Hello and welcome to a reading from The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group, written by Mark Silinsky and published by Praeger, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing in New York, New York. This reading is brought to you by Kensington Security Consulting, which brings education to national security. This reading turns to the structure of the Taliban.
The Taliban’s Four Strategies
The term “strategy” is key to the language of war. It refers to a broad plan of action to secure victory. These strategies aim to weaken Afghanistan’s economy, terrorize the enemy, increase their support base, and destroy the national will of states backing the current government. These four strategies remain central, and chapter six will detail the specific tactics. One primary Taliban strategy is to weaken the economy. Insurgents target the economy because a prosperous Afghanistan would strengthen the government’s credibility, attract more international investment—especially in natural resources—encourage domestic savings and investments, and develop human capital. Afghans would become stakeholders if they saw good returns on their investments. In turn, young Afghans would be drawn to vocational education and to fields like technology, engineering, and science that offer financial benefits. Talented Afghans might be less likely to spend their energy memorizing the Koran if they could pursue education that improves their living standards. That’s why donors in Bonn prioritized economic growth, and why the Taliban see it as a threat. Another Taliban strategy is to terrorize both Afghan and non-Afghan enemies. Fear successfully suppressed early dissent during their 1996-2001 rule. The insurgents have many enemies, including those involved in modernizing the country. They have targeted teachers, healthcare workers, public administrators, military and intelligence personnel, many NGO workers, and others seen as collaborators.
A third strategy involves expanding the Taliban’s support base. This includes financial backing, access to weapons, and recruitment from across the Islamic world. In the 1990s, Pakistan provided millions of dollars, arms, and adolescents to the Taliban. The Pakistani connection to the Taliban persists. Pakistan has also supported other insurgent groups, as discussed in chapter eight. Along with domestic and Pakistani support, the Taliban continue to receive substantial aid from Arabs.
The fourth strategic goal is to undermine the resolve of the government’s international backers. The Taliban have made significant progress in gradually weakening the once-strong will of Western societies to sustain their military presence in Afghanistan, as demonstrated by polls. Five years into the counterinsurgency, President Bush grew concerned that American resolve would lessen as U.S. soldiers were killed.
The Taliban’s Basic Sets of Tactics and Targets
The term “strategy” refers to the Taliban’s core military and political agenda. The strategy is implemented through “tactics.” The Taliban have successfully adapted their tactics to the environment and circumstances. There are three main groupings of tactics: violent attacks, non-violent intimidation, and information operations. The basic sets are discussed below, and the specific tactics will be discussed in the next chapter.
Violent Tactics
The first tactic is brute force. The mujahedin tortured and mutilated the bodies of Soviet soldiers, and some of these insurgents continued their brutal tactics in their next war as the Taliban. Since 2001, the Taliban has killed and injured their enemies during their ongoing campaign to conquer. Assassination and indiscriminate murder are proven, cost-effective weapons in an insurgency because of the fear they create. The insurgents have studied terrorist trends from Iraq and Israel and have determined that human and roadside bombs are highly effective. There are many targets for the Taliban. Some of the main target groups include education, communications, the civil service, and police and security forces, which are listed below.
Target Set- Economic and Entrepreneurial Enterprises
One target set of the Taliban centers on businesses or businessmen who cater to affluent Afghans, foreigners, or pro-government personnel. Upscale hotels and restaurants are prime targets for several reasons. The Taliban and the Haqqani insurgents see swanky hotels as pretentious and view the proprietors and wait staff as collaborators serving a foreign, conquering force. These venues also attract the rich and powerful of Afghanistan. The Taliban also attacks cafes, markets, and shopping centers.
The Taliban also terrorizes impoverished entrepreneurs. Attempting to support their families by selling second-hand goods, toiletries, DVDs, and cosmetics, these poor vendors expose themselves to the Taliban’s often-erratic and always-brutal moral codes. The Taliban morality police beat individuals who listen to music, wear Western clothes, watch television, or participate in all but the most Islamic and primitive activities. They also severely punish entrepreneurs who sell banned clothing, DVDs, and television sets. In doing so, the Taliban further limits Afghans' ability to earn a living.
Target - Education
“Education is the factory that turns animals into human beings." Ghulam Hazrat Tanha, the director of education in Herat. "
From the beginning, the Taliban persistently and aggressively targeted education. During their 5-year rule, they shuttered schools, completely segregated the sexes, and purged the texts for what they considered un-Islamic elements. Today, out-of-power, the Taliban fear the power of education in building national capacity, empowering women, creating physical infrastructure, assuring competent administration, promoting job creation, and fostering a sense of national purpose.
