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The Plato Paradigm0100 Meno 80bMeno has effectively excused himself from answering again about virtue. Socrates pretends to acknowledge that neither of them knows what virtue is, in order to suggest that they search together for it. Meno immediately raises the eristic argument whereby searching is pointless - either one knows and therefore has no need of searching, or one does not know, which makes searching futile since one would not recognize the thing searched for even if found. This is actually not an eristic argument, but is Meno's appropriation of an eristic question, "Who searches for something, the one who knows, or the one...
2023-06-3014 minThe Plato Paradigm0099 Meno 79eMeno celebrates his aporia, his lack of supply (of answers). He exploits what he has heard about Socrates and his ability to stun, like a torpedo fish, not only himself but anyone who touches him, and portrays himself as yet another one of Socrates' victims.
2023-06-2314 minThe Plato Paradigm0098 Meno 79cSocrates wraps up the series of answers Meno has given about virtue by ensuring that he cannot give a fourth answer without suddenly changing and applying some dialectical thought to the subject.
2023-06-1714 minThe Plato Paradigm0097 Meno 78dSocrates concludes his criticism of Meno's third answer about virtue by labouring the point that an action in itself is neither virtue nor vice [not correcting Meno's notion that the whole of virtue or vice is a particular action], but is virtue if done with a part of virtue (it follows that it is vice if done with a part of vice). Socrates not only shuts down any future answer about virtue which is a particular action, but he also shuts down the addition of justice or soundmindedness or any other part of virtue by treating these as parts of...
2023-06-1014 minThe Plato Paradigm0096 Meno 78cHaving discarded the first part of Meno's third answer concerning virtue, Socrates turns to the second part, and soon establishes that Meno is still thinking of the virtue of the man. Of all the possible ways to refute this yet again, Socrates simply adds "justly" and (instead of "soundmindedly") "piously" to the explanation of virtue, but Meno fails to predict the impending refutation.
2023-06-0214 minThe Plato Paradigm0095 Meno 78bHaving treated the first part of Meno's third answer about virtue last time, this time Socrates explains why it is redundant. Having concluded sophistically last time that there is no one who does not desire good things, Socrates exploits one further assumption made by aristocrats like Meno, that virtue is a characteristic of someone exceptional. If all people desire good things, then this desiring is nothing special, and therefore not part of virtue.
2023-05-2614 minThe Plato Paradigm0094 Meno 77bAfter Meno's third answer to the question, "What is virtue?", that it is someone desiring fine things and being able to acquire them, Socrates begins his examination of the statement by apparently questioning whether there are people who do not desire fine things. Socrates actually indulges in some sleight of hand worthy of a sophist.
2023-05-1914 minThe Plato Paradigm0093 Meno 77aMeno's third answer regarding virtue is "Someone desiring fine things and being able to acquire them". Socrates will begin his examination of this next time, but we already consider some of the problems now.
2023-05-1214 minThe Plato Paradigm0092 Meno 76dSocrates and Meno discuss which of the three sample answers they each prefer, although it isn't clear which one Socrates prefers or why. Socrates entices Meno to continue the discussion by hinting at an initiation into the mysteries. We learn that Meno and Socrates conversed yesterday as well.
2023-05-0514 minThe Plato Paradigm0091 Meno 76cThe third example Socrates gives of the sort of answer he expects from Meno is even worse than the previous two, although Meno accepts this one enthusiastically. The first answer had been that shape is the only thing which always follows colour, and Meno had called that one silly, since the recipient of the answer might not know what colour is; the second, that shape is the end of solid, was performed with Socrates "dialectically" ensuring that Meno accepted all the elements of the answer before giving the answer. Meno has now demanded to know what colour is, so Socrates...
2023-04-2814 minThe Plato Paradigm0090 Meno 76aMeno avoids having to answer again the question what virtue is because Socrates allows him to. Immediately after Socrates' second reply regarding shape, Meno asks what colour is, and Socrates plays the erastes (lover) to Meno's eromenos (beloved), pretending to give in to the demands of the younger man.
2023-04-2114 minThe Plato Paradigm0089 Meno 75dSocrates provides a second definition of "shape" (schema), but this time ensuring that Meno agrees beforehand to the various elements forming the explanation. Things are not as obvious as they seem (obviously).
2023-04-1414 minThe Plato Paradigm0088 Meno 75bSocrates pretends to help Meno give him an answer to the question "What is virtue?", which would explain every virtue, by providing a sample answer to the question "What is shape?", applicable to all shapes. Socrates encourages Meno to criticize it, spurring him on by noting that it's now Meno's turn to answer the question "What is virtue?", which Meno apparently will avoid by any means. Although the answer about shape is very bad, Meno utilizes a stock criticism which he has heard given in an eristic setting (as hinted to by Socrates in his response). Any answer by a...
