. Additionally, 3,000 people and 1,000 tons of cargo—mainly from the city’s surviving industry—were to be brought out on the return trips. The primary burden fell on the Ladoga Military Flotilla, where many boats had been repaired over the winter, new vessels were constructed (including 14 metal barges, 31 towed wooden boats, and 118 small-capacity self-propelled boats for use on the lake, plus 17 self-propelled boats and 4 towed boats provided by fishermen), and relevant docking facilities were greatly expanded.
The Germans finally succeeded in persuading the Finns to deploy a small naval group comprising 4 Italian torpedo boats, 4 German cutters, 7 self-propelled amphibious assault boats, 12 self-propelled landing barges, 1 headquarters ship, 1 medical ship, and 4 transport ships to support a 3,000-man amphibious task force. These were concentrated in the ports of Sortavala, Lakhdenpokhia, and Impilakhti.
The partisan movement around Leningrad continued to grow with 50 new detachments. By the end of April, Soviet records claimed the partisans behind Army Group North had inflicted 15,000 losses on German troops along with 69 tanks, 500 vehicles, and 13 aircraft. They also claimed to have destroyed 26 warehouses in addition to 114 rail and road bridges. On top of this, Party officials had formed 25 special partisan groups in key population centers to create an underground network and provide the necessary infrastructure to support the growing partisan movement.
Meretskov’s forces reopened route Dora during early April, claiming the corridor connecting the 2nd Shock Army had been expanded to 6km (though some reports noted it was 4km wide by the 9th), still too narrow to adequately protect the communication routes. He also reported the 59th and 52nd Armies were failing in their offensives, although he would claim they were inflicting heavy casualties on the Germans. The 2nd Shock Army had also been stopped by a German defensive line along the Tigoda River line, suffering from heavy fatigue from their constant fighting. Meretskov would also blame the dense forests for assisting the German defensive efforts. He also accused Klykov of failing to properly organise his men and of being overly concerned about his exposed lines of communication.
Meretskov proposed widening the supply route towards Chudovo and eventually capturing the town. To do this, the 52nd Army was to switch to a defensive posture and hold the southern neck of the supply corridor. The 2nd Shock Army would halt to rest and refit bar a small local offensive to capture Ruchi. The 59th Army was to be strengthened with forces taken from the 52nd Army and attack on the 12th to take Spasskaia Polist with a secondary offensive aimed at taking a railroad bridge over the Volkhov near Sosninskaia Pristen. STAVKA approved this plan on the 9th. However, the Rasputitsa arrived in full force. The combination of mud and German artillery fire prevented nearly all movement through the corridor to the 2nd Shock Army. Both supply routes quickly became submerged in mud and water. Lack of all supplies caused conditions to rapidly deteriorate, and command-and-control systems began to break down. While the 2nd Shock Army had not been strangled by Operation Raubiter, it was certainly being choked.
Despite this, the German 18th Army reported it was only holding onto Lyuban due to “luck and entirely unfounded optimism, both of which could be dispersed at any time by Soviet infantry and a few tanks.” Army Group North itself would report to Hitler and the OKH that it was “living from hand to mouth and on an almost indefensible optimism.”Seydlitz’s renewed drive towards the Demyansk Pocket started back on the 4th, with his frontline only 8km from the Lovat river. Yet it would take until the end of this week for them to reach within 500m of the river. The 5th and 8th Light Infantry Divisions were advanced slowly on a narrower front than the original attempt at the end of last month. The 5th Division was leading the offensive but was rapidly exhausting itself. Mountaineer Regiment 206 was brought up as reinforcement with its lighter equipment more mobile in the terrible conditions. The thawing snow and heavy mud prevented any sophisticated manoeuvres, leaving only the most direct route to Demyansk. This route also minimised the amount of forest cover which could be used by the Soviet defenders.
