Last time we spoke about the end of the winter offensive.STAVKA ordered the Western and Kalinin Fronts to defensive positions after heavy losses. Fighting persisted in pockets like Demyansk, where Germans relieved encircled forces at great cost, and Belov's cavalry/airborne group near Moscow, increasingly isolated as the 50th Army failed to link up. In the north, the 2nd Shock Army near Volkhov faced encirclement; General Vlasov was appointed to salvage it. Leningrad's siege continued, with German air raids damaging ships and the Road of Life halting due to thaw. German plans included summer operations like Nordlicht to capture Leningrad. In the center, rear-area raids and failed offensives left Belov's forces vulnerable. In the south, debates delayed Operation Fridericus; Manstein prepared Trappenjagd in Crimea, with Richthofen leading air support. Stalin planned a Kharkiv offensive, but secrecy faltered when General Samokhin was captured with plans. Gehlen's Operation Flamingo infiltrated Soviet command.
This episode is the Towards Kholm
Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
The end of April was relatively quiet on the Eastern Front as the combatants looked to recover from several months of constant fighting. However, conflict still occurred. In the Arctic, the Soviets expanded their offensive while the Germans attempted to finally relieve the garrison at Kholm. This week, we will cover the events of April 26th to May 2nd, 1942, as OKW decided they did not like OKH’s old report and created a new one. The Soviet offensive in the Arctic expanded on the 27th with the 14th Army attacking over the Litsa. The 10th Guard and 14th Rifle divisions struck the 6th Mountain division on both its flanks. During the night, the 12th Naval brigade crossed the Litsa bay and exploited the open flank. This caught the Mountain Corps of Norway completely by surprise. The assault formed part of a broader Soviet effort to seize Petsamo and threaten the vital nickel mines that supplied German war industry, with naval infantry and land forces coordinating in a three-phased push supported by the Northern Fleet. However, the Naval brigade’s advance was stopped at the end of April by extreme snowstorms, which stalled all movement in the area for several days. This gave the 6th Mountain Division time to recover and reorganize its battered lines before the weather finally broke.
Meanwhile, the Germans were struggling to deal with the offensive launched in the Kestenga region last week. On May 1st, Dietl was forced to request that the Finnish 12th Brigade be transferred to reinforce the Finnish 3rd Corps. Mannerheim, however, refused, as he was unwilling to be drawn into a lengthy operation that might overcommit Finnish resources far from their own strategic priorities. On the other hand, he offered to transfer the 163rd Infantry Division to Dietl’s command and assume responsibility for the Ukhta section of the front, but only after a German Corps relieved the 3rd Corps. While this was no immediate help to Dietl, it would mean he was no longer responsible for Ukhta and that he was gaining a new division under his command. Thus, it was accepted. With no help arriving from the Finnish, Dietl was forced to bring in further battalions from neighbouring formations, scraping together whatever reserves he could from already stretched units across the far northern sector. At the same time, the Soviet 26th Army reinforced its attempt to envelop the 3rd Corps with the 186th Rifle Division and the 80th Rifle Brigade. This meant Siilasvuo’s 9 battalions were now opposing 2 Soviet divisions and 2 brigades, a ratio that highlighted the growing imbalance in the frozen wilderness.
These events convince Mannerheim to abandon his plans to downsize Finnish infantry divisions into brigades. Those plans had been based on the assumption that the war was nearly won and that only minimal forces were needed to hold the front line until the USSR’s surrender. This was now very evidently false. While only two divisions had fully completed the conversion, many Finnish divisions would find themself partially converted with a heavily reduced third regiment, a structural weakness that would haunt the Finnish Army for the remainder of the Continuation War as manpower demands continued to mount.
With the start of May, the recently arrived He-111 torpedo bombers started operations from their Norwegian bases. On May 2nd, they attacked Convoy PQ 15 and claimed to have sunk 3 vessels. In reality, one of the hit vessels had only been damaged, but this vessel would later be sunk by a German submarine. The strikes came from aircraft of KG 26 operating out of Bardufoss, targeting the Allied supply run to Murmansk in a daring low-level torpedo run that caught the convoy north of Norway; the merchant ships Botavon, Jutland, and Cape Corso were among those lost, with heavy loss of life aboard. May would also see a continuation of the German naval build-up, and by the end of the month, 1 battleship, 3 heavy cruisers, 8 destroyers, 4 torpedo boats, and 20 submarines would be based in Norway. However, the lengthening daylight hours in the Arctic meant submarines were becoming increasingly easy to spot, making their sorties increasingly dangerous as Allied air cover and escorts grew more effective with the changing season.