2023-04-0714 minThe Plato Paradigm0087 Meno 74eSocrates is making a meal out of Meno's inability to give a simple answer to the question what is X in all instances of X. He would like Meno to give an answer to what is shape, for this to serve as an exercise (meletē) towards Meno's later answer regarding virtue. Socrates points out that this "What is X?" problem is applicable to all things, such as shape and colour. Meno bargains with Socrates, as if he will answer concerning virtue if Socrates answers regarding shape. We may already suspect, along with Socrates, that Meno will once more stall after S...
2023-03-3114 minThe Plato Paradigm0086 Meno 74bMeno has recalled Gorgias' two answers concerning virtues perfectly, but one gives many virtues, the other only one virtue, but not applicable to all. He is thus out of options which might satisfy Socrates' question, to say what that virtue is which is in all, and it is up to Socrates to keep the conversation on virtue going. He suggests that they go back and look at shape and shapes which had been mentioned a while ago. We should note that Socrates does not talk about shapes as such, but elements of shape (the round and the straight), just as...
2023-03-2514 minThe Plato Paradigm0085 Meno 73dMeno's second attempt at explaining what virtue is by using Gorgias' other reply out of context is already doomed to failure, but Socrates adds to the problems by deliberately adding to Meno"s "being able to rule humans" the adverb "justly", which is only a part of the general adverb "well", thus inviting a list of many other virtues from Meno which, being virtues, are not the one virtue Socrates is supposedly looking for. Incidentally, Socrates manages to slip into a discussion of general and particular ("virtue", "a virtue") a reference to shapes ("shape", "a shape"), which will become significant...
2023-03-1714 minThe Plato Paradigm0084 Meno 73cSocrates once again asks Meno for an answer given by Gorgias despite having dropped the sophist from the conversation a little earlier. This second answer makes sense in Gorgias' context, but it does not follow in the present context. Socrates therefore is carefully manipulating Meno into making a series of apparent errors. We may ask ourselves why.
2023-03-1014 minThe Plato Paradigm0083 Meno 73aSocrates completes his argument moving virtue away from the "what" to the "how", from particular activities appropriate to types of people and towards virtue as the appropriate way in which any activity is done. This allows all types of people to be good in just one way, common to all - they do what they do "well" - which is in stark contrast to Meno's first answer, the list of many different virtues (= good roles) appropriate to different types of people. This is in line with Socrates' desire to receive an answer pertaining to the one aspect of virtue in...
2023-03-0414 minThe Plato Paradigm0082 Meno 72dSocrates attempts to steer Meno away from regarding virtue as the task appropriate for each particular individual to do, towards the way in which anything is done (well, justly, with self-control). The means by which Socrates attempts to do this suggest that he realizes that Meno is not amenable to strict logical. We may also note that despite Socrates emphasizing that he is looking for the one aspect of virtue, he splits "well" into "justly" and "with self-control", which will become significant shortly.
2023-02-2414 minThe Plato Paradigm0081 Meno 72aSocrates explains that he is looking for the aspect of arete (virtue), the one thing which is common to all the different types of arete.
2023-02-1714 minThe Plato Paradigm0080 Meno 71dSocrates turns the tables. Instead of saying what sort of thing he thinks arete (virtue) is, he manipulates Meno into telling him what Gorgias says arete is. Meno answers in the style of Gorgias, generously and without fear. Each type of person according to gender, age, and social status has an appropriate role or task, and this is a virtue. Meno is happy to say that there are very many virtues, he is that generous. This is surely an answer befitting one who knows what arete is.
2023-02-1014 minThe Plato Paradigm0079 Meno 71bSocrates finally manages to get Meno to react despite not selecting one of the choices Meno gave him regarding the sort of thing arete (virtue) is. Meno reacts to the suggestion that someone not knowing Meno at all would not know what sort of person Meno is, but immediately turns to the scoop that Socrates doesn't know at all what arete (virtue) is ( for which reason Socrates claims not to know what sort of thing arete is).
2023-02-0414 minThe Plato Paradigm0078 Meno 70cSocrates continues his reply to.Meno's first question since Meno fails to react to any of the shocking things Socrates says. Having portrayed Gorgias as a seller of sophia, teaching people to be able to answer any question put to them, and having adopted Meno's conception of abstracts as concrete things, it follows that Gorgias' move from Attica to Thessaly has resulted in a drought of sophia in Attica, meaning that no one in Attica could possible answer Meno's question - and yet Meno fails to conclude that Socrates cannot answer his question; Socrates will have to spell this out...
2023-01-2714 min2023-01-2114 minThe Plato Paradigm0076 Meno 70aMeno's first question is not what it is usually considered to be. It is about the sort of thing arete (virtue) is, and not whether Socrates can tell Meno how to acquire virtue.