At Kholm, the daily attacks kept up the pressure on Scherer. On the 10th, one well-planned Soviet offensive struck the north of the town. One rifle battalion supported by three KV-1 tanks swept through the outer defensive lines as the German antitank guns failed. Scherer was forced to beg for urgent air support, but it did not arrive. It was only the steep banks of the Policeman’s ravine which stopped the tanks and their push. Purkaev, however, failed to capitalise on this due to still being forced by STAVKA to split his attention between Kholm and Velikiye Luki. His army lacked the strength to achieve both objectives simultaneously. For their part, the Luftwaffe had a battalion of paratroopers that it was willing to drop into Kholm to reinforce the garrison. However, doing so meant diverting transports from the Demyansk airlift. Furthermore, it was predicted that the transports would suffer heavy losses in such an operation. Also, it was considered likely that half the paratroopers would land amongst the soviets while a majority of the other half was likely to suffer broken bones landing amongst the buildings of Kholm. Thus, the airdrop was rejected.
By the end of March, the 3rd Shock Army had suffered 40,000 casualties, including 15,000 dead or missing from grinding attritional assaults on village and town fortresses. It was a burnt-out husk of its former self. The 4th Shock Army had also largely burnt itself out in its sieges of Velizh and Demidov. While these battles would help teach the Red Army the need for heavy artillery, tanks, and extensive engineer support in order to take prepared positions; the Germans decided the lesson of these battles was that encircled forces were capable of easily holding out indefinitely in a fortified position if the Luftwaffe was capable of keeping them supplied. This would thus buy sufficient time for the ground relief operation to be organised and reach them while draining Soviet strength.
In a weird quirk, the German 59th Corps defending the Velikiye Luki area had found itself directly attached to Army Group Center rather than any Army Command. This left it in an extremely weak position to compete for the Army Group's scarce resources. Thus, its commander, Chevallerie, began fortifying his positions. The Velikiye Luki itself was recognised as being particularly vulnerable to being isolated and thus was turned into an all-around strongpoint.
In April, the straight-line distance between the northern boundary of Army Group Center at Velikiye Luki and its southern boundary near Oroyol was approximately 564 km. However, its frontline was actually closer to 1450 km. This was in part thanks to the roughly 250 by 250km Toropets salient and the 120 by 200 km bulge, which had been created after the Sukhinichi encirclement. This was also not helped by the Salient into the Soviet lines held by the 9th, 4th Panzer, and 4th Armies. There, the forces of the 4th Panzer Army around Gzhatsk remained only 140km from Moscow. In addition to this, there still remained a mass of partisans, two cavalry Corps, an airborne corps, and two Armies operating in the Army Group’s rear areas. To shorten this frontline, the 9th German Army still planned to remove the Toropets salient in Operation Nordpol 2. Meanwhile, the 4th Army began planning Operation Hannover to remove the 33rd Army, Belov’s Guard Cavalry, and the 4th Airborne Corps.
Behind Army Group Center’s lines, the 5th Corps received its new mission to crush the Soviet 33rd Army. By the 10th, parts of the 5th Panzer division had managed to properly deploy around the 33rd. It was one of 7 divisions which was deploying elements against the 33rd. The 33rd Army suffered worse than Belov and the airborne forces from a lack of supplies. Its soldiers were still on a starvation diet and lacking ammo of all sorts. Its artillery was often quiet due to a lack of ammo and fuel. While the 33rd starved, the 4th Airborne Corps would continue to lose ground from the German push north, with Bol’shaia Myshenka falling early in the week. Then on the 9th, another large offensive hit the junction of the Corps and the 2nd Guard Cavalry division. Verterkhovo Station and Zhukovka fell to the Germans. By the 10th Ugra station was relieved with its besieged garrison withdrawn from the frontline. On the 11th, the Germans pushed northeast towards Preobrazhensk and Marinovka, threatening the link between Belov and the Airborne Corps. This threat meant all forces would be operationally subordinated to Belov. His orders were to destroy this German counterattack and then unite with the 50th Army. By the end of the 11th, the two Corps working together had managed to stop the German drive, although the main objective of relieving Ugra Station had been achieved. To allow enemy penetration still further north meant giving him the capability in the future of uniting with his Viaz’ma group. That threatened the full separation of 4th Airborne Corps and Partisan Detachment Zhabo from General Belov’s group, which was operating northwest of Ugra Station. It was necessary to combine the actions of all units operating on that axis. With that aim, 4th Airborne Corps was operationally subordinated to General Belov, to whom the front commander gave the mission – by uniting the forces of all units to liquidate the penetrating enemy group, and, while attacking in the direction of Miliatino, unite with 50th Army, which had already attacked in the direction of that point. On April 8th, the 8th Airborne Brigade was resubordinated to the 4th Airborne Corp after several months operating under Belov’s Command.
