The need for effective climate action is clear. However, progress is slow and the window of opportunity to avoid the worst impacts of climate change is closing. To address the opportunity from a legal perspective, Queen’s Law brought together legal scholars for a December 1-2 conference titled “Institutions for Effective Climate Action: An International & Comparative Perspective.”
The main objectives of this research exchange were threefold: to generate a better understanding of how legal institutions may be contributing to lagging climate action across a range of key policy areas; to develop strategies for ways legal institutions might be better leveraged to enhance climate action; and to create community and research connections.
Abstract:
Hajin Kim
Do market based regulations undercut demand for environmental protection?
An oft-made objection to market-based regulations is that they commoditize pollution; they reduce the moral stigma of pollution because they make it just another product that is bought and sold. If true, the growing popularity of these instruments could reduce the public's care for the environment. This project tests whether regulatory form alters the moral stigma of polluting in general and polluting in compliance with or in violation of the law. I hypothesize that market-based tools can reduce the moral stigma of pollution through the expressive effect of law. But for some, the regulatory form might be considered a taboo trade-off that elicits moral outrage and greater moral stigma of pollution. In addition, the lower perceived efficacy of the market-based tools may also lead people to express greater dismay at the pollution. While there may be a population-level null effect, reactions of sub-populations could contribute to polarization of environmental attitudes.
Rory Gillis
Carbon Pricing and Tax Floor Mechanisms in Federal Nations While there is near-consensus support for carbon pricing among environmental economists and policy experts, carbon pricing routinely encounters political obstacles, including opposition from political leaders, tepid public support, pleas for exemptions from politically-powerful industries, and time inconsistency problems related to changes in government. These problems are especially prominent in federal nations where divided legislative jurisdiction can result in numerous veto points. This article examines how federal nations use tax mechanisms in non-environmental contexts to set "tax floors" -- minimum effective rates for taxes that are highly susceptible to inter-jurisdictional "races to the bottom". It then uses Canada's carbon pricing regime, which imports some of these tax floor mechanisms, to illustrate how these mechanisms can be applied to carbon pricing and to assess their potential and limitations.