2023-01-1414 minThe Plato Paradigm0075 Politeia (Republic)This is a barebones summary of my full analysis of Politeia in my 2015 book entitled Plato's Republic as a Philosophical Drama on Doing Well, Lexington Books, with special emphasis on the explicit use of paradeigmata in the dialogue.
2023-01-0714 minThe Plato Paradigm0074 Hippias Major 4 of 4Final part of the summary of my analysis of Hippias Major.The original analysis was published asHippias Major: An Interpretation (Palingenesia XXXVII), Stuttgart 1991My more recent article assessing Hippias Major and Minor together may be found in“Plato on the Good: Hippias Minor and Hippias Major”, in Y.Z. Liebersohn, I. Ludlam, A. Edelheit edd. For a Skeptical Peripatetic: Festschrift in Honour of John Glucker (Studies in Ancient Moral and Political Philosophy 3), Academia Verlag: Sankt Augustin 2017
2022-12-3014 minThe Plato Paradigm0073 Hippias Major 3 of 4 - The ArgumentsWhat scholars tend to treat as a flawed philosophical argument is actually much worse than that. The dynamics of the dialogue require Socrates to appear impressed by Hippias, while Hippias must appear good (by being expert) to Socrates. Socrates is beneficial in that he continually applies dialectic and attempts to make Hippias think dialectically; Hippias is harmful, especially here, where he attemtps to teach Socrates eristics, the very opposite of dialectics (neither affects the other since they are both static models in this philosophical drama). The question "What is the fine?" is answered and refuted seven times.
2022-12-2314 minThe Plato Paradigm0072 Hippias Major 2 of 4 - Reputation and AudiencesHippias acts as if he is the expert on reputation (eudoxia), on how to appear beneficial despite not being beneficial. Socrates is obliged to frame everything he says in a way which allows Hippias to believe that his audience of one is continually impressed by him. To create more dissonance within this stricture, Socrates invents what I call the Questioner, a rude man who criticizes Socrates; Socrates takes advice from Hippias on eristics, but is thoroughly defeated by the Questioner. This should have made Hippias review his own abilities, but he has no trouble simply distancing himself from Socrates after...
2022-12-1714 minThe Plato Paradigm0071 Hippias Major 1 of 4This is a four-part summary of Hippias Major. I had analysed this dialogue already in the 1980s, and published the analysis in 1991. A thorough read-through of this particularly eristic dialogue would take around 80 episodes. There are other dialogues I would like to analyse now, so it seemed reasonable to produce a short summary updating the published analysis - Hippias Major: an Interpretation.
2022-12-1014 minThe Plato Paradigm0070 Euthyphro Conclusions 3:3This final episode of the Euthyphro series discusses the central idea, its aspects, the paradeigmata, the deigmata, and a red herring
2022-12-0314 minThe Plato Paradigm0069 Euthyphro Conclusions 2 of 3The characters are not only remarkably consistent, but they are also extreme and clear-cut.
2022-11-2614 minThe Plato Paradigm0068 Euthyphro Conclusions 1:3The dialogue's surface argument is philosophically unsatisfactory, to say the least
2022-11-1814 minThe Plato Paradigm0067 Euthyphro 15cIn this last section of the dialogue, we see Euthyphro choosing to walk away rather than propose another definition of the holy (to hosion). Socrates still praises Euthyphro for his wisdom, but in such a way that anyone with thicker skin than Euthyphro would rethink his prosecution of his father. Socrates claims to want to know what the holy is not only to prevent his own case from coming to court, but more generally in order to live better. This provides us with the clue we needed to explain why Socrates is bothering to talk with Euthyphro, to help Euthyphro...
2022-11-1214 minThe Plato Paradigm0066 Euthyphro 14eThe art of commerce seems not to benefit both sides, humans and gods, but humans only. Euthyphro, equating pleasant things with gratitude (keCHARISmena, with CHARIS), explains that the gods receive gratitude (i.e, thanks for goods received from them) in the form of presents. Euthyphro does not see why this is a problem, even when Socrates spells the problem out - the holy as the god-beloved has already been refuted, and those things dear to the gods (theois phila) are none other than god-beloved (theophile). With this wordplay the second definition of holy is finally refuted.
2022-11-0514 minThe Plato Paradigm0065 Euthyphro 14cBy means of question and answer, Euthyphro's suggestion that holy are those things pleasing to the gods, performed through the sacrifices and prayers of humans, is transformed into the holy being the techne of commerce, whereby humans and gods obtain from each other things which they need.