The Leningrad Front’s bridgehead across the Neva River at Nevskaia Dubrovka would be crushed by a small offensive by the 18th Army on the 29th. The assault had started back on the 26th with a heavy artillery barrage. The 357 Soviet defenders from the 86th Rifle division would manage to hold out for three days against repeated infantry assaults before being overwhelmed. Most of the soviet defenders would end up being killed in the battle, including the divisional chief of Staff Major Kozlov. The elimination of this small but irritating bridgehead allowed the Germans to shorten their lines slightly and redirect artillery that had been pinned down covering the crossing.
On the 30th, Khozin would order the 2nd Shock Army to adopt an all-around defensive posture in the Lyuban salient. The 13th Cavalry Corps was to be kept as a mobile reserve force for the Army. He hoped this move would buy time to plan and prepare a new operation. Its goal was to widen the corridor connecting the 2nd Shock Army to Soviet lines. On May 2nd, Khozin would report his plans to STAVKA. The Kirishi sector was seen as vital to crush to free up forces from the 4th Army for use elsewhere, while the Spasskaia Polist' region was also seen as vital as it dominated the communication routes to the 2nd Shock Army. These adjustments reflected the hard lessons of the winter fighting, where overextended salients had repeatedly invited German counterattacks.
To resolve this, a series of offensives was planned for early May. The 59th Army was to take Spasskaia Polist, while the 54th would continue toward Lipovik to support the 4th Army and also prepare an offensive on Lyuban. The 4th Army was to attack Kirishi, then advance on Chudovo. Meanwhile, the 2nd Shock Army would largely stay on the defensive, though it was to form a small shock group to support the 59th Army and prepare its own offensive on Lyuban once the 6th Guards Rifle Corps arrived. It seems, then, that Meretskov had won the previous week’s debate. The 13th Cavalry Corps was to remain in reserve to exploit any success by the 2nd Shock Army and 6th Guards Rifle Corps. These operations were tentatively set for mid to late May. Khozin then submitted a series of reinforcement requests and listed the formations needing rehabilitation. While STAVKA approved his operational plans on May 3rd, it made no comment on the requested reinforcements, leaving field commanders to improvise with what little extra support might trickle down from the strategic reserve.
Throughout May, partisans would continue to smuggle resources into Leningrad. 500 tons of bread, meat, and other products from occupied regions were transferred into the city to help sustain the population. Scurvy had become an issue during the winter. City officials had countered the rise of this health issue by producing Vitamin C extract from pine needles. They produced 738,500 liters of pine extract in the first half of 1942. There, the conditions were slowly improving. The Leningrad funeral trust recorded burying 102,497 bodies in April. This decreased to “only” 53,562 in May. These grim figures, while still horrifying, marked a turning point after the catastrophic winter, as the partial reopening of supply lines and the heroic efforts of the “Road of Life” across Lake Ladoga began to ease the worst of the famine that had claimed hundreds of thousands of civilian lives.
With Demyansk relieved last week, the 16th Army's main priority was now to relieve Kholm. Group Lang started its assault to relieve Scherer on April 30th. Blocking their way was the heavily dug-in 8th Guard Rifle Division supported by the 71st Tank Brigade. Constant heavy Luftwaffe support was needed to blast a way north. This initial charge reached within 2km of Kholm before getting bogged down by the evening of the 30th. The defenders under Generalmajor Theodor Scherer had already endured months of isolation, reduced by this point to roughly 1,500 combat-effective men from an original force of around 5,500, fighting with whatever weapons and ammunition could be flown in or dropped by glider.
