Chapter four discussed the Taliban’s downfall and the security and developmental priorities for the conquering nations, which met in Bonn. Chapter five will analyze the specific target sets, tactics and their effects on the counterinsurgency with greater granularity. This is a chapter on how the Taliban fight.
The Taliban’s Diaspora
Before its ejection in late 2001, the Taliban’s governmental structure was similar to those other impoverished Third World, one-party states. The Taliban had a monopoly on the use of force and law enforcement. There were chains of command and a clearly stated, if not always followed, hierarchy of control from Mullah Omar to the regional bureaucrats. But communications were poor and effective decision making was often decentralized outside of Kabul and Kandahar.
The Taliban had nothing that resembled a professional civil service. However, there was a rank order of decision making in the Taliban. Most important decisions were made by Mullah Omar and religious clerics on the basis of their interpretation of religious law. Hiring and promotion was based on performance but also on cronyism and patronage. Within the government, there were rivaling factions, ambitious bureaucrats, petty arguments and other characteristics universal to large organizations. When the Taliban became outcasts, they took this system of governance, with all its assets and idiosyncrasies, and adopted it to the circumstances and environment of their exile.
Leaving Afghanistan, the Taliban looted what remained of the Afghan treasury. In early 2002, the Taliban traded in barter and began to expand its criminal operations. By 2011 the Taliban would raise nearly $400 million per year. This money would come from taxes, donations, and criminal enterprises, to be discussed in chapter seven.[1]
The Taliban needed sanctuary. Mao Tse Tung, recalling his long march to escape Nationalist Chinese forces, defined sanctuary as a strategically located area where insurgents can train and build their forces. The area should provide limited freedom of movement but not for conventional maneuver. In sanctuaries, insurgents can supply, refit, and regroup free of significant enemy interference. The ideal local population would welcome the insurgents. In early 2002, the Taliban certainly found sanctuary in Waziristan. Waziristan is an autonomous tribal zone contiguous to Afghanistan. Stretching 1,500 miles from Baluchistan to the Hindu Kush, it is largely Pashtun, deeply religious, and, for the Taliban, friendly.
When they were scattered into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, they were fortunate to have preexisting logistical networks, madrassas, and charities that served as billeting facilities and, later, bases of operations. As in their earlier climb to power, or phase one in the government’s insurgency model, the Taliban forged amicable relations with local mullahs. In FATA and the Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP), renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Mullah Omar pooled his resources and lent his prestige to local chieftains, some of whom would emerge as important allies.
The Taliban improved relations with Baitullah Mehsud, who forged his local Taliban organization, the TTP, in 2007, as discussed in chapter eight. The bond between Mehsud and Omar was strong but sometimes ambiguous. Mehsud served as the subordinate member of this Taliban team from the beginning, even though he was hosting the fugitive Omar. Even before the TTP was formalized, Mehsud required his forces to prove fealty to Omar as their leader.
The local Taliban under Meshud, in conjunction with the Omar’s exiled Taliban, imposed order on territories that had eluded the Pakistani government’s forces. They punished criminals swiftly and severely. They also suppressed or eliminated village elders who defied them. They enforced Sharia. The Taliban recuperated in Waziristan, and then many dispersed across different regions of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Pashtun belt. Mullah Omar went south to Baluchistan, and so did many other Taliban.
The Taliban received a warm reception from Quetta’s devout and elderly residents in the hardscrabble Baluchi capital. But not everyone welcomed them, and Quetta’s small middle class, particularly its women, detested them. The flood of unemployable and penurious Taliban youth put pressure on the already-fragile economy. Tourism, already weak, declined, and owners of the few cyber cafes faced uncertain prospects.
Within 1 year, clerics openly preached hatred of America and recruited in the cities' madrassas and mosques. In the bazaars, the Taliban hawked jihad paraphernalia – taped speeches of bin Laden and bumper stickers advocating martyrdom. Quetta became no place for the liberal-minded.
The shura appointed four committees -- military, political, cultural, and economic -- to regulate all relevant matters. Other committees would be established. As of mid-2013, Mullah Omar led the Quetta Shura and the other three. He was presumed to live in Quetta. He was assisted by a staff with military and organizational responsibilities. Some of these leaders had overlapping regional responsibilities. The Afghan Taliban had regional military shuras for four major geographical areas of operations. The eponymous shuras were named after the areas in which they were based – Quetta, Peshawar, Miramshah, and Gerdi Jangal.
[1] “Report Says Taliban Raised $400 Million Last Year,” Radio Free Europe, States New Service, September 11, 2012.