2022-10-2914 minThe Plato Paradigm0064 Euthyphro 14bWe learn a little more about dialectic. The questioner allows the questioned to feel in charge of the conversation, but it is in fact the questioner who steers the conversation by means of the type of questions asked. One of the examples in this dialogue is the sustained attempt by Socrates to turn every concept Euthyphro raises into a version of techne. He has construed Euthyphro's therapeia as techne, and now construes Euthyphro's praying and doing things pleasing to the gods as an episteme of praying and sacrificing, where episteme (knowledge, understanding) stands in for techne (the practical application of...
2022-10-2114 minThe Plato Paradigm0063 Euthyphro 14aWhen pressed to explain what the gods actually do in their therapeia, Euthyhphro avoids the question but actually reveals an important aspect of the holy. Humans, subservient to the gods, pray and do things pleasing to the gods, and these things are holy; things displeasing to the gods are disrespectful and unholy. It is up to the court of the archon basileus to turn away the anger of the gods in cases of potential disrespect (murder, not believing the gods exist), since angry gods do not provide affected households, or the polis as a whole, with the many and fine...
2022-10-1514 minThe Plato Paradigm0062 Euthyphro 13dEuthyphro attempts to explain what he means by dividing justice into the therapeia of gods and the therapeia of men, but Socrates continues to treat therapeia ("tending") as if it is techne (craft). Last time the therapeiai made animals better, while this time the therapeiai lead to positive ends, such as health. Euthyphro's portrayal of the relationship between men and gods as between slaves and masters is not quite the same as Socrates' portrayal of craftsmen as servants. Their masters accomplish good things through the craftsmen, but what good things do the gods achieve through men?
2022-10-0814 minThe Plato Paradigm0061 Euthyphro 13bEuthyphro has defined justice as the therapeia (tending) of gods on the one hand and the therapeia of men on the other. Socrates treats therapeia as if it is techne (skill, craft, art), suggesting that there is an expert for every therapeia, and Euthyphro the expert on the gods naturally agrees. However, while the therapeia of animals leads to their improvement, the therapeia of the gods cannot possibly lead to their improvement, so that it becomes clear (!) that the two types of therapeia are different. To be clear, the therapeia of men was already a rhetorical flourish by Euthyphro, made...
2022-09-3014 minThe Plato Paradigm0060 Euthyphro 12eEuthyphro has made what might appear to be a division of the genus justice into two species - the tending of gods and the tending of men. He has in fact allowed the holy to become the species of justice exemplified by Socrates' court case, and being unable to leave his own court case for a single minute, he has his exemplify justice as the tending of men. When Socrates begins to use "tending" (therapeia) as if it were expertise (techne), Euthyphro goes along with it, because he regards himself as an expert on the gods' attitude towards justice among...
2022-09-2314 minThe Plato Paradigm0059 Euthyphro 12eEuthyphro gives the answer to Socrates' question that the holy is that part of justice which is the therapeia of the gods, while the rest of justice is the therapeia of humans.
2022-09-1714 minThe Plato Paradigm0058 Euthyphro 12cSome background this time. Species = {GENUS: specifying difference} (e.g., Man is ANIMAL: rational: mortal). A species entails other species, and all the species together fully complete all instances of the genus. The genus ANIMAL may be divided into the species God = ANIMAL: rational: immortal; Man = ANIMAL: rational: mortal; Beast = ANIMAL:irrational: mortal; Divine Beast (e.g. Cerberus) = ANIMAL:irrational:immortal. So… Euthyphro agrees to Socrates’ suggestion that the holy is a part of the just. The subsequent example of a division of NUMBER into its two Species - {NUMBER:scalene} and {NUMBER:isosceles} indicates that Socrates is treating the holy...
2022-09-1014 minThe Plato Paradigm0057 Euthyphro 12aHaving just suggested that the just (to dikaion) is part of the holy (to hosion), Socrates purportedly explains what he means by adducing the poet Stasinus who says something which Socrates claims is the opposite (regarding the relationship of the terms), that where there is apprehension there also is reverence/shame. This hardly explains anything, but It does recall the shameful behavior of Euthyphro towards his authority figures, especially his father, although no such connection is made by either speaker.
2022-09-0214 minThe Plato Paradigm0056 Euthyphro 11eFollowing the refutation of the holy as the godloved, and Euthyphro's reluctance to offer an alternative definition, Socrates suggests that the holy is the just (or that holiness is justice), in whole or in part.
2022-08-2714 minThe Plato Paradigm0055 Euthyphro 11cMentioning the legendary sculptor Daedalus eventually allows Socrates to confess that he too is an expert (sophos), albeit an unwilling one. His expertise is in changing not only his own opinions, but those of others as well. This expertise is not rhetoric but dialectic, the art of dialogos, conversation.
2022-08-2014 minThe Plato Paradigm0054 Euthyphro 11bHaving established that the godloved is merely an affect of the holy, Socrates asks Euthyphro again for something which is common to all instances of holy but is not an affect. Euthyphro complains or observes that every attempt at an answer so far has moved around. Instead of pointing out the obvious, that the (very few) suggestions so far have been wrong, Socrates begins to develop the conceit that the answers are like the statues made by Daedalus.