Thus, Purkaev realised time was running out to capture Kholm, so that evening he launched a massive assault on Scherer’s garrison. Overnight, a massive artillery barrage knocked out the majority of the garrison’s heavy weapons. Then, at 5:45 am on May 1st, three rifle regiments and 15 tanks launched concentric attacks on the town. Multiple T-34s broke into Kholm, and the defences around the Red Ruins nearly collapsed. Urgent Stuka support was called in to drive the tanks back. As this arrived, so did a new 5cm AT gun, which was delivered via glider—an audacious resupply that proved decisive in the close-quarters fighting. This support would eventually allow Scherer’s forces to stop and contain the Soviets after a roughly seven-hour battle. 7 Soviet tanks alone were found knocked out around the airstrip, where fighting had been partially intense. The garrison’s survival hung by a thread, but the combination of airpower and desperate improvisation had bought just enough time.
Group Lang spent the next several days bogged down along the Kholm road, unable to defeat the last layers of Soviet defences. Then, on the 5th, Lang gathered his forces for one final effort in coordination with Stuka support. This allowed the 411th Infantry Regiment to create a breach in the 3rd Shock Army’s Lines. Through this, a small battlegroup of two assault guns and 60 infantry rushed into Kholm. Scherer’s garrison was relieved after a 105-day-long siege. Forczyk states Scherer had suffered 60% casualties with 1,500 killed and 2,200 wounded from his original force of 4,500. However, he also estimated the 3rd Shock Army had suffered up to 25,000 casualties during the Siege of Kholm. Scherer’s garrison would be replaced with the 218th Infantry Division, and its survivors were withdrawn to Germany for home leave. Kholm would remain in German hands as a heavily fortified strongpoint, a thorn in the Soviet side that continued to tie down forces long after the relief.
During the entire sieges of Demyansk or Kholm, the VVS of the Northwestern Front, for some reason, never decided to raid the primary airbases at Pskov or Ostrov. Nor did they attack the supporting fighter bases around Dno. This could have seriously disrupted the Demyansk airbridge, which was essential for the survival of the 2nd Corps inside the pocket—perhaps due to poor coordination, competing priorities elsewhere, or the Luftwaffe’s own fighter cover making such raids too costly. Between the start of the airbridge in January and the relief of Kholm in early May, 14,455 transport sorties were flown to Kholm and Demyansk. This brought in 24,303 tons of supplies and equipment, in addition to 15,446 replacements, for the hard-pressed troops inside the pocket. 22,093 wounded were extracted on the return flights. This had come at a steep cost. The transport groups lost 125 aircraft, with another 140 seriously damaged. Furthermore 387 aircrew were killed during these missions. These losses would amount to roughly half of all the transport airframes Germany would build throughout 1942. It had also consumed 42,155 tons of aviation fuel, which was nearly one-third of the aviation fuel produced in the Reich in a month. The operation had also severely disrupted pilot training programs, with pilots and airframes ruthlessly stripped away from training groups to replace losses and bring up their numbers.
And the losses would not stop here. Demyansk may have been relieved, and supplies reached them through the Ramushevo corridor. However, even by the end of May, only 50 to 100 tons of supplies per day would reach the 2nd Corps over ground. The Luftwaffe would need to supply the rest of the Corps' minimum daily supply of 300 tons. The only bright side was that improving weather would gradually increase the efficiency of the transports, allowing groups to be transferred away. Morzik would eventually release all but three groups, which were needed to keep the 2nd Army Corps supplied in its overextended position. These missions would continue all the way until the Stalingrad operation, with another 18,639 transport sorties flown after the creation of the Ramushevo corridor. While the Airlift had saved the 2nd Corps and Scherer’s Kholm garrison, Morzik considered it a horrific failure due to its costs. Furthermore, Hitler and the Wehrmacht had been encouraged and rewarded for holding on to several hopeless positions and thus would do so again in the future, a dangerous precedent that would echo in later campaigns.
In response to these events, STAVKA would detach Group Ksenofontov from the Kalinin Front and use it as a cadre to form the 53rd Army. This was tasked with holding the south of the Demyansk Pocket. The Northwestern Front would also be assigned nine Artillery Regiments from STAVKA reserve forces to bolster its firepower. These were to support an upcoming operation with the 1st Shock and 11th Armies against the Ramushevo Corridor due to start next week, signalling Soviet intent to keep pressure on the Germans even as winter gave way to spring.