They attack a broad set of educational targets: students, teachers, parents, and facilities. Tactics include stand-off attacks, assassinations, murders, and morbid, disfiguring attacks, such as throwing acid into the faces of schoolchildren. One of the countless attacks occurred in August and September 2003, when the Taliban burned several buildings at an elementary school near Kabul and, as their standard modus operandi, left leaflets threatening to kill teachers, parents, and children should they pursue education. After the attack, nearly 200 of the 400 boys and girls stayed away for some time.
The Taliban’s intimidation worked and often still does. But out-gunned Afghans sometimes fight the Taliban. The Afghan villagers have organized broadly and often effectively against Taliban attacks on educational facilities, educators, and students. By summer 2012, there were more coordinated, village-level self-defense efforts to save the schools. Sometimes with or without government help, villagers took up arms to protect their schools. According to a report, a school principal organized 500 students to fight against the Taliban's attempts to shut down the schools in August 2012.
Additionally, villagers have opposed the Taliban through non-violent resistance. Fully aware of the risks if they are caught, school teachers and administrators have kept schools open, often cautiously and secretly. They have hidden in guesthouses, teaching in small groups to minimize the chance of being discovered. In eastern Afghanistan, an underground education system has developed. Sometimes, government forces have kept Afghanistan’s schools open; other times, they have made compromises with the Taliban regarding school content and attendance. In some cases, the Taliban have shut schools completely.
Target – Communications
The Taliban also targets communication systems and their operators. They regularly attack radio broadcasts and transmission towers. Cell phones have helped bypass older, less advanced forms of communication. Counterinsurgency forces use transmissions to fight the insurgents. The Taliban attacks towers and threatens to kill operators and technicians who maintain them. When these threats are credible, service is often disrupted during the night and sometimes during the day. The Taliban believes informants use cell phones to alert U.S. troops after dark. In neighboring Pakistan, Voice of America operators agreed to the demands of local insurgents to stop broadcasting.
Target- Civil Servants and Police
Taliban kill Afghans who work for the Kabul government and Coalition Forces. From the beginning of the counterinsurgency, there was a limited pool of well-educated Afghans who had in-demand skills. They are called the "second civil service." These skills include English, technical skills—especially in information systems—and accounting. The Taliban need to kill these individuals or discourage them from aiding the government.
Of the civil service branches, the Afghan police have been the most targeted. The U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency manual clearly states that the police, not the military, are the front-line soldiers in counterinsurgency. As David Galula notes, the police are the government’s most effective and efficient organization for removing insurgent political agents from the population. For Coalition Forces to hold and develop an area, a credible police force is essential. Through daily interaction and relationship-building, police develop detailed knowledge of the physical and human terrain. They gather intelligence from local villagers about Taliban presence and identity. Additionally, there is a criminal motive for killing police officers. Because the Taliban engage in criminal enterprises, they oppose police who remain uncorrupted.
The Taliban employ various methods to kill and injure police. Many are killed by explosives, especially mines placed on roads. Sometimes, police officials such as chiefs are targeted. For example, in August 2012, the Taliban tracked the route of a police chief. When he traveled a route in Badghis Province, a roadside bomb was detonated, wounding him and killing others. Some attacks involve the Taliban impersonating police officers. In the first recorded attack of this kind, an Afghan policewoman killed a U.S. police contractor in late December 2012.
Taliban terror also affects the Pakistani police. In Peshawar, home of one of the four shuras, Taliban fighters often outgun their opponents and fight with brutal ferocity. A police inspector said in December 2012 that violence against security forces has damaged morale at many local stations and checkpoints, causing them to suspend night patrols.
Targeting Health Care Providers
The Taliban target health care providers, especially those connected to NGOs. Sometimes they kill these workers randomly; other times, they target specific health professionals. Superstitions can also drive kill orders. For instance, the Taliban and some Afghans believed that efforts to eradicate polio—long conquered in much of the West—were un-Islamic and part of American plots. In late December 2012, Western medical personnel were killed while administering polio vaccines.
As a result, some NGOs have pulled out of Afghanistan. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) withdrew early in the insurgency, in June 2004, due to their inability to protect their employees. MSF had served in Afghanistan for nearly 25 years. Other NGOs, such as the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), have become wary.
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