2022-08-1314 minThe Plato Paradigm0053 Euthyphro 10cSocrates continues his examination of the holy as godloved with further observations on the difference between something causing an activity and something described by an activity
2022-08-0614 minThe Plato Paradigm0052 Euthyphro 10bSocrates presents Euthyphro with active and passive participles and verbs in order to impress upon him the nature of cause and effect. An activity is logically prior to a thing described by that activity. A thing described by an activity is not the reason for that activity. This will become relevant to the discussion on the holy defined as the god-loved.
2022-07-3014 minThe Plato Paradigm0051 Euthyphro 10aThe Euthyphro Dilemma - will not be discussed in this series, since it has little to do with this dialogue or with Plato. Instead, we shall be examining the original question at 10a which is effectively the springboard for many and varied discussions about the connection between God and morality.
2022-07-2314 minThe Plato Paradigm0050 Euthyphro 9dEuthyphro finally concludes that what is holy (to hosion) is what all (not some of) the gods love, and that what is unholy (to anosion) is what all (not some of) the gods hate. Euthyphro may seem to have switched from a definition of holy involving the removal of miasma to one involving a divine hatred of injustice, but he is simply describing two aspects of his own god-loved action (prosecuting his father).
2022-07-1514 minThe Plato Paradigm0049 Euthyphro 9cSocrates continues to run rings around Euthyphro with gods loving just acts, hating unjust acts, all the while disagreeing with each other, and yet Euthyphro remains blithely confident that all the gods love his prosecution of his father, and is happy to have the killing at the centre of his court case appear to be hated by all the gods. The subsequent definition of holiness (hosion) and unholiness seems to make all acts outside of Euthyphro's court case either both holy and unholy, or neither holy nor unoly, but Euthyphro is to wrapped up in his court case to notice.
2022-07-0914 minThe Plato Paradigm0048 Euthyphro 9aIt becomes even more apparent that Euthyphro is concerned with to hosion rather than justice, but will use justice as a rhetorical device. Rhetoric is necessary in a court case. Socrates is not so easily influenced by rhetoric, and he dwells on the legal difficulties of Euthyphro's case.
2022-07-0214 minThe Plato Paradigm0047 Euthyphro 8dEuthyphro is motivated by to hosion (the holy) to prosecute his father (the prosecution will remove the pollution of murder). Socrates has contrived a portrayal of the gods whereby they are in conflict with each other primarily because they disagree who among them acts justly or unjustly in any given action. This nonsensical portrayal is based on opinions held by Euthyphro, which is why Euthyphro agrees with it. Socrates finally begins to bring this new emphasis on the problematic nature of justice to bear on Euthyphro's prosecution of his father.
2022-06-2514 minThe Plato Paradigm0046 Euthyphro 8bSocrates continues his questioning of Euthyphro's reply that the holy is what is loved by the gods. Euthyphro insists that all the gods love his prosecution of his father's unjust killing of one of their bondsmen.
2022-06-1814 minThe Plato Paradigm0045 Euthyphro 7cSocrates continues to examine Euthyphro's suggestion that the holy (to hosion) is what is loved by the gods.
2022-06-1114 minThe Plato Paradigm0044 Euthyphro 6eSocrates asks for a paradigm of the holy, effectively a definition of the holy (to hosion). Euthyphro suggests the god-loved, the dear-to-the-gods (to prosphiles). Socrates begins his examination of the definition by asking over what we have disagreements. We do not disagree over things which may be measured objectively.
2022-06-0414 minThe Plato Paradigm0043 Euthyphro 6dThe stage is set for the ostensibly more philosophical part of the dialogue. Socrates has made Euthyphro his unofficial teacher; Euthyphro accepts that he was the one who brought up the notion of one thing common to many things (idea is a general aspect; eidos is a particular aspect). Everything is ready for a discussion of the common aspect of to hosion (the holy), next time.
2022-05-2714 minThe Plato Paradigm0042 Euthyphro 6bGiven that they are paradeigmata of aspects of the idea of the holy (to hosion), Euthyphro and Socrates are faithfully extreme in features pertaining to those aspects. Euthyphro believes everything about mythology. Belief in mythology may therefore be understood to be a feature of one of the aspects of the holy.
2022-05-2114 minThe Plato Paradigm0041 Euthyphro 6aHow does Euthyphro intend to use his mythological justification for prosecuting his father? Socrates apparently doesn't know what Euthyphro does, which he says is why he will agree with Euthyphro, his teacher, the one who knows, concerning the holy.