Unhappy with the previous OKW report on Ostheer’s strength, the OKH sought to remove what it saw as nonsense. In purely numerical terms, the Army was now judged stronger than in June 1941, with 7 new infantry divisions, 2 new panzer divisions, and 4 more infantry divisions expected soon. The 625,000-manpower shortfall, despite 1.1 million replacements, was quietly overlooked, as was the poor quality of many replacements and new troops. The shortage of skilled NCOs and junior officers was likewise downplayed. On the other hand, the report was satisfied with weapons deliveries to the frontline, which would meet the needs of Army Group South, even if the other two Army Groups still lacked heavy equipment. Ziemke claims: “725,000 rifles, 27,000 machine guns, 2,700 antitank guns, and 559 pieces of light and 350 pieces of heavy field artillery” For comparison Erickson claims the Soviets produced during the winter alone “4,500 tanks, some 3,000 aircraft, nearly 14,000 guns[artillery pieces] and over 50,000 mortars”
The report did admit artillery and anti-tank ammunition supplies; however, they were likely to be a concern due to delays in increasing their production. This assessment painted an optimistic picture that masked deeper structural weaknesses, with Army Group South receiving priority at the clear expense of the other two army groups.
Meanwhile, the 3,300 tanks believed to be on hand were smaller than in Operation Barbarossa; this was more than made up for by the increase in the armaments on these vehicles. Both the Panzer III and Panzer IV had been upgraded since 1941, as had support vehicles like the StuG. Obsolete light tanks were also being converted into vehicles such as the Marder II tank destroyer. The report admitted that mobility had declined sharply, with Army Group South retaining only 80% of its original mobility. This came at the cost of demotorising its regular infantry and denying motorisation to the other two Army Groups. Even so, there remained a 75,000-vehicle shortfall, of which only half was expected to be replaced. Worse still, current production was below the losses anticipated for Fall Blau. As a result, nearly 250,000 horses were to be requisitioned across Germany and the occupied territories to help make up the deficit and replace those already lost, a stark reminder that the Wehrmacht was increasingly reliant on horse-drawn transport even as it prepared for its next great summer offensive.
Following this, on May 1st, Gehlen would report that the Soviets were largely on the defensive across the front, but wearing down attacks were extremely likely. Kharkiv was identified as a particularly likely target for a Soviet attack. However, it was insisted that none of these attacks would likely cause a breakthrough, an assessment that would soon be put to the test.
In the Army Group Center’s sector, the flow of formations south started. The 4th Panzer Army HQ would be transferred to Army Group South, as would five of the twenty Corps-level Headquarters. For the most part, the frontline was quiet with both sides looking to recover from their winter ordeals. Still, minor skirmishes and other small actions were commonplace even when no major operation was underway, as exhausted units probed for weaknesses and gathered intelligence.
Behind German lines, the Belov’s Guard Cavalry and the 8th Airborne Corps had all gone on to the defensive by the 26th. On the other side of the German lines, the 50th Army had also halted its offensive. They had not been able to sever the Warsaw highway nor link up. With this cessation of the offensive, local German forces would attempt to counterattack the Airborne troopers. However, the same waist-high floodwater had hindered the paratrooper’s offensive through the swamp land and now obstructed German offensives. For the rest of April, attacks against the Soviet village strongholds were easily repulsed. Under these conditions, Zhukov granted the paratroopers permission to withdraw to their pre-offensive positions. After the Germans noticed this withdrawal, they followed closely behind but did not engage the Soviets, apart from some small skirmishes. Both sides were relatively content to entrench themselves and recover throughout the early days of May. New airstrips were constructed in the Soviet territory to bring in sufficient supplies to keep Belov’s forces adequately supplied. The 1st Guard Cavalry Corps occupied the northern sector of the line from Dorogobuzh to south of Viaz’ma. The 1st Partisan regiment covered the Northeastern flank, supported by a composite battalion drawn from survivors of the 33rd Army. Belov and Kazakin still hoped to return to Soviet lines but knew they needed time to recover before making any new attempt, buying precious weeks to reorganize their battered but still dangerous raiding force.
