Shows
MCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)Russellian Descriptions & Gibbardian Indicatives (Two Case Studies Involving Automated Reasoning)Branden Fitelson (Rutgers University) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Computational Metaphysics titled "Russellian Descriptions & Gibbardian Indicatives (Two Case Studies Involving Automated Reasoning)". Abstract: The first part of this talk (which is joint work with Paul Oppenheimer) will be about the perils of representing claims involving Russellian definite descriptions in an "automated reasoning friendly" way. I will explain how to eliminate Russellian descriptions, so as to yield logically equivalent (and automated reasoning friendly) statements. This is a special case of a more general problem -- which is representing philosophical theories/explications in a way that automated reasoning tools...2019-04-2045 minMCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)Accuracy & CoherenceBranden Fitelson (Rutgers University) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Bayesian Methods in Philosophy titled "Accuracy & Coherence". Abstract: In this talk, I will explore a new way of thinking about the relationship between accuracy norms and coherence norms in epistemology (generally). In the first part of the talk, I will apply the basic ideas to qualitative judgments (belief and disbelief). This will lead to an interesting coherence norm for qualitative judgments (but one which is weaker than classical deductive consistency). In the second part of the talk, I will explain how the approach can be applied to comparative...2019-04-2049 minMCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)An "Evidentialist" Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism.Branden Fitelson (Rutgers) gives a talk at the Workshop on Mathematical Philosophy titled "An "Evidentialist" Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism.". Abstract: In this talk, I will raise a potential problem for Joyce's argument for probabilism (and sufficiently similar "accuracy-dominance"-based arguments for probabilism). The problem involves a potential conflict between "accuracy-dominance" (coherence) norms and certain "evidential" norms for credences. An interesting analogy with the case of full belief is also drawn (which connects up with a larger project on the relationship between accuracy, coherence, and evidential norms for various sorts of judgments). This is joint work with Kenny Easwaran.2019-04-2041 min
MCMP – EpistemologyCoherenceBranden Fitelson (Rutgers) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (16 July, 2014) titled "Coherence".2015-02-1800 minMCMP – EpistemologyBelief vs ProbabilityBranden Fitelson (Rutgers) meets Hannes Leitgeb (MCMP/LMU) in a joint session on "Belief vs Probability" at the MCMP workshop "Bridges 2014" (2 and 3 Sept, 2014, German House, New York City). The 2-day trans-continental meeting in mathematical philosophy focused on inter-theoretical relations thereby connecting form and content of this philosophical exchange. Idea and motivation: We use theories to explain, to predict and to instruct, to talk about our world and order the objects therein. Different theories deliberately emphasize different aspects of an object, purposefully utilize different formal methods, and necessarily confine their attention to a distinct field of interest. The desire to enlarge...2014-10-1700 minMCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)Paradoxes of ConsistencyBranden Fitelson (Rutgers/MCMP) gives a talk at the MCMP conference on Paradox and Logical Revision (July 23-25, 2012) titled "Paradoxes of Consistency & (Revising) The Logic of Belief".2012-08-0139 minMCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)Round Table on Coherence (Part 2)Branden Fitelson (Rutgers) and Richard Pettigrew (Bristol) discuss philosophical approaches to coherence, differing perspectives, and formal/conceptual common grounds in part 2 ("Truth Table") of the MCMP Round Table on Coherence (20 July, 2012). Abstract: Recent arguments for probabilistic norms have attempted to justify coherence requirements for (sets of) degrees of confidence solely by appeal to considerations involving their accuracy. Richard Pettigrew, Bristol, and Branden Fitelson, Rutgers, (and their collaborators) have worked extensively on various arguments of this sort. This public MCMP event is to bring their differing approaches and perspectives to one table.2012-07-201h 31MCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)Round Table on Coherence (Part 1)Branden Fitelson (Rutgers) and Richard Pettigrew (Bristol) present formal approaches to coherence in part 1 ("Table of Contents") of the MCMP Round Table on Coherence (20 July, 2012). Abstract: Recent arguments for probabilistic norms have attempted to justify coherence requirements for (sets of) degrees of confidence solely by appeal to considerations involving their accuracy. Richard Pettigrew, Bristol, and Branden Fitelson, Rutgers, (and their collaborators) have worked extensively on various arguments of this sort. This public MCMP event is to bring their differing approaches and perspectives to one table.2012-07-201h 22