2022-05-1414 minThe Plato Paradigm0040 Euthyphro 5dSocrates asks his "teacher" Euthyphro what the holy and the unholy (hosion, anosion) are, and Euthyphro explains that prosecuting his unjust father is holy. He points to the precedents of Zeus binding his unjust father Kronos, and Kronos castrating his unjust father Ouranos.
2022-05-0714 minThe Plato Paradigm0039 Euthyphro 5bSocrates takes the next steps towards becoming Euthyphro's student of holiness (to hosion, he hosiotes). In the process he sneakily introduces irreverence (to asebes, he asebeia) and the concept of aspect (idea, cf. eidos).
2022-04-2914 minThe Plato Paradigm0038 Euthyphro 4eSince Euthyphro claims to know about divine things - the holy and the unholy (hosion and anosion) - accurately, Socrates prepares the ground for a discussion of the holy by pretending to become a pupil of Euthyphro (although Euthyphro is not a sophist) as if in order to defend himself against Meletus, either in his trial, or in a counter-trial. Socrates and Euthyphro are both extreme characters, something which needs to be taken into account: they are deigmata of paradeigmata of "to hosion", and aspects of a concept are as clear-cut as the concept itself.
2022-04-2214 minThe Plato Paradigm0037 Euthyphro 4cEuthyphro describes the events leading up to the death of the person on whose behalf he is prosecuting his father. Euthyphro's family claim his prosecution of his father for murder to be anosion (unholy), but he claims to know exactly what hosion and anosion mean. He and his family appear to agree that what is anosion causes miasma (pollution).
2022-04-1514 minThe Plato Paradigm0036 Euthyphro 4cEuthyphro explains why a murderer should be prosecuted by a family member. Both the murderer and the family member have pollution (miasma) and need to remove it through a trial in a court of law. We also have our first indirect mention of the concept hosion. Since this will be under discussion throughout the dialogue, we may simply delimit it here as pertaining to the gods. It is often translated as "holy".
2022-04-0914 minThe Plato Paradigm0035 Euthyphro 3eSocrates and Euthyphro turn to a discussion of Euthyphro's prosecution, and Euthyphro defends his decision to prosecute his father for murder.
2022-04-0114 minThe Plato Paradigm0034 Euthyphro 3cBeing and appearance: Euthyphro regards himself and Socrates as fellow predictors of the future; the Many regard Euthyphro as mad (lacking a sophia), but Socrates as possessing a sophia concerning new gods with which he corrupts the young; Socrates, for dialectical purposes, appears to attribute to Euthyphro sophist-like qualities, such as a sophia (the ability to predict the future) and exhibiting himself, which he does not attribute to himself.
2022-03-2614 minThe Plato Paradigm0033 Euthyphro 2dEuthyphro, being a seer in his spare time,considers Socrates to be unjustly charged with inventing new gods (as if the writ itself is an act of injustice). Meletus, Socrates' prosecutor, and the Many, do not take seriously the idea of a personal daemon, and fail to understand Socrates' daimonion (demonic power). Euthyphro identifies with Socrates as a victim of the Many, since Euthyphro himself is (according to him) similarly mocked in the people's assembly whenever he predicts the future.
2022-03-1714 minThe Plato Paradigm0032 Euthyphro 2bSocrates describes his accuser, Meletus, to Euthyphro, and emphasizes how young he is both through the direct description of his appearance and through the agricultural image of a farmer weeding out older plants. Meletus was the actual prosecutor in 399 BC, but he was put up to it by a powerful radical democrat, Anytus, who is not mentioned here (he appears in another dialogue, Meno). Despite appearances, the dialogue is not about Socrates' trial per se.
2022-03-1114 minThe Plato Paradigm0031 Euthyphro 2aThis is the second Platonic dialogue to be analysed in this podcast. Euthyphro and Socrates meet outside the Stoa of the Archon King and begin to discuss their respective cases concerning offences to the gods
2022-03-0414 minThe Plato Paradigm0030 Hippias Minor The Paradigm ShiftIn this final episode on Hippias Minor we see how the dialogue is a dramatization of the consequences of the Many's misconstrual of appearance as a good in itself. Plato has made concrete three aspects of dynamis (ability/power) in the form of the paradeigmata "dialectician" (representing true ability as a means), and two paradeigmata for dynamis treated as a good end in itself - "aristocrat" (social ability/power), "craftsman" (technical ability). These paradeigmata are made palatable for a dialogue by adding personalizing details to them to make them deigmata, embellished copies of the paradeigmata. "Dialectician" becomes a deigma with...
2022-02-2614 minThe Plato Paradigm0029 Hippias Minor ConclusionsConclusions are made regarding Plato's point in writing Hippias Minor, and how he went about writing it.
