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Richard Pettigrew (Bristol)

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Seize the Moment PodcastSeize the Moment PodcastRichard Pettigrew: Are You the Same Person You Were Years Ago? | STM Podcast #117On episode 117, we welcome philosopher Richard Pettigrew to discuss ‘The Russian Nobleman’ thought experiment, what makes you a self, whether we should be held to the commitments made earlier in life, the notion of the perpetually dying self and how it can alleviate the terror of death, how the philosophical construct of the self can help but also harm others, the self in clinical psychology and what constitutes pathology, and whether “inauthentic” sources can create “authentic” choices. Richard Pettigrew is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bristol, with particular interests in formal epistemology, philosophy of mathematics, logic, and the theory o...2022-01-231h 04LSE PodcastsLSE PodcastsThe Occult [Audio]Speaker(s): Professor Lauren Kassell, Professor Richard Pettigrew, Dr Nisha Ramayya | Join us as we delve into the mystic just in time for Halloween. Philosophy often presents itself as founded on logic and rationality, but even the most rigorous of us must concede that the world can be a strange place. So how does philosophy contend with the mysterious and the inexplicable? Can it really be logic all the way down, or might rationality stand on something a little spookier? Lauren Kassell is Professor of History of Science and Medicine, University of Cambridge. Richard Pettigrew is Professor of Philosophy, University...2019-10-301h 27MCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)MCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal PrincipleRichard Pettigrew (University of Bristol) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle"2019-04-201h 09Moral Sciences ClubMoral Sciences ClubChoosing for Changing SelvesA talk given by Richard Pettigrew (Bristol) at the Moral Sciences Club on 9th October 2018.2018-10-1146 minMCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)MCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)What chance-credence norms should not beRichard Pettigrew (Bristol) gives a talk at the 9th Formal Epistemology Workshop (Munich, May 29–June 2, 2012) titled "What chance-credence norms should not be".2012-09-1635 minMCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)MCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)Tutorial Decision Theory I: Decision theory in epistemologyRichard Pettigrew (Bristol) gives part I of his tutorial in decision theory (28 June 2012) titled "Decision theory in epistemology".2012-08-011h 24MCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)MCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)Tutorial Decision Theory II: ConditionalizationRichard Pettigrew (Bristol) gives part II of his tutorial in decision theory (28 June 2012) titled "Conditionalization".2012-08-0151 minMCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)MCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)Round Table on Coherence (Part 2)Branden Fitelson (Rutgers) and Richard Pettigrew (Bristol) discuss philosophical approaches to coherence, differing perspectives, and formal/conceptual common grounds in part 2 ("Truth Table") of the MCMP Round Table on Coherence (20 July, 2012). Abstract: Recent arguments for probabilistic norms have attempted to justify coherence requirements for (sets of) degrees of confidence solely by appeal to considerations involving their accuracy. Richard Pettigrew, Bristol, and Branden Fitelson, Rutgers, (and their collaborators) have worked extensively on various arguments of this sort. This public MCMP event is to bring their differing approaches and perspectives to one table.2012-07-201h 31MCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)MCMP – Mathematical Philosophy (Archive 2011/12)Round Table on Coherence (Part 1)Branden Fitelson (Rutgers) and Richard Pettigrew (Bristol) present formal approaches to coherence in part 1 ("Table of Contents") of the MCMP Round Table on Coherence (20 July, 2012). Abstract: Recent arguments for probabilistic norms have attempted to justify coherence requirements for (sets of) degrees of confidence solely by appeal to considerations involving their accuracy. Richard Pettigrew, Bristol, and Branden Fitelson, Rutgers, (and their collaborators) have worked extensively on various arguments of this sort. This public MCMP event is to bring their differing approaches and perspectives to one table.2012-07-201h 22