In response to this deteriorating situation, Belov would already report to Zhukov on the 10th. There he detailed the condition of his forces, which covered over 300km of the frontline. He was heavily outnumbered with no reserves. The circumstances forced him to focus only on defensive operations. In this report, he requested permission to break out of the encirclement near Milyadno to link up with the 50th Army and potentially the 10th Army. This would also sever the Warsaw highway. After the link-up was achieved, Belov sought permission to restore his Corps, including the elements that had been cut off when he originally crossed the Warsaw highway. Then his Guard Corps could concentrate for a drive on Yartsevo to link up with the Kalinin Front. Zhukov approved this plan on the 11th, but both Zhukov and Stalin forbade any weakening of the forces around Dorogobuzh. Belov would also be informed that the 50th Army had exhausted itself again and was not ready to renew its offensive.
They had restarted their attack on the 5th. This time, the 50th Army reached Fomino 1 before their momentum ran out. Successive counterattacks would see Fomino 1 repeatedly change hands for the rest of the week as both the Soviets and Germans threw fresh formations into the sector.Some of the most successful partisan formations had by now gathered over 1,000 members. Those formations between 1 and 3 thousand men were now starting to be split into partisan regiments and brigades with some organisational features mirroring the Red Army. With over 5,000 members, one of the most successful partisan formations was the 1st Smolensk Partisan division which was one of the two partisan divisions operating alongside Belov’s 1st Guard Cavalry Corps. It would grow to have 7,342 men, two BT-7 tanks, fifty mortars, ten field guns and assorted equipment. Another successful formation was the 1st Kalinin Partisan Corp which controlled 7 brigades and 3 detachments. These larger formations were increasingly able to control entire regions unchallenged by the Germans, who could not divert the necessary manpower to suppress them. However this increase in size was criticised by some as it encouraged the partisans to become far more defensive of their territory. It also meant they were less capable of stealthy operations while also still lacking the firepower to truly stand up to any concerted German attack. A German report dated April 6th claimed one third of Army Group Center’s operational area was controlled by Partisans.
The USSR kept partisan operations under strict control, embedding Party officials in their command because it feared how armed civilians might behave and questioned their loyalty to the Soviet state. These concerns were partly justified by the presence of anti-Soviet groups. In the Bryansk region, for instance, one force operating under a Tsarist emblem regularly fought pro-Soviet partisans and grew to around 9,000 men by late spring. Lacking the manpower to suppress Soviet-aligned resistance, the Germans even allowed this group to administer the Lokot district as an autonomous zone.
Despite their lack of manpower to police their conquered territory, Hitler still resisted the idea of creating militia or police forces from the populations in the conquered territories. He wanted only Germanic troops to maintain law and order in the occupied USSR, as he stated: "The most foolish mistake we could possibly make would be to allow the subject races to bear arms. So let's not have any native militia or police. German troops alone will bear the sole responsibility for the maintenance of law and order throughout the occupied Russian territories." This, of course, contradicted Hitler’s desire in Directive 41 issued on 5 April 1942. This detailed the Wehrmacht's strategy for the Eastern Front after the harsh winter of 1941-1942. Praising German troops' defensive triumphs, which inflicted heavy Soviet losses and depleted their reserves, Hitler aimed to reclaim the initiative post-thaw. The goal was to annihilate remaining Soviet forces and isolate key industrial centers, while securing Western and Northern European occupations. Adhering to Barbarossa's outline, the plan prioritized sequential operations due to logistical constraints. Central armies would hold; northern forces would seize Leningrad and link with Finns later. The main focus was the southern sector: destroying Soviets west of the Don to capture Caucasian oil fields and passes. Preparations involved mopping up the front to free forces, with limited offensives using overwhelming Army and Luftwaffe power for quick wins. Key actions included clearing Kerch Peninsula, capturing Sevastopol (with naval Black Sea disruptions), and encircling. Izyum breakthroughs. The core "Main Operation" (Operation Blau) entailed phased attacks from north to south, concentrating armor and air power for tight encirclements to avoid 1941-style escapes. It began with a pincer from south of Orel to Voronezh, followed by advances along the Don from Kharkov, linking near Stalingrad via a Taganrog thrust. Stalingrad was to be captured or neutralized as an industrial hub. Bridgeheads across the Don, especially at Rostov, were prioritized. Allied troops (Hungarians north, Italians central, Romanians southeast) would hold the extending Don front, backed by German anti-tank reserves, prepared for winter. The Luftwaffe supported Army deployments, disrupted Soviet logistics (e.g., Don bridges), and targeted air forces. The Navy aided Black Sea supplies and blockaded the Baltic. Hitler emphasized secrecy and reported preparations, reflecting optimism in German superiority but underestimating Soviet recovery.