2022-02-1814 minThe Plato Paradigm0028 Hippias Minor 376aSocrates finally concludes that if anyone performs injustice willingly, it is the just man, but neither Hippias nor Socrates is happy with this conclusion. It is often said that the dialogue ends in aporia, but there was never any dialectical attempt to define a concept in any case. The eristic debate finishes in favour of Hippias, who may now be sure to have some new students. Socrates has failed in his attempt to make Hippias realize the true nature of ability, as a means, and not a good end in itself.
2022-02-1214 minThe Plato Paradigm0027 Hippias Minor 375dSocrates makes one last attempt to have Hippias realize that ability is only a means and not a good end in itself. He posits justice as an ability. Were justice really an ability, we would need to regard it as an ability with necessarily good ends (were it to have bad ends, it would not be justice); but Hippias regards justice itself, being an ability, as good in itself, and for him this ability, like all others, is then free to have bad ends.
2022-02-0414 minThe Plato Paradigm0026 Hippias Minor 375bSocrates continues to attempt to make Hippias rethink the notion that ability per se is good. Having questioned whether doing bad willingly (with ability) is better than doing bad unwillingly (without ability, and hence without choice) with regard to inanimate tools, he continues with animate tools (e.g., horses and slaves) whose souls do bad from choice (being able), and Hippias prefers even them to those who do bad unwillingly (without ability), but Hippias balks at the notion that we ourselves might do bad willingly.
2022-01-2814 minThe Plato Paradigm0025 Hippias Minor 374eIn this eristic movement concerning the choice between two equally bad outcomes, one with ability (willingly) and one without ability (unwillingly) Socrates moves from inanimate tools to animate tools, such as horses, dogs, archers, where the worthless soul is less preferable because the outcome is bad without ability.
2022-01-2114 minThe Plato Paradigm0024 Hippias Minor 374bSocrates continues his attempts to make Hippias realize that ability is a means, and not a good end in itself, by asking which bad end is preferable, the one by choice (with ability) or the one without choice (without ability). His examples turn to parts of the body.
2022-01-1514 minThe Plato Paradigm0023 Hippias Minor 373dIs the intentional or the unintentional wrongdoer better? Hippias effectively contradicts his escape clause (where he pointed out that the intentional wrongdoer is considered by the Many to be worse) by choosing the intentional wrongdoer (Hippias has built his reputation upon the Many's admiration of ability per se). However, as he points out, the fields Socrates has chosen are running, wrestling, and other physical pursuits. The implication is that they have nothing to do with criminal wrongdoing and therefore should not lead to a refutation of his escape clause.
2022-01-0714 minThe Plato Paradigm0022 Hippias Minor 373cEudicus brings Hippias back into the conversation. Hippias agrees to be questioned again. Socrates exploits Hippias' attempted escape clause to move the conversation from the ability to lie to the ability to do wrong.
2022-01-0114 minThe Plato Paradigm0021 Hippias Minor 373aSocrates cashes in on his investment at the beginning of the dialogue. Eudicus is availed upon to bring Hippias back into the conversation. Socrates is now able to play on Hippias' two contradictory criteria by which the ability to do wrong is either good or bad.
2021-12-2614 minThe Plato Paradigm0020 Hippias Minor 372cSocrates does not allow Hippias to escape, but begins buttering up Hippias in an effort to return him to the conversation. This does not work, and Hippias remains uncooperative. Socrates will move on to stronger tactics next time. All of this marks the transition between the first and second major arguments of the dialogue.
2021-12-1814 minThe Plato Paradigm0019 Hippias Minor 371dSocrates springs the double trap. Hippias escapes by moving the goalposts, from simple lying (the able person can lie or tell the truth at will and is therefore better) to injustice (no able person doing injustice willingly is considered better than one doing injustice unwillingly). This is not opening up the discussion, but an attempt by Hippias to end the discussion with the crowd still on his side.
2021-12-1114 minThe Plato Paradigm0018 Hippias Minor 370eSocrates at the beginning of the eristic debate had made Hippias interpret "polytropos" negatively as "unsimple" and "lying", making Odysseus very bad in contrast to Achilles the truthful and simple. Under pressure, Hippias has had to add "willingly", so that the evil Odysseus lies willingly. Socrates now springs an eristic surprise on Hippias, a double trap emphasizing the ability both of Hippias and Achilles to lie willingly.
2021-11-2714 minThe Plato Paradigm0017 Hippias Minor 369dSocrates demonstrates how Homeric characters should be analysed - by comparing what they say with what they do. Could Plato be hinting at the way Platonic characters should be analysed? Socrates provocatively calls Achilles a liar for declaring his intention to go home, while never actually making any preparations.
2021-11-2014 minThe Plato Paradigm0016 Hippias Minor 369cSocrates derails Hippias' attempt to turn the eristic competition into a rhetorical competition. Socrates praises Hippias while incidentally touching upon the art of learning and the art of judging character.
