Hereditary monarchy seems like a ridiculous way to pick a leader, yet it dominates most of human political history. We argue the reason is transaction costs: succession systems survive when they settle “who rules next” cheaply enough to prevent recurring civil war.
• Why hereditary monarchy is historically prevalent compared with democracy and universal suffrage
• Why “divine right” stories often rationalize a choice people already find tolerable
• Thomas Paine’s critique of hereditary succession and what it misses
• Hobbes on the state of nature as what happens when sovereignty is contested
• Succession as the master coordination problem of political order
• Transaction costs applied to elections, enforcement, legitimacy, and rent seeking
• Why elective monarchy can become an armed auction for total power
• Bright line rules versus discretionary selection and why speed can beat “better”
• How constitutional design lowers the cost of leadership transition when it works
• The legitimacy problem and why dynasties converge on endogamy
• The genetic consequences of endogamy and the Habsburg cautionary tale
• Twedges, book recommendation, and a listener letter on board game “math trades”
LINKS:
Thomas Paine, Common Sense, February 1776
Michael Munger, The Ugly Pig, 20224
A.P. Martinich, Thomas Hobbes: A Biography, 1999.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651.
Neal Schultz, Suicide Kings: Hereditary Monarchy, 2025
Cosmos Institute, Coasian Bargaining at Scale, 2025
UPDATE: An interesting, and more clearly articulated, application of the reasoning here.... https://aminga.substack.com/p/how-transaction-cost-economics-explains
You can follow Mike Munger on Twitter at @mungowitz
