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Scientific Sense ®Prof. Ben Levinstein of the University of Illinois on the mind of ChatGPT (Part 2)
Scientific Sense ® by Gill Eapen: Prof. Ben Levinstein is an associate professor at the University of Illinois, who specializes in formal epistemology, decision theory, philosophy of science, and—increasingly—in the ethics and philosophy of artificial intelligence. Much of Ben's past work has developed new accounts of rationality for both belief and action.
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2024-08-201h 10Scientific Sense ®Prof. Ben Levinstein of the University of Illinois on the mind of ChatGPT - Part IScientific Sense ® by Gill Eapen: Prof. Ben Levinstein is an associate professor at the University of Illinois, who specializes in formal epistemology, decision theory, philosophy of science, and—increasingly—in the ethics and philosophy of artificial intelligence. Much of Ben's past work has developed new accounts of rationality for both belief and action.
Please subscribe to this channel:
https://www.youtube.com/c/ScientificSense?sub_confirmation=12024-08-1744 min
MCMP – EpistemologyA Pragmatic Vindication of Epistemic Utility TheoryBen Levinstein (Oxford) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (6 May, 2015) titled "A Pragmatic Vindication of Epistemic Utility Theory". Abstract: Traditionally, probabilism and other norms on partial belief have been motivated from a pragmatic point of view. For instance, as Frank Ramsey long ago showed, if you're probabilistically incoherent, then you're subject to a set of bets each of which you consider fair but which are jointly guaranteed to result in a net loss. Since Joyce's seminal 1998 paper, some epistemologists have shifted course and have tried to establish norms on epistemic states without any recourse to practical rationality. I use...2015-05-1200 min
MCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)Comments on Ben Levinstein's "Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating"Chris Meacham (University of Massachusetts) comments on Ben Levinstein's "Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating" at the 9th Formal Epistemology Workshop (Munich, May 29–June 2, 2012).2012-09-1612 minMCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and UpdatingBen Levinstein (Rutgers) gives a talk at the 9th Formal Epistemology Workshop (Munich, May 29–June 2, 2012) titled "Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating". Abstract: Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010) argue that (1) agents should minimize the expected inaccuracy of their beliefs, and (2) inaccuracy should be measured via the Brier score. They show that in certain diachronic cases, these claims require an alternative to Jeffrey-Conditionalization. I claim that this alternative is an irrational updating procedure and that the Brier score, and quadratic scoring rules generally, should be rejected as legitimate measures of inaccuracy.2012-09-1630 min