2021-11-1614 minThe Plato Paradigm0015 Hippias Minor 368eSocrates allows Hippias to escape being refuted, and Hippias proposes a straight rhetorical debate with speech and counter-speech, to prove that the true Achilles and the false Odysseus are two different people. The audience (Eudicus and friends) would decide.
2021-11-1214 minThe Plato Paradigm0014 Hippias Minor 368aHippias polytropos. Socrates never calls Hippias explicitly "polytropos", but he does point out how many technai (skills) Hippias is an expert in. He also goes out of his way to indicate that Hippias is always advertising his expertise in many technai. Hippias, then, is a deigma for the polytropos, but a rather useless polytropos since the products of his various types of expertise are used simply in order to show that he is the polytropos.
2021-11-0914 minThe Plato Paradigm0013 Hippias Minor 367dHippias is happy for Socrates to publicize Hippias' ability in calculation, geometry, and astronomy, although Hippias' ability to lie and tell the truth in all these fields would seem to aid Socrates' general argument that the false and the true man are one and the same. Hippias is supposed to be defending the position that the true man is better than the false man, who is someone else (just as Achilles is supposed to be better than Odysseus).
2021-11-0614 minThe Plato Paradigm0012 Hippias Minor 367aSocrates eristically refutes Hippias' claim that Achilles is better than Odysseus by arguing that the true and the false are actually the same, but Hippias just as eristically escapes the refutation. Socrates until now had incidentally shown that Hippias is most able at calculation, but now Hippias in his escape allows Socrates to show that Hippias is most polytropos, as we'll see next time.
2021-11-0214 minThe Plato Paradigm0011 Hippias Minor 366dSo what was Hippias' prepared speech on Achilles, Nestor, and Odysseus about? And for what purpose? Being most able and most polytropos is distinguished.
2021-10-2914 minThe Plato Paradigm0010 Hippias Minor 366aSocrates seems to have no idea how to win.an eristic debate. Instead of making the audience laugh at Hippias, he allows the sophist to agree that he, Hippias, is the most able, most expert, and best, at arithmetic.
2021-10-2214 minThe Plato Paradigm0009 Hippias Minor 365dHomer is finally dropped from the conversation. Hippias will say what he and Homer think... Socrates asks about the false person, and Hippias in response, because of eristic choices (Black or White, no Grey) offered by Socrates, attributes to the false person: ability, prudence, and expertise.
2021-10-1614 minThe Plato Paradigm0008 Hippias Minor 365bSocrates uses the eristic debate to predict what Hippias will say. Because Socrates attributes polytropos to Achilles, Hippias is required by eristics to give the term a negative connotation and reattribute it to Odysseus. LSJ, the Greek-English Lexicon, says that Plato gives the term this negative connotation, and makes Hippias' temporary wordplay an acceptable usage.
2021-10-1214 minThe Plato Paradigm0007 Hippias Minor 364eSocrates is confused about the most obvious thing in Homer's Odyssey, applying Odysseus' epithet to Achilles. Hippias then has to explain that Achilles is better than Odysseus precisely because Achilles is not polytropos while Odysseus is. Socrates' trap is sprung.
2021-10-0714 minThe Plato Paradigm0006 Hippias Minor 364cApparently Hippias has a prepared speech for his exhibitions in which he claims that Homer made Achilles the best, Nestor the most expert, and Odysseus the most polytropos. Socrates is puzzled (only) by the last example, despite this epithet appearing in the first line of the Odyssey.
2021-10-0614 minThe Plato Paradigm0005 Hippias Minor 364bThe changing faces of Socrates' first question about Achilles and Odysseus. What is the connection between Hippias and the three Homeric heroes, Achilles, Nestor, and Odysseus?
2021-10-0114 minThe Plato Paradigm0004 Hippias Minor 363cSocrates, Hippias, and Eudicus cooperate to create a competition between Socrates and Hippias.
2021-09-3014 minThe Plato Paradigm0003 Hippias Minor 363bSocrates begins spinning his web. Using Eudicus' father, Socrates restricts Hippias, who hasn't even entered this conversation yet, to discussing just Achilles and Odysseus, and to supporting Achilles as the better hero, which everyone knows to be true anyway: he is aristos (best) in the Iliad.
2021-09-2514 minThe Plato Paradigm0002 Hippias Minor 363aWhy is Socrates silent? Who is Eudicus? These and other non-philosophical questions meet us immediately at the beginning of Plato's Hippias Minor
2021-09-2314 minThe Plato Paradigm0001 Plato and ParadigmsHow did Plato really intend his dialogues to be read? If everything in a dialogue is taken into account, we don't need to guess. In this series, I'll demonstrate with a close reading of a few short dialogues what Platonic dialogues are actually about. No previous experience is required, and indeed may actually be an advantage.
2021-09-2014 min