On April 28th, Timoshenko would finalise the plans for the Kharkiv offensive with Directive 00275. Several alterations had been made after multiple protests from Timoshenko’s subordinates. One example was General Moskalenko of the 38th Army, who had been concerned about the initial major role given to the green 28th Army. Their men and command structure had not yet seen combat, while the 38th Army had been fighting in the local area for months already. This had led to the 28th neighbouring armies being ordered to support their offensive. Group Bobkin was created out of concern that the 6th Army’s Shock group was too large and dispersed to be controlled by a single officer, thus necessitating the division of command. However, not all concerns about the offensive were listened to. Shaposhnikov and several other figures thought Timoshenko was mad for cramming so many forces into the Izyum Salient. Timoshenko, however, would manage to convince Stalin that the operation would be a complete success despite these fears. While May 4th had been initially set as the offensive start date, last week's redeployment problems, which continued into this week, delayed the offensive until the 12th. The rushed planning reflected the high command’s eagerness to strike before German reinforcements could fully arrive, even as intelligence warnings about enemy concentrations began to filter in.
The 28th Army was to attack from the Volchansk bridgehead northeast of Kharkiv, supported by the 21st and 38th Armies. Riabyshev’s shock group, made up of 6 rifle divisions and 4 tank brigades, would strike along a narrow 20-km front against the German 17th Corps. Once a breach was made, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps would dash through and wheel south to encircle Kharkiv. At the same time, the 6th Army was to attack from the Izyum bulge with 8 rifle divisions, 4 tank brigades, and Operational Group Bobkin, which included 2 rifle divisions, a cavalry corps, and a tank brigade. After breaking the German 8th Corps, the new 21st and 23rd Tank Corps would exploit the gap and link up with the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, while the 6th Cavalry Corps raced toward Berestyn to form the outer encirclement ring. If successful, the Soviets would not only retake Kharkiv but also encircle much of the German 6th Army. The Southern Front would protect the flank, with the 57th Army defending Lozova and the 9th Army holding Barvinkove. May 4th was set as the starting date. Despite the postponement, Soviet redeployment remained rushed, allowing the Germans to detect parts of the buildup. Defensive works were therefore expanded across the front, using coerced local labour and requisitioned local materials. Strongpoints dominating key communications were heavily reinforced, and positions were designed to hold out even if encircled. The formations in Ukraine were also the strongest in the Ostheer, having been prioritized for replacements. By May 1st, there were on average only 2,400 vacancies per infantry division in Army Group South. It was hoped to fully restore the Army Group’s infantry before Fall Blau started, although this would be at the expense of the amount and quality of replacements going to the other two army groups.
Meanwhile, Bock’s HQ would issue Army Group South Directive 1 on the 29th, providing a detailed plan for the BLAU operations. Bock would also complain in his diary “In the evening, on the insistence of the OKH, the first draft of our directive for the [summer] offensive was hastily thrown together”
There had been no terrain studies nor consultation with the involved army commands nor with OKH. The rushed directive was done solely as a desk exercise. This assumed that Bock would retain control of the entire Army Group until the completion of Blau II, at which point the split into Army Groups A and B would occur. Group B would hold the line from Kursk to Stalingrad using the Don River when possible. Group A would be responsible for capturing Stalingrad and then driving into it. The plan reflected the high command’s growing confidence in a renewed summer drive toward the Caucasus oil fields, even as local threats loomed.
Also, the quibbling over Operation Fridericus would end on the 30th, largely due to Hitler’s pressure. Remarking the decision as “born in severe pain and on the whole not pretty”, Bock reluctantly ordered Fridericus II into effect with a tentative start date of May 18th. Thus, German forces north and south of the Izyum Salient started to concentrate near its neck. As the Germans moved to attack and defend simultaneously, the floodwaters of major rivers began to subside. At the same time, roads started to become recognisable as roads as the Rasputitsa finally started to ebb away in Ukraine, opening the way for the mobile operations both sides now craved.