On the 8th, Timoshenko was given direct command of Southwestern Front with Bagramian becoming its Chief of Staff to tighten their control over the planning and conduct of the forthcoming Kharkiv operation. The first version of Timoshenko’s offensive was issued on the 10th. Following a preparatory period of strategic deception, the Southwestern Front was to launch two converging attacks on Kharkiv. In the south, Timoshenko planned to mass 200 tanks to support the infantry forces of the 6th Army. Following them was a mobile group of 269 tanks to exploit success toward German lines of communication west of Kharkiv.
In the northern attack, 300 tanks would support the initial attack of the 21st Army and the newly mobilized 28th Army. Their second echelon was to be the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, reinforced with one tank brigade. They were to race towards Kharkiv to link up with the mobile force advancing from the south. These Soviet mechanised and cavalry forces would then encircle Kharkiv and the German operational reserves. Following rifle forces would occupy the city and destroy its defenders. The minimum goal of this offensive was to shorten the front line and weaken the expected German offensive against Moscow, but both Timoshenko and Stalin hoped for greater results that could prepare the way for subsequent operations towards the Dnepr River. It was hoped to capture the City but the minimum expectation was to reach artillery range of the City and destroy its industrial and transportation capabilities. Back on April 1, the Bryansk Front had been removed from Southwestern Direction control and resubordinated directly to the Stavka. Furthermore the 40th Army on Southwestern Front's right flank was shifted to the Bryansk Front to participate in its anticipated May offensive.
The Southern Front was to dig in along the frontline from the southern face of the Izyum bulge down to the Sea of Azov. The 57th Army defended Lozova, and the 9th Army held Barvinkove. However, Timoshenko would raid the Southern Front for additional formations for his offense. Seven artillery regiments, three tank brigades and two rifle brigades were taken from Southern Front's right wing armies to reinforce Southwestern Front's offensive and to strengthen its reserves. Later another Rifle Division was transferred from the 9th Army to the 18th. This left just 11 weak rifle divisions and one rifle brigade to cover the Barvenkovo axis between the 57th and 9th Armies. Bagramian believed the two armies could support each other if either came under attack. But despite Stalin’s backing, the plan faced opposition from other STAVKA members and the front commanders. General Moskalenko was especially critical, particularly of the major role assigned to the inexperienced 28th Army. As a result, the plan underwent weeks of revisions, while smaller offensives were launched to improve Soviet positions on the bridgeheads and along the northern face of the Izyum salient.
On the 10th, Gehlen would argue that a general offensive by the Soviets was unlikely, but local offensives could be expected where the German line was weak or near vital objectives. He also argued that Soviet Combat strength was concentrated in the south. Meanwhile, Bock would still remain in fierce debate with Halder and Hitler over which variant of the FRIDERICUS plan to use to crush the Izyum Salient. Their attention was also split with the preparations for Fall Blau. Interestingly while Directive 41 had been signed on the 5th, it would not arrive at Army Group South until the 10th. Bock however was on leave and would not be able to see the document until April 21st.
Directive 41 called for a three-phase offensive with an implied fourth phase to take the Caucasus. The first phase was to be a drive on Voronezh. Phase 2 was then a push south along the river line towards Millerovo. The third phase was to reach Stalingrad. This would secure the northern flank of the later drive to the Caucasus. This rolling offensive was decided upon due to the expected difficulties of assembling and supplying the needed forces, with the worst difficulties expected in the south. Thus, the phased operations would ease this burden and prevent the difficulties in the south, thereby delaying operations in the northern areas of the Army Group. Furthermore, it was expected that the majority of the troops involved would be young and inexperienced, having been hastily trained. Thus, the succession of smaller operations would help build up their experience and confidence. Hitler would hammer home this particular point, announcing: “The operation must start with success: young troops cannot be exposed to setbacks. Setbacks must not occur.” To aid the ground units of Army Group South, General Löhr’s Luftflotte 4 would provide air support to both axes of advance of Case Blue, tasked to protect the concentration of forces in the Army Group South area, to disrupt Soviet lines of communications, and above all to destroy the railroad bridges across the Don. On the other hand, the Kriegsmarine's main function was to carry out naval transports in the Black Sea and to be ready to engage the Soviet Black Sea Fleet in combat without delay.
The operation’s second main objective was to crush the Red Army’s fighting strength. To this end, each phase called for a two-prong offensive to create as many encirclements as possible. Hitler had been convinced that the massive encirclement battles of Barbarossa and Typhoon had been tactical errors, with the large distances involved allowing too many Soviets to escape. Thus, Hitler demanded a succession of smaller, more tightly controlled encirclements. The phased nature of the operation would assist in this by allowing the greatest concentration of ground and air forces possible.
If successful, this plan would end up creating a long stationary frontline along the Don river south of Voronezh. Mindful of the shortage of German manpower, Germany’s allies were encouraged to volunteer forces to help man this static line. Hitler had also announced that allied national contingents would go into action, ‘if possible within the framework of their own Armies or in closed Army Corps”. The Hungarians would take the northern segment of the line, and the Romanians would take the south. The Italian forces would keep these two rivalled allies apart with a small number of German divisions and extensive anti-tank detachments backstopping all three. One of the problems that constantly preoccupied Hitler during the preparatory period was the exposed flank that would extend from Voronezh to the area northeast of Kursk. The Fuhrer ordered this defense line amply provided with antitank guns. A total of 350-400 self-propelled 75-mm antitank guns-more than half of them captured French weapons-and some 150 captured Russian 76-mm guns were to be distributed along this front to repel Soviet medium and heavy tanks. Tractors and captured prime movers were to be employed to give a certain degree of mobility to those guns which were not self-propelled. The allied forces were expected to be weaker than the German equivalents, along with being far less committed to the cause. However, it was believed they could manage the static defensive front, especially after the German forces had crippled the Red Army.
One reason for this confidence was a catastrophic underestimation of Soviet war production by German intelligence services. A report from the end of March estimated that the Soviets would be able to produce only 6,600 aircraft, 6,000 armoured vehicles, and 7,800 artillery pieces throughout 1942. Post-war data show these figures were in reality 21,681, 24,446, and 33,111, respectively. In part, this error was due to an underestimation of how much Soviet industry was moved and reactivated in the eastern parts of the USSR. It was also based on the mistaken assumptions that the USSR was as inefficient as German production was. First, the German assumption was that for the manufacture of a tank, an aircraft, or an artillery piece Soviet industry needed the amounts of crude and alloyed steels then still customary in Germany. Secondly, the experts in the Wehrmacht High Command, while quite realistically assuming that a much larger proportion of the total steel production went into armaments in the Soviet Union than in Germany, proceeded to the over-optimistic conclusion that the resulting neglect of all other sectors ‘must result in a far-reaching disruption of the entire production and transport apparatus, and that output of war equipment has already declined compared with the autumn of 1941 and will decline even further’. In point of fact, as far as the final part of that prediction was concerned, the opposite was the case. This very exception highlights a third source of error in the German calculations. The relief provided to Soviet production by Anglo-American Lend- Lease deliveries was underrated. The fact that between 1942 and 1944 the Soviet Union produced only 128,000 trucks, or roughly a third of the vehicles supplied to it by the United States, reveals the dimension of that relocation of production. This was coupled with the overestimation of the disruption caused by the USSR switching to a War Economy, which, in reality, had only boosted Soviet military production. The benefits of Lend-Lease were also largely discounted, despite the fact that the US deliveries of motor vehicles allowed the USSR to focus production of vehicles towards tanks and other ground vehicles.