In Crimea, both sides were likewise making final preparations for a new offensive on the Kerch Peninsula. Kozlov was preparing yet another attack on Koi-Asan. It remains disputed whether STAVKA ordered the Crimean Front to go on the defensive, only for Budenny, Kozlov, and Mekhlis to ignore it, or whether STAVKA instead urged Kozlov to attack again. What is clear is that the Crimean Front made no serious effort to build defense in depth. Foxholes, trenches, and other fieldworks were treated as a waste of effort better spent preparing for the next offensive. Two-thirds of Kozlov’s forces were concentrated within the northern 51st Army, with nine divisions crammed into the salient and more in reserve—a deployment that left the southern sector dangerously thin.
Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe continued to increase its advantage over Crimea. Back on the 24th, the VVS commander of Sevastopol Ostryakov, was assassinated alongside the deputy commander of Naval Aviation, Korobkov, in a precision strike from six JU-88. Korobkov had just arrived to conduct a STAVKA inspection. Lax radio discipline had allowed German signals intelligence to learn about the event and its itinerary. By May 1st, Richthofen had arrived in Crimea and established a headquarters in Kischlaw. Unofficially, the 8th Air Corps and Wild's provisional Air Command South were independent of each other. In reality, Richthofen subsumed Wild’s command into his Air Corp which would be officially recognised several weeks later.
The day after Richthofen arrived, Manstein held the final briefing for Trappenjagd, describing it as a ground offensive whose main effort would come from the air. The Luftwaffe was to pull the infantry forward. With Kozlov preparing a new offensive and the diversionary attacks of the 42nd Corps and the Romanians drawing many Soviet forces north of Kerch, only three divisions of the 44th Army held the front line, with three more in reserve. Opposing them, Manstein concentrated two infantry divisions and one light infantry division as the spearhead of his attack. They were to be amply supported with combat engineers, two batteries of Flak 88 guns, and 3 Assault Gun battalions. A makeshift motorised brigade known as the Groddeck Motorized Brigade, despite being near divisional strength, was formed as an offensive reserve. After the Parpach Antitank ditch had been breached, the 22nd Panzer and 170th Infantry Division would be ordered to race towards Kerch. In his briefing, Manstein explained the plan’s logic: the Soviets had massed two-thirds of their forces in the northern sector, leaving the south thinly held with only three divisions in line and two or three in reserve. “We intended to make our decisive thrust… down in the southern sector, along the Black Sea coast. In other words, in the place where the enemy would be least expecting it.” 5th May was hoped to be the start date, but bad weather stranded two fighter groups and a ground attack wing in Silesia. This forced a delay until the 7th to allow these formations to arrive in Crimea. The three reconnaissance squadrons of the Crimean VVS with ancient aircraft missed all of the German preparations, leaving Kozlov largely blind to the gathering storm.
And lastly, on the 26th, Hitler would give a speech at the Reichstag. Here, all the defeats and reverses of the Winter were transmuted into a stunning victory over the elements emphasised with many comparisons to Napoleon’s disastrous 1812 campaign. In the speech, Hitler declared, “We have a gigantic winter battle behind us. The hour will come when the fronts will awaken from their paralyzed state,” framing the retreat to a stable line from Taganrog to Lake Ladoga as a triumph of German will against temperatures that had dropped to 52 degrees below zero at points. However, he would use this speech as an excuse to gain more power over the German generals; the Reichstag unanimously granted him sweeping new authority to act without legal constraints, allowing him to punish or remove any German—soldier, officer, judge, or official—without due process if he deemed it necessary for victory. Similarly, on May 1st, Stalin would issue his annual May Day order.
May Day order. 130
“… Greeting you and congratulating you on this First of May, I order:
Under the invincible banner of the great Lenin—forward to victory!”
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STAVKA ordered the Western and Kalinin Fronts into defensive positions, reflecting severe losses, while skirmishes continued around Demyansk and near Moscow. German forces struggled too: Soviet offensives grew in the Arctic, endangering key resources, even as the Kholm garrison stayed under siege. Elsewhere, the 18th Army cleared a Soviet bridgehead near Leningrad, enabling German operational adjustments. Finnish troops under Mannerheim managed mounting Soviet pressure with limited resources.