To secure his Allied manpower, Germany launched a diplomatic offensive aimed at its war partners. On the 6th, the Romanian chief of staff would visit the Wolfsschanze. During April, Hitler would grant decorations and awards to the president of Finland, the king of Bulgaria, the Field Marshal of Croatia, and the Regent of Hungary. At the end of the month, Mussolini would be hosted in Salzburg. Hitler would even make a surprise visit to Finland on June 4th for Mannerheim's 75th Birthday. The Germans were not the only ones interacting with their allies. On the 8th, the British Government invited Molotov to London, but the Soviets would take several weeks to accept.
Bock’s War diary notes: “On April 1, attacks were beaten off on Slavyansk’s northwestern front. On the 6th Army’s southern front, Kopanskoje south of the Donets was lost, further attacks were repulsed in the bridgehead south of Novo-Borisoglebsk; to its right and left weak enemy forces again crossed the Donets. Repeated Russian attacks in the north tip of the Volchansk breach broke down. On April 6, there were only localized attacks on the entire army group front, all of which were repulsed. The following day, weak enemy forces were driven back across the Donets near Ogurzewa.”
In Crimea, Kozlov launched another offensive on April 9 to seize Koi-Asan with six rifle divisions and over 150 tanks, but repeated the same mistakes. He still lacked the heavy artillery needed to suppress German guns or break strongpoints. The infantry attacks were poorly coordinated, advancing across open, muddy ground where standing water left men exposed. Tanks were committed too early, before anti-tank defenses were cleared, and arrived piecemeal, making them easy targets. The assault collapsed by April 11, achieving nothing but heavy losses. In light of this and later events, Vasilevsky would describe both Kozlov and Mekhlis as utterly incompetent. Konstantin Simono, Correspondent for Krasnaya Zvezda, observed: “Never before or since have I seen such a great number of people who were killed neither in battle nor in the attack, but rather in systematic artillery strikes. Without fail, every ten meters there was an individual subjected to that danger. The people were trampled and knew not what they were doing. There was neither a foxhole nor a slit trench around—nothing. Everything was taking place in these barren open spaces and mud, and it was absolutely open on all sides of the field.” Forczyk states that the Crimean Front suffered an over 40% casualty rate with 352,000 total losses between January and April 11th. Manstein's 11th Army suffered only 24,120 casualties over the same time period. This includes both the Kerch and Sevastopol frontlines.
Lastly, as the week ended, the 11th Army artillery command surveyed the Sevastopol perimeter for heavy gun positions, signalling the arrival of a massive siege train. Across Europe, huge artillery pieces were dismantled and sent by rail to Crimea. Even the smallest was a 280 mm coastal howitzer. Among the largest were the 420 mm Gamma mortars, firing 1-ton shells, and the 533 mm Karl guns, firing 1.5-ton shells. Yet even these were overshadowed by Dora, with its 800 mm bore, 31-meter barrel, and 7-ton shells. At the opposite extreme, tiny Goliath remote demolition vehicles were also being packed for transfer to 11th Army.
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
Soviets struggled to relieve the encircled 2nd Shock Army near Volkhov and Demyansk Pocket, facing heavy losses. Leningrad's logistics improved via Lake Ladoga amid partisan growth. In the rear of Army Group Center, Belov's forces resisted German encirclements. Hitler issued Directive 41 for Operation Blau, targeting Caucasus oil. Timoshenko took Southwestern Front command, planning a Kharkiv offensive with massed tanks. In Crimea, Kozlov's attack on Koi-Asan failed disastrously, suffering massive casualties against Manstein's